(tē•kün) To mend, repair and transform the world.

TIKKUN


BLACKS & JEWS

Jonathan Kaufman, Paul Berman, William Strickland, Hillel Levine & Lawrence Harmon

A BIMONTHLY JEWISH CRITIQUE OF POLITICS, CULTURE & SOCIETY JULY/AUGUST 1988 $5.00

Kitty Dukakis
An Interview

Nature, Science & Domination
Steven Vogel



The Common Good
Robert Bellah & William Sullivan

Racial Politics
Clayborne Carson

ISRAEL UPDATE
The Unilateral Option
Tzvi Marx

The Art Scene
Marx Wartofsky

Freud
Phyllis Grosskurth

The Elections
David Twersky

PLUS

Deborah Hertz on German Jewish Women; Nan Fink on American Family Celebration; Bonnie Smith on Sex in America; Shabtai Teveth & Idith Zertal Debate Ben Gurion's Role During the Holocaust; Sanford Levinson & Louis René Beres Debate the Killing of Abu Jihad; Fiction by Robert Ehle; Reviews by Norman Weinstein, Laurence Jarvik, Nancy Strickland; Poetry by Daryl Hine & Christopher Salvesen.

T.E.L.

To lighten his sad eyes you did it all;
The freedom you had wrought in Eros' name
(Hearing he had died before you came
Through silken dust to see Damascus fall),
You threw away, who afterwards could claim
Not anywhere now rest and peace at all
Unless in self-denial, secret, small
Acts of kindness, penitence and shame.

The saints' besetting sin is, being wrong,
And their redeeming grace, it could not matter
Less if what they worshipped was not there.
You erred about the Arabs and the air:
The former proved ungrateful, and the latter
An element where men do not belong.

Panta Rhei

The illusory stability of things,
Smoke without which there can be no fire,
Shimmers in the updraft that desire
Creates, material imaginings,
Objects as fragile as relationships,
Irreplaceable so cherished at some cost.
Fabric rips, valuables get lost,
And though it has no feelings china chips,
Like people whom things must not be confused
With, too often smashed to smithereens
Or nobbled in the deadly undertow
Of daily life, negligently abused.

But what if all this flim-flam simply means,
Ourselves apart, that nothing moves at all?
What rider does not know
The disconcerting, transient sensation
As a train begins to leave the station
Of stationary motion,
Refreshment and shoe-shine stand, newspaper stall
And platform appearing to slide away, although
In fact the world stands still and still we flow.

—*Daryl Hine*

Daryl Hine's books include Resident Alien, Daylight Saving, *and* Academic Festival Overtures.

TIKKUN

A BIMONTHLY JEWISH CRITIQUE OF POLITICS, CULTURE & SOCIETY — VOLUME 3 NUMBER 4

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Cover art: *"Moving In,"* by Stephanie Weber. Mixed media painting on wood panel, 48"×96". California artist Stephanie Weber is represented by the Littlejohn-Smith Gallery in New York City. Her mixed media paintings have been exhibited at the Skirball Museum in Los Angeles, the Jewish Museum in New York, and the San Francisco Fine Arts Museum.

TIKKUN UPLIFTS JEWISH, INTERFAITH, AND SECULAR PROPHETIC VOICES OF HOPE THAT CONTRIBUTE TO UNIVERSAL LIBERATION

A catalyst for long-term social change, we empower people and communities to heal the world by embracing revolutionary love, compassion, and empathy. We support ethical, spiritual, economic, and political ideas that seek to replace the ethos of selfishness, materialism, nationalism, and capitalism with an ethos of generosity, caring for everyone on the planet (including animals), and every attempt to build local and global solidarity while enhancing love.

Tikkun magazine grew out of the empirical research of the Institute for Labor and Mental Health chaired by Rabbi Michael Lerner, which focused on the stress that people often experience in the world of work and which is often brought home into personal life. We discovered that the capitalist ethos is held together by a series of beliefs that must be dismantled in order to build a society that strengthens the love and caring relationships in both families and friendship circles. **Among those toxic beliefs:**

I. The fantasy that we live in a meritocracy, create our own world, and hence have only ourselves to blame if things are not turning out in the way that we might have wished. While we encourage people to do what they can to make their lives more fulfilling, we also want people to understand what we are all up against: the vast inequalities of wealth and power by the top 10 percent of wealth holders (in the US and globally), and thru that their ability to exercise the control over the media and much of the educational systems and large corporations.

2. **This self-blaming is reinforced by a political system** that makes it very difficult for ordinary citizens to believe that they can have any substantial impact on changing the system. Whether in politics or in personal life, people tell each other that seeking major changes is unrealistic and that they themselves are unrealistic if they think they can achieve major changes.

3. Many people have religious or spiritual beliefs that incline them to want to live in a society where people care for each other and for the planet. Yet most of the movements for societal change ignore or even ridicule those beliefs, driving many to embrace the Right Wing movements that welcome them. **Tikkun brings to public expression those very hopes and yearnings that have been denied so long and suppressed so deeply that we no longer know they are there.** Thus we advocate for far-reaching approaches that include pushing Israel to help Palestinians establish their own independent state living in peace with Israel, a Global Marshall Plan, and the ESRA Environmental and Social Responsibility Amendment to the US Constitution.

We created Tikkun magazine to bring these ideas to a large constituency. We strived to provide a wide, open, and welcoming tent - a space for rich intellectual, spiritual, and political exploration. For that reason, we published many articles from a wide variety of belief systems and religions, not all of which we agreed. We believe that people learn and grow by reading perspectives different from their own.

We are **no longer in print**. We struggled to raise enough money because of the controversial positions we take. On one hand, some progressives dismiss spiritual discourse as inherently flakey or reactionary, see our position on Israel as too soft, and are unhappy with our refusal to engage in demeaning discourse, such as labeling all whites as racists or all men as sexist, even as we called for reparations for victims of every form of historical oppressions. Many liberals, on the other hand, found our criticisms of Israel too upsetting and our advocacy for the human rights and dignity of Palestinians too challenging.

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Letters

Tikkun *reserves the right to select, edit, and shorten all submissions to the Letters section.*

ISRAEL

To the Editor:

Your fine publication continues to give broad coverage to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's "peace mission" and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's opposition. Shultz is being touted everywhere as the man of peace and Shamir as the uncompromising obstruction to lions and lambs lying down together in the Middle East.

But will history prove Mr. Shultz another Neville Chamberlain? Shultz knows that the PLO came into existence in 1964, three years prior to any "occupied territories," with its sole purpose being to expunge Israel from the Middle East—and that its bottom line has not been modified. Yasir Arafat's top advisor, Hani al-Hassan, recently stated: "The support granted by the Palestinians of Jaffa and Nazareth proves that the battle is over the whole of Palestine." Yet Mr. Shultz presses on with his shuttle diplomacy and "compromises."

I was recently asked to address Prime Minister Shamir when he was in Los Angeles. Our Christian delegation reminded him that we are praying for the true peace of Jerusalem—not a piece by piece destruction of Israel that could be the unintended result of the Shultz pressure.

My hope is that Shultz's compromises will not find the fertile ground that was accorded Chamberlain's appeasement. Just as surely as Hitler had forewarned the world of his intentions in *Mein Kampf*, so a sworn PLO covenant decrees the destruction of Israel and the absorption of Jordan. Shultz's plan may have emotional appeal. So did Chamberlain's. However, the facts are all on Shamir's side. This is why it is Mr. Shultz, not Mr. Shamir, who is the real impediment to peace.

Rev. Frank Eiklor
Shalom Ministries
Orange, California

To the Editor:

The following is an open letter to Prime Minister Shamir:

I can no longer remain silent. I must do something, however small, to protest the treatment of the Arabs in the occupied territories. For twenty years these people have been ignored and used by the Arab countries in the Middle East; for twenty years they have been ignored, used, and subjugated by the State of Israel. It is time for an intelligent, just, and moral solution to this ugly situation.

Aside from writing, there is only one other small form of pressure that I can apply to the State of Israel. I have three Israel Bonds which are due for renewal. I am going to cash them in instead. This is not an insignificant

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action. All across the United States religious and nonreligious Jews are appalled at the callous and dishonorable behavior of the Israeli government toward the Arabs living in the occupied territories. If we were all to cash in our bonds, it would indicate to the world, the Israeli government, and the Israeli protesters that American Jews will not stand by in silence while Israeli politicians oppress the people of Gaza and the West Bank and destroy the credibility of the State of Israel.

The decision to cash in my bonds was not an easy one. As a child I attended Israel Bond fundraising dinners at my grandparent's home in Pittsburgh. My father was an Israel Bond chairman and has a photograph of himself with Golda Meir hanging on the wall in his house.

But Jews cannot unequivocally support the State of Israel when its behavior is unethical. There comes a time when we have to stand and say that the importance of a Jewish state to our psyches and to the real world cannot legitimize the use of immoral practices. It is time to end the occupation and to negotiate security and peace for Israel.

Leslie Kermath
Allenspark, Colorado

To the Editor:

There are eighteen or more countries in the Arab league, not to mention the additional non-Arab Moslem countries of Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and North Africa; as well as countries with large Moslem populations, such as Turkey, the Philippines, India, and the Soviet Union. Two-thirds of the territory arbitrarily called "Palestine" is now known as Jordan. Why can't the Palestinian Arabs find a home?

At the time of Israel's 1948 War of Independence, 850,000 Jews fled from Arab lands to escape persecution and murder. In contrast, 540,000 Palestinian Arabs voluntarily left Israel at the urging of their leaders, so that the invading Arab armies "could purge the land of Jews." Arab nations confiscated approximately eleven billion dollars in property from Jews in Arab lands—five times that amount abandoned in Israel by the Arabs.

In this postwar population and property exchange, Israel, a tiny country about the size of New Jersey, absorbed 600,000 Jewish refugees from Arab lands. Why of all the people displaced in the post-World War II period, including tens of millions of Germans, Koreans, Africans, Hindus, and Moslems, have only the Palestinian Arabs remained perpetual refugees? How is it that the Arab nations, with their vast wealth and territory, have unlimited resources for Palestinian terrorism and no resources for Palestinian resettlement? According to Kahaled Al-Azm, prime minister of Syria in 1948:

> We Arabs brought disaster upon Arab refugees by inviting them and bringing pressure to bear upon them to leave.... We have rendered them dispossessed. We have accustomed them to begging.... We have participated in lowering their moral and social level.... Then we exploited them in executing crimes of murder, arson, and throwing bombs upon ... men, women, and children—all this in the service of political purposes.

After forty years, isn't it time for the Arab nations to stop maintaining their fellow Arabs as stateless refugees for purposes of political manipulation and terrorism, and instead, to accept them as immigrants.

Linda Weinstein
Saratoga, California

To the Editor:

Most Israelis rightly believe that negotiating with the PLO could lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza that would be governed by the PLO. Israeli supporters of the right-wing parties and even many of the Labor party see the establishment of a PLO-led state as a mortal danger to the very existence of Israel.

Why are most Israelis so very afraid even of the idea of a PLO state? These fears are partly based on Israel's experiences with the PLO: on the memories of numerous killings of Israeli and other Jewish civilians (including children) by the PLO. Their fears are also based on the PLO founding "covenant" which states as the goal of the PLO the elimination of the Jewish state. Even though the PLO declared a readiness to agree to a Palestinian state in a part of Palestine, the PLO has never clearly retracted its original "covenant" nor its policy of "armed struggle." The PLO's "armed struggle" means the fight for national liberation to Palestinians; to Israeli Jews, however, it means terror against innocent civilians, including children. The fears of the PLO and of a state led by it are connected in Israelis' minds with the belief that going back to the pre-1967 borders would be suicidal for Israel and that those borders are indefensible. Actually, Israel won more decisively the wars of 1948, 1956, and 1967 with the allegedly "indefensible" borders than it did with the wider borders in the wars of 1973 and 1982.

On a deeper psychological level, the Israelis experience subconsciously the PLO and a PLO state as Nazis, as implacable enemies who are determined to annihilate the Jewish state and the Jewish people. Most Israelis have an insufficient awareness of their own power to influence Arab thinking and feeling about Israel, to strengthen or to weaken Arab hatred and extremism or moderation.

What are the real dangers of a PLO-led state to Israel? Militarily a PLO state would be much weaker than Israel and it is therefore most unlikely that it would dare to start a war against Israel. The fears of increased terror against Israel based in a PLO state are also unrealistic. Since the PLO state would not want to be reoccupied by Israel, it would have to refrain from supporting terror against Israel, like Jordan does. The achievement of the Palestinian's national goals of self-determination and of a Palestinian state is very likely to reduce the Palestinians' hatred of Israel and the motivation for joining anti-Israel terror groups.

A PLO state would economically be very weak and dependent on possibilities of work in Israel for its citizens. This would discourage any ideas of terror or war against Israel in the new state. It would also encourage economic, scientific, and technological cooperation with Israel.

By comparison, continuation of Israel's rule over the Palestinians of West

Errata

In John B. Judis's review of *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics* by Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, the publisher should have been listed as Hill & Wang.

Bank and Gaza is very likely to keep increasing the hatred of Israel in both the Palestinian people and in the surrounding Arab countries. Therefore, the continued occupation is likely to increase the motivation for terror against Israel. Within Israel, the occupation reduces the loyalty of its Arab citizens as well as the pride of its Jewish people in their state. The continued occupation with its military suppression of the Palestinians is likely to weaken the Israeli Jews' heroic fighting spirit and their feeling that they are undoubtedly right. This spirit has been a stronger factor in Israel's past wars than has been the shape of its borders.

Isaac Zieman
New York, New York

To the Editor:

In your editorial, "The Occupation: Immoral and Stupid" (March 1988), you have managed to state both sides of the dispute quite fully, but your emphasis is misplaced. It is not the place of American Jews to tell Israel unequivocally that the occupation cannot continue. The entire world must belatedly express to the Palestinians that they can no longer reject the legitimacy of the State of Israel.

You base your moral outrage on the biblical command of "one law shall be for you and the *ger*." You state that "there is no right to the land of Israel if Jews oppress the *ger*, the widow, the orphan, or any other group that is powerless." Since when are the images of Arafat, the PLO, Al Fatah and the concept of *jihad* (holy war) reflections of "powerless" victims. The newly educated and politically adept Palestinian spokesmen (many schooled at universities in the occupied territories) omit reporting the gains in education, medical care, and municipal services that Israel has provided since 1967. They conveniently forget to mention that the very charter of the PLO dictates violent overthrow of the Zionist entity.

I too have compassion for those beaten and killed, but I have more compassion for those Israeli soldiers and civilians and their families who have been killed and maimed over the years. Israel is defending itself against bodily harm, harm to the physical well-being of its troops and harm to its very existence.

American Jews do not have the responsibility, or even the right, to pressure Israel into the untenable position of being unable to defend itself.

Israel has, unfortunately, been boxed into an untenable position. For the various reasons you have stated, Israel cannot continue to occupy the territories. The moral responsibility of the American Jewish public is not to deepen the quagmire in which Israel finds itself. We should proclaim our sympathy and support while urging in the strongest of terms that all possible attempts at a compromise be made now. The key phrase is compromise. One party to a dispute cannot compromise alone without being compromised, and to compromise Israel's security could indeed have "consequences that reverberate for centuries to come."

Jeffrey J. Sorokin, MD
President, Jewish Community Relations Council
Cherry Hill, NJ

To the Editor:

I have read your editorial on the Israeli policies on the West Bank, and I say "Blessed be God's name." Blessed because some Jews still believe in compassion for the disenfranchised, even if they are Arabs. Blessed because someone realizes the hostility being created by the current policies, hostility which will surely come back to haunt both the Jews of Israel and the Diaspora.

Stephen Spielberg
Toledo, Ohio

To the Editor:

Diaspora Jewish dissent against various Israeli policies is not going to stop. Nor should it. Israel should welcome dissent as a healthy sign of the Diaspora love of Israel. Gone is the generation of the book/movie *Exodus*. It is hard, impossible, and frankly deceitful to continue to "sell Israel" as a David against Goliath anymore. It makes much more sense for Israel to accept the fact that a more sophisticated young leadership has assumed the reins of command in Diaspora Jewry. Much of this young leadership knows Hebrew and has lived in Israel for periods of time. It will be inappropriate for Israeli leaders to continue to relate paternalistically to Diaspora Jewish support as a given.

Therefore, the issue is no longer the inherent right of Diaspora Jewry to dissent. The question remains its context and responsibility.

Take, for example, the cherished concept of "territories for peace" which the vast majority of Israelis affirm. Witness the ratification of the 1978 Camp David accords. Only the extreme Israeli right wing opposed the dismantling of Sinai Jewish communities. The majority supported the withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula with its oil wells, strategic depth, and gateway to the Straits of Tiran. The offer of an airtight peace plan was too much to refuse. Israel gave peace a chance.

We still have our fingers crossed—or starred, if you would have it, that the next leader of Egypt will not be like a new Pharaoh who does not know Joseph.

"Territories for peace" has therefore become the watchword of dissent against currently perceived Israeli policy. The only problem is reality. No Arab leader offers "peace for territories." And Jordan's nightly news regularly refers to occupied Haifa, occupied Jaffa, and so on. It is hard to face reality. But when you live in Israel, that is what you have to do. There is no Palestinian Sadat. And we must cope with that.

There is a widely used Israeli rhetorical expression: "Why do you crash through an open door?" I must ask that door-crashing query of current dissenters against so-called "Israeli policy." They have a right to dissent. Yet they are off the wall: give Israel a Palestinian Sadat and you'll get the same Israeli "Camp David" consensus for the principle of "territories for peace." Yes, even at the price of dismantling Jewish settlements. Although I live in one. No Arab leader makes such a "Sadatian" offer.

For the past four months, young ruffians of the PLO have terrorized their own population against any form of settlement or accommodation with Israel. The PLO has forced thousands of old and young into confrontational suicide-like situations. When you throw a molotov cocktail at an armed soldier, the consequences are obvious.

Perhaps the frustrated critics of our situation might turn their angry dissent in other directions:

- against the intransigence of the Palestinian Arab leadership which will not accept Zionism.
- against media personalities who

insinuate that all Palestinian Arab leadership wants is the West Bank and Gaza.

• against the United Nations, whose UNRWA agencies confine hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs to the confines of refugee shanty towns. UNRWA regulations specifically forbid the State of Israel from improving the health, sanitation, housing, or educational facilities of these camps.

Given the genuine concern of so many Jewish leaders that justice be afforded the non-Jew in Israel, wouldn't it be appropriate if they also spewed their anger against the PLO and the United Nations? Couldn't Israel share the heat a little bit?

I should therefore like to suggest a new module for dissent which could be called "egalitarian dissent." For every demonstration or protest offered against Israel because of the current unrest, dissenters should also demonstrate against the PLO, the United Nations and, say, ABC's Peter Jennings. The issue is not whether to dissent or the right to dissent. The issue is how to dissent.

David Bedein
Jerusalem, Israel

To the Editor:

Your March/April 1988 editorial served a very useful purpose for me. It helped me clarify my ideas on the problem, and demonstrated that my ideas are diametrically opposed to yours.

To refute your arguments one by one would result in a letter as long as your article, minus some pontificating. So I will limit my letter to a few succinct observations.

1. Israel has *no one* to deal with. The PLO is the only existing representative for the Palestinians, and it is unacceptable to Israel. No Palestinian "moderates" can possibly step forward without incurring the wrath of the PLO.

2. Israel is *not* in deep trouble. The Palestinians are. Israel has never been stronger or more resolute militarily. If the Palestinians can continue their rock-throwing, the IDF will continue to react. Make no mistake about this: Palestinian deaths are brought about by Palestinians.

3. As disturbing as present conditions are, there really is no sense of urgency to alleviate or eliminate them. The present battle of attrition will continue for many more months, until the Palestinians realize that they are making no headway, but are getting their people killed.

4. Your opinions and judgments are a valid expression of your distress and frustration, but they do a great disservice to the Israeli cause. However right it is for Jews to express their condemnation of present Israeli policy, those judgments serve to support the cause of the Palestinians and the PLO, undermine the Israeli position, and escalate attacks.

5. If it appears to be more "moral" for Israeli soldiers to shoot Palestinians dead, rather than "brutalize" them, then so be it. It is not my definition of morality, after 6 million Jews were destroyed, for 3 million survivors to turn the other cheek. Too many of us Jews have been, and are, moral wimps. The Israeli people, leaders, and army have been *forced* to be tough and self-sufficient. Not even editorials like yours will diminish them.

Lester Weissman
Tenafly, New Jersey

To the Editor:

After fourteen houses in the West Bank village of Beita had been summarily blown up, the Israeli army report revealed that Tirza Porat had died from a bullet fired by an Israeli guard and not from Arab stoning.

An American-Israeli fund has been set up to finance rebuilding these destroyed homes, in the hope that this may be a step toward establishing better Israeli-Palestinian communication.

Mail your contribution to: **Rebuild Beita Fund**, The Mail Room, Box 316, 5615 Morningside, Houston, TX 77005.

The fund is CPA audited; it is not tax-deductible.

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Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Abbie Lipschutz, Houston, Texas,
Coordinator

To the Editor:

The Bible recounts an incident (2 Samuel 12) where the prophet Nathan visits King David. It seems that David, enamored of Bathsheba, wife of Uriah the Hittite, contrived his death, whereupon David was free to marry Bathsheba. Nathan denounced the King to his face, and although David confessed his sin and repented, the child of the union died as punishment for the sin.

This familiar story illustrates two themes: 1) that immoral behavior is wrong, no matter who commits it, and 2) that such behavior is subject to criticism by someone—prophet or other....

If one adopts the values of our American political culture and bases one's judgments on these values, one can only criticize Israeli actions in the harshest terms.

Israelis often counter with a basic question: what right have you, safely ensconced in America, to criticize us? You do not share our troubles, fears, anxieties, and difficulties. Terrorism does not trouble your sleep. If you want to criticize, come and share our problems. If not, keep quiet and send money. This argument breaks down for two reasons. First, criticism is endemic to all political discourse and action and is practiced by everyone

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everywhere. Do we not criticize the USSR over its treatment of refuseniks? Do we not criticize the South Africans? The Chileans? Duvalier? The Marxist Ethiopian regime? etc., etc. Second, criticism cannot be leveled at a country or society using *its* moral standards. Since nations have somewhat different standards of ethical behavior, to adopt this approach is to have no standards at all. Its absurdity can be seen by applying this approach to Hitler's Germany. Since annihilation of the Jews was considered a moral good by Germany, criticism of Hitler's actions would have been unjustified. Criticism can be leveled only in terms of a generally understood and accepted moral code. I think we can agree that there exists such a code in the U.S. and in Western Europe, which is applied to nations that call themselves democratic. By that code, the current Israeli actions are indefensible.

Jews who support Israel often ask petulantly why Israel should be held to a higher moral standard than other states. Israel is not being required to toe a stricter moral line. It is being asked to conform, as above, to the generally accepted moral behavior expected of democratic states. No one expects decent behavior from despotic, tyrannical, and oppressive regimes; hence while we condemn them, we are not shocked. But if Israel wishes to be considered a member of the democratic community of nations, it cannot behave as it does.

There are moral grounds on which to censure Israel which apply specifically to it. How can a people which has been victimized, discriminated against, humiliated, brutally tortured, and murdered for over two thousand years practice such atrocious behavior? The answer seems to be that it is the Israelis who now have power. As Lord Acton has reminded us, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

I close with a parody of a 1960s protest song:

Where have all the Nathans gone?
Gone to silence, everyone.

Daniel Feinberg
West Palm Beach, Florida

To the Editor:

I would like to comment on your article recommending that Israel back a demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank which appeared (presumably among other places) in the Sunday Boston Globe on March 20, 1988. I think that you are fooling yourself if you think that a demilitarized state with Israel's security needs protected by a joint US-Soviet-Israeli force would be anything other than another nail in Israel's coffin.

In the first place, if there really is such a thing as Palestinian nationalism (which assumes that the Palestinians are a separate or distinct people in the first place), Palestinians will not be satisfied by a demilitarized state. Demilitarization may be ok in the very rare example of Austria, but even Switzerland, which is at war with no one, has an army. A demilitarized state in the Middle East, where the ability to protect power is the daily and ultimate test of one's right to exist, would not even be considered a state. The citizens of such a state are not going to be content with a country in which they can determine only the hours of garbage collection and the amount of traffic fines, while everyone else is free to participate in the usual warfare, so don't waste time thinking that this is a satisfactory solution to nationalist demands. Further, "demilitarization" is a very cloudy word—does it mean no tanks and heavy artillery? How about shoulder-fired Stinger missiles, which would now be within range of Lod airport? How about stones and molotov cocktails thrown at Israeli security patrols?

In the second place, the idea of a tripartite US-Soviet-Israeli force guaranteeing Israel's security would be a joke if the probable results weren't so serious. The Soviets have no interest in seeing Israel secure—they are major providers of arms and training to terrorist organizations around the world, especially to the PLO. Further, one of the great events of the 1970s, from the point of view of US security, was the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt. The Soviets would be troublemakers and spoilers in the Middle East, and the present US position as the sole major outside power in the region should not be given away so easily and cheaply by inviting the Soviets back in. Even US guarantees are not so solid that they should make Israel feel comfortable about making real security concessions. The US gave security guarantees to Saigon in the 1960s, and Saigon is now Ho Chi Minh City. Even a change in administration or an increase in popular isolationism could result in a decrease of US support for the idea of sending American boys to serve as active peacekeepers in a foreign land. You can't seriously suggest that Israel rely on such "guarantees."

You cavalierly suggest that if all else fails, Israel can maintain the right to enforce demilitarization if the other countries withdraw. Putting aside for a second the question of subjecting Israel to the certain (because there will be serious breaches) fate of having to sacrifice soldiers, please consider the practical increased difficulty Israel would have and opprobrium it would face if it had to occupy an actual sovereign state rather than "territories" in order to maintain the peace. When you think about it, public outrage could completely tie Israel's hands in that situation.

There was no peace in 1948 when the Arabs were offered a homeland (militarized) under the partition, and there was no peace prior to 1967 when the Israeli offer to trade land for peace was emphatically rejected by the Arabs at Khartoum (no peace—we want it all).

It seems to me that the Arabs will never be first class citizens in a country on the West Bank, since even if such a country were to be established it would never be truly a first class country. The Arabs can have a choice—be second class citizens of a demilitarized, occupied no-man's land on the West Bank, or be first class citizens of a Palestinian state—Jordan.

Joshua W. Katzen
Boston, Massachusetts

To the Editor:

The main difficulty is that your belief that the Palestinians are, or may be, willing to coexist with Israel is demonstrably wrong. Thomas L. Friedman, in *The New York Times* of September 9, 1986, reported on a poll taken on the West Bank and Gaza. The poll was taken by the Palestinian newspaper *Al Fajr* (with which Hanna Siniora is affiliated), supervised by a political scientist at Al Najeh University, and financed by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and *Newsday*.

Only seventeen percent favored a Palestinian state limited to the West Bank and Gaza as the ultimate solution. Fifty percent would agree to such a

state but only as an interim step to the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state. Seventy-eight percent favored the elimination of Israel as the final solution.

Mr. Friedman also reported that "[v]iolence against Israelis, both civilian and military, was generally viewed as justified, legitimate and effective on the strategic and tactical level.... Acts of terrorism against civilian targets received wide support; eighty-eight percent said the massacre of civilians riding on an Israeli bus on a coastal road near Tel Aviv in 1978 was justified...." As the means of solving the "Palestine problem," sixty-one percent favored "armed struggle" while only seven percent said "diplomatic initiative."

You can theorize and blind yourself to the hard facts, but that will not produce a solution. It has ever been thus. Before there was a Jewish state, there were a number of efforts by Jews to bring about Arab-Jewish cooperation, but no Arabs of consequence would associate themselves with such efforts. You talk about the large demonstrations in Israel for peace with Palestinians. Where are the large Palestinian demonstrations for peaceful coexistence with Israel?

In 1922 Britain issued what came to be known as the Churchill White Paper outlining the principles of government under the Mandate and calling for Arab-Jewish cooperation. The Arabs rejected the White Paper and said that "[n]ature does not allow the creation of a spirit of cooperation between two people as different [as Arab and Jew]...." Mr. Friedman's article shows that nothing has changed in the sixty-five years that have since passed.

Lawrence Eno
New York, New York

The Editor replies:

We normally get twenty-five letters for every one that we have room to print. Since the Palestinian uprising, the ratio has been closer to two hundred to one. Though we tend to be partial to our critics—printing more of their letters than those of our supporters—we carefully read every letter that comes in and deeply appreciate the strong outpouring of support.

While Ms. Weinstein correctly notes the refusal of Arab countries to resettle Palestinians, she then concludes that "the Arabs" should resettle the Palestinians. The Palestinians draw the opposite conclusion: they need their own state, since the Arab states have been just as unreliable as Israel in the way they have dealt with the problem. For this reason, they will not accept Peres's Jordanian option.

Mr. Sorokin says that the PLO and Arafat do not fit into the category of the powerless stranger, the *ger.* True, but they are the outgrowth of years in which the strangers sat in refugee camps, oppressed and forgotten. The biblical injunction not to oppress the powerless has no qualification like "if they are acting nicely, respecting your political system, and going along with your way of doing things." The injunction is unconditional.

Mr. Bedein says that the problem is that there is no Palestinian Sadat. Prime Minister Shamir frequently repeats his contention that Israel will never give up the West Bank—hardly an inducement for any Palestinian to break with the PLO. Israel's moves against Mubarak Awad are only the latest in a series of actions against Palestinian moderates that have prevented the emergence of an alternative to the PLO. You can't deport the moderates and then say that there is no one to talk to. One important point worth repeating, though: Bedein's correct contention that if a peace settlement were to be produced through negotiations, the majority of Israelis would likely support it. All the more tragic that Shamir has resisted the Shultz plan and that Israelis still refuse either to negotiate directly with the PLO or to implement the *Tikkun* plan (hold a plebiscite with no conditions on those who may run for office, and then negotiate with whomever the Palestinians elect).

Leslie Kermath decided to cash in Israeli bonds. We have received hundreds of letters of this sort, as individuals attempt to make symbolic gestures of opposition to the current Shamir policies. Some people have circulated their own petitions, others have stipulated in their donations to the Federation or UJA that their money should not be used for Israel, and still others have sent letters to their local Jewish newspaper or to the Knesset. Probably the most effective actions, however, involve providing direct support for the Israeli peace parties as they enter the election campaign. Donations can be sent to the Organizing Committee for Peace, 1024 Creston Road, Berkeley, CA 94708.

Mr. Weissman says Israel is not in deep trouble because it can meet the military threat from the Palestinians. The military threat, however, will come from surrounding Arab states which may have superior weaponry if the growing U.S. disillusionment with Israeli policies on the West Bank eventually leads to a "more even-handed policy" in which the U.S. reduces its commitments to Israel. We fear that will be the result of continued Israeli intransigence. A recent *Los Angeles Times* poll indicated that thirty-four percent of all Americans favor a reduction in military and economic aid to Israel. The longer the occupation continues, the more likely that percentage will grow. In this sense, the occupation itself is the greatest military threat to the survival of Israel.

Mr. Katzen worries about allowing the Russians into the Middle East. The fact is that their willingness to participate in a serious peacekeeping force to ensure the demilitarization of a Palestinian state would be a very strong

(Continued on p. 86)

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Publisher's Page

People frequently ask us what we mean when we say that *Tikkun* is a Jewish-based magazine. Our short reply is that many of our writers, including ourselves, approach their subject matter from a Jewish point of view—even when the articles are not about Judaism or about Jewish issues. Understandably, this answer often raises more questions than it answers, such as: What do we mean by "a Jewish point of view"?

I find it most useful to think of the Jewish point of view as a cluster of unresolved issues that seem to be on Jewish minds more than on others. These issues are strongly influenced by (but are not reducible to) Jewish history and Jewish values. Although the list of issues is probably very long, I want to discuss three of the more important issues here.

The first issue has to do with the tension between universalism and particularism. Most Jews are socialized to feel loyal to the Jewish people, yet are taught to be concerned about the larger world. When there is conflict between particularistic loyalties and universalistic concerns, what is to be done?

This unresolved conflict plays itself out in the ongoing dialogue about the American Jewish relationship to Israel. Is it disloyal to speak out publicly about what's going on? Those leaders who have done so have been branded as traitorous by many Jews. Yet, at the same time, are we not evading responsibility if we keep silent when we see Israel acting in oppressive, destructive ways? The tension between the two poles is causing many ruptures in the American Jewish world.

The conflict between particular and universal concerns is experienced by Jews not only when dealing with specifically Jewish issues but also when participating in the larger American society. It's no surprise, therefore, to find Jews challenging the narrow chauvinism that sometimes is manifested in U.S. foreign policy or questioning the way Americans consume so many of the world's resources.

A second unresolved issue that colors the Jewish point of view is the tension between the messianic vision of the world and the pessimistic perception that the world will always be a place of pain and sorrow. The pessimistic view—coming from the Jewish experience of persecution throughout history which culminated in the Holocaust—is in conflict with the idea that the world can be, and indeed someday will be, a place where there is freedom, equality, and comfort of living for all beings.

The conflict between optimism and pessimism can be seen in the current arguments between those who have faith that Israel will continue to exist even if it gives up land for peace, and those who say that Israel has to be tough because the Arab world won't ever give up its desire to destroy the Jewish state. It leads Jews to dream of ways to bring about the messianic age—but, at the same time, to figure out how to survive under great adversity.

A third unresolved area of tension exists between separation and wholeness. Judaism in many ways is a religion of separation: the sabbath is separated from other days, the clean is separated from the unclean, and so forth. Making distinctions in this way allows Jews to see the world in moral categories.

Yet there is also in Judaism an affirmation of a fundamental oneness that transcends all differences. The notion of one God and one humanity (we are all supposed to have been born from the same mother and father) teaches us to see commonality and community.

It is often difficult to find the balance between separation and wholeness. We can become so immersed in the unity of being that we close our eyes to evil and refuse to struggle to change things. On the other hand, there is a danger of seeing only divisiveness and opposition in the world, when we are overly sensitized to distinctions.

I have described here some of the tensions that shape the Jewish point of view. Yet there is nothing about any of these issues that makes them so distinctively Jewish that they are irrelevant to others. They often exist in other traditions and certainly confront almost anyone living in the modern world. Part of the reason that many non-Jews are excited about *Tikkun* is that these important Jewish questions are also universal questions, and the wisdom that comes from struggling with them has universal applicability. □

Editorials

What It Would Take To Win

The "wisdom" of the summer of 1988 is that Michael Dukakis will have to make a colossal blunder in order *not* to win the presidency. He is ahead in many of the polls, and the lingering mess from Iran/contra, Meese, and Noriega will hang George Bush in November. According to this theory, Dukakis should just keep cool, look like a competent problem-solver, and all will work out.

We doubt it. In a campaign that has no central focus, small side issues can often dominate public debate (e.g., which side will be tougher on drug users? or which candidate seems more charismatic and in control during a TV debate?), and soon we may be hearing the media telling us that Bush *looks* more presidential. *Tikkun* does not endorse candidates* but it does have an approach to politics that emphasizes the need to reintroduce substantive issues. In this election, we are convinced that unless substance is introduced explicitly by the liberals, the electorate will once again respond unconsciously to the fears and concerns of the past, leading to unexpected and displeasing results for the Democrats.

Let's consider those unconscious concerns for a moment. In some fundamental way they are all connected to the breakdown of communities of meaning and purpose in America and to the resulting strains that undermine loving relationships, families, and friendships. When the right talks about the breakdown of traditional values or about the spiritual crisis facing America today, its words strike a responsive chord in many people. People's ability to make long-term commitments to friendships and families has declined significantly in contemporary American society. The larger communities of meaning—religious communities, political movements, the labor movement, and cohesive neighborhoods, for example—provided not only substantial social support for families and those involved in other types of stable relationships (including, for example, helping singles meet potential partners), but also a framework within which relationships could be endowed with a greater sense of purpose and spiritual significance. Now that these communities have weakened, individual families are increasingly expected to take the place of these communities and provide the spiritual and ethical "meaning of life."

Very few relationships can fill this task. Right-wing religious fundamentalist communities, and the right in general, offer people a very attractive deal: You can be part of "the truly saved," "the righteous nation," or "the crusade against communism" and thus become part of a large and abiding national community. Even though Bush will represent himself as best able to continue the process of peace agreements with the Russians, he will simultaneously attempt to hook in to the anticommunist symbols of the past, assuring people that their unconscious need to be part of a community that provides them with this ersatz sense of purpose will not be ignored.

In this light, it is possible to understand the reaction of many Americans to President Reagan's appearance in Moscow. Previous to his departure, Reagan had just acknowledged for the first time that the U.S. has its own set of "human rights" problems (he mentioned homelessness, for example). Instead of rejoicing at the possibility of further reducing world tensions, however, many Americans expressed great suspicion of the Soviets, betraying a deep need to keep the cold war struggle alive. What, after all, could take the place of anti-communism in supplying a sense of mission and purpose for America?

This need for a sense of mission and purpose is neither trivial nor pathological. Liberals and progressives should not dismiss this need, and instead should develop a two-part strategy to meet it. First, we need to restructure the dynamics of daily life so that this need can be fulfilled more adequately in the world of work, in families, and through activities such as fighting world hunger and poverty—activities that provide a community around humanly nourishing work. This long-term goal should be on the agenda of every liberal and progressive political candidate or movement, even though it cannot be achieved by this fall. Second, what can be conveyed in the short-run is a vision of an American community working toward these goals and toward the establishment of world peace and democracy. Such a vision must be articulated clearly and cogently, and it should be made the centerpiece of the presidential campaign. This vision will provide a substitute for the visions offered by the right, and it will enable people to give up their cold-war

*We use the Dukakis campaign and the Democrats purely for the sake of showing how *Tikkun*'s general approach might be made concrete and applied to some specific political reality. This concreteness should make it easier for other candidates, political parties, and social movements to see how they might adopt these principles and apply them to their own situations.

worldview without fearing that they will be left with nothing to feel committed to except the endless struggle for money and individual pleasure—the guiding values of the American competitive marketplace.

People need to know the nature of the moral vision that is being promulgated and how specific policy proposals fit into that moral vision. Liberals may fare far worse than they expect in 1988 if they try to reduce the election to issues of economics and administrative competence. Most Americans tend to take traditionally liberal positions on many policy issues—Nicaragua, full employment, and health care, for example—yet they often feel pulled towards the right because the right speaks to the values crisis that they experience in daily life and because the right's anticommunism seems to provide a larger sense of purpose and direction.

There are three ways to build a 1988 politics that embodies the kind of vision that Americans will want to hear: (1) Repudiate the selfishness of the Reagan years and emphasize the Common Good; (2) Articulate a program aimed at supporting families; and (3) Make a commitment to making the next four years decisive in ending the cold war.

First, the Common Good. There is a deep irony in the dynamics that have led people to Reagan and the right. On the one hand, the normal workings of the competitive marketplace are precisely what drives people to seek ersatz communities in order to escape the individualist, materialist, and self-centered ethics of daily life. On the other hand, the price of admission to these right-wing communities has often been a willingness to go along with an approach that elevates the private self-seeking marketplace to a position of holiness and justifies going to war with other countries in order to defend its sanctity. The contradictions in this position were escapable as long as the right had no power and could blame the agonies of daily life on the alleged liberal domination of society. But eight years of conservatives in power have intensified the privatization and selfishness of American life. Conservatives have brought into sharper focus the spiritually and morally corrupting consequences of blind support for the competitive marketplace. Ivan Boesky and "junk bonds," Wall Street corporate mergers that depleted corporate resources that might have otherwise been reinvested to improve corporate efficiency and ability to compete, criminal activity by Reagan's highest aides, governmental deals with Noriega, a media dominated by images of people whose highest goal in life is to satisfy their own personal desires without regard to anyone else—all these are just the most visible symbols of a culture that has lived out "the Reagan revolution" and produced revulsion in many Americans. The allure of "getting your own" and "taking care of #1" has dramatically decreased because the deeper human needs they promised to satisfy remain unfulfilled. In 1988, many Americans are ready to hear a very different ethos, indeed hunger for a new framework that could help articulate their desire for something more than what the right-leaning '80s produced. That is why this is the correct historical moment to build politics around the theme of the Common Good.

The spirit of the Reagan years was, "Does this program, project, or life choice serve my individual interests?" But the spirit of the years ahead must be, "Does this program, project, or life choice advance the Common Good?" This spirit projects a moral criterion for action that runs directly counter to the ethos of the private-pleasure orientation and the "me-firstism" that have represented "the meaning of life" in the 1980s.

Repudiate the selfishness of the Reagan years and emphasize the Common Good.

It's not enough to talk about the questionable ethics of Ed Meese or the illegal acts of high officials in the Reagan administration. No one really believes that corruption belongs to only one side of the political spectrum. People must come to understand that in a moral climate that recognizes no higher ideal than "looking out for number one," the likelihood of corruption, dishonesty, and governmental lawbreaking increases dramatically in every corner of society. Articulating the theme of the Common Good becomes an important political act that may elevate politics and provide a norm for both individual and collective life.

Because liberals quite rightly insist on the central importance of individual rights, they have been unfairly blamed for the ethic of selfishness that is a product of the competitive marketplace whose sanctity conservatives always defend. By making the Common Good a liberal theme, we expose the fundamental hypocrisy in the conservatives' claim to be the force that cares about "traditional values." But ours is not a mere political trick: By espousing communitarian rather than individualist values we help advance a set of ideals that can be used to judge liberals once they are in office, and we also help to engender important public debate about what parts of America's economic and political system really are consistent with the Common Good. For further reflections on this topic, see Harry Boyte's article on "Commonwealth" in the May/June issue of *Tikkun*, and Robert Bellah and William Sullivan's article in this issue.

Second, Family Support. A commonly shared deception

in contemporary society is that families and relationships are in trouble all of a sudden because individuals have, one by one, made a mess of their own lives. The consequent shame and the tendency for people to blame themselves often lead people to deny their family problems and militantly assert how wonderful family life really is. This tendency mirrors the dominant meritocratic fantasies that govern our economic life as well. In other words, just as we supposedly have no one but ourselves to blame if we have workplaces that are alienating, frustrating, and unfulfilling (after all, this meritocratic reasoning goes, if we were more together or smarter or better people, we would have found more fulfilling and more lucrative work), so too if our family life feels phony, lacking warmth and intimacy, dominated by inequalities of power and empty rituals, we believe that we have only ourselves to blame. To compensate, we turn to everything from therapy to drugs, from alcohol to every possible form of remolding our bodies and our personalities.

While it would be wrong to deny completely our responsibility for our personal problems, especially since there are ways in which each of us could improve our situation, the massive impact of the larger social order on our personal lives is much greater than we recognize. The women's movement got its initial strength from showing how sexism—not the failures of individual women—often created power imbalances in families, schools, and workplaces that severely restricted the possibilities for every woman. Ironically, the right picked up this psychological approach to politics when it positioned itself as the "profamily force" and then provided people with relief from the self-blaming that accompanies their personal lives.

But the right has succeeded in this only by inappropriately externalizing the problem: blaming it on gays, "uppity" women, or "permissive" social values. False and misleading as their analysis has been, however, the right has been able to help people situate people's personal pain in a larger social context, thereby undermining the dynamic of self-blaming and providing the kind of psychological relief that generates appreciation and political loyalty from millions of Americans.

For this reason, a vision of family support, while incorporating the important programmatic ideas being advanced by the Coalition of Labor Union Women for child care, maternity and paternity leaves, flexible work schedules, etc. (see Nan Fink's article in this issue), must place these specific programs within a broader framework that addresses the underlying ethical and emotional issues confronting Americans.

The candidate or social movement that begins to address these underlying emotional issues in a way that reduces self-blaming and helps give people a more realistic picture of the forces that make family life and relationships more problematic than they seemed in the past will enjoy the trust, gratitude, and loyalty of a political constituency composed of the bulk of New Deal voters that have subsequently moved to the right.

Articulate a program aimed at supporting families.

Finally, Ending the Cold War. Not unilaterally, but through a negotiated settlement. Gorbachev has a higher "approval rating" among Americans than most *American* politicians, and this fact speaks to a unique opportunity for us to forge a very different foreign policy direction. Nevertheless, many prominent Americans have expressed great suspicion towards Gorbachev and the Soviets. ABC News anchorman Peter Jennings, for example, in a series of spots before the summit, warned his audience not to be fooled by Moscow's not looking as bad as Americans have been led to believe by forty years of media indoctrination. He promised that if there were lots of fruits and vegetables in local stores, he would make sure to ask Soviet citizens when they last had seen so much good food. Other members of the media also did their best to keep the old "don't trust the Russians" approach alive and well. Openness and restructuring, we were constantly reassured, would not be significant enough to undermine our faith in the need to spend hundreds of billions of dollars a year to combat "the Soviet threat."

Yet even the the best attempts to whip up the troops didn't work sufficiently well. The sight of America's most right-wing president having decent relationships with the Soviets, along with his acknowledgment that the U.S. has its own set of "human rights problems," is making it harder for the right to sustain its worldview. Only the need for *some* unifying national purpose can give the right the edge, and that edge can be eliminated if liberals are able to articulate an alternative moral vision to fill the gap left by anticommunism.

If the next president were to state that his goal is to negotiate for such things as an end to the cold war on terms that involve dramatic disarmament agreements (possibly like those proposed by Reagan in 1987 and then withdrawn in haste when Gorbachev unexpectedly agreed to them), settlements of regional conflicts, the implementation of programs for mutual cooperation in helping to eliminate world hunger and poverty, and the redirection of American energies toward promoting democracy worldwide, he could fire the idealistic energies of the American people.

Nothing has distorted American politics and economic life more than the fierce commitment to the arms race

and the cold war. There is considerable evidence that the distorting impact of defense spending has played an important role in making America less competitive in the world economy. The Machinists Union, many of whose members are employed in the defense industry, long ago offered convincing studies to prove that defense spending creates far fewer jobs than almost any other federal government spending program. While a propeace candidate or social movement must go out of its way to assure American workers that any transition to a peaceful economy would be accompanied by guarantees that workers would continue to be employed at the same salary levels they currently enjoy, it is also plausible to talk about the expansion of jobs that such a change in economic focus could bring.

Ending the cold war need not be equated with granting legitimacy to the lack of democracy and the denial of human rights that still characterize Soviet society. We will never diminish the intensity of our demands for free emigration of Soviet Jews or for their right to develop their own culture and religion within the Soviet Union. Yet the growing success of Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* gives us a unique opportunity to support the forces inside the Soviet Union that are pushing for democratization and liberalization. By relying on the continued existence of the cold war, hardliners inside the Soviet Union are able to argue for continued limitations on human rights and democratic freedoms, lest these freedoms be used to help the other side in the interminable cold war struggle. For this reason, it is not enough to talk, as candidate Dukakis has done thus far, about reducing nuclear forces while simultaneously building up conventional forces in Europe. Not only does this kind of approach lend itself to a technological debate in which the candidates uncritically accept the popular demonization of the Soviets, but it also does nothing to support the liberalizing forces in the Soviet Union. Ending the cold war, not finding a safer and less costly way to fight it, should be the principle articulated by any candidate or social movement that hopes to energize the idealism of the American people in 1988. Indeed, George Bush will be able to present himself as the man best able to "manage" the process of "tension reductions" while "hanging tough." If liberals want to be taken seriously on foreign policy, they will have to articulate a fundamentally new vision, a vision that "ending the cold war" provides.

The dynamics of the June summit have further clarified the deep meaning of Gorbachev's rule in the Soviet Union. The ruling elite may not be prepared for democracy or human rights in a form that would satisfy the U.S., but they are determined, within the boundaries of preserving the regime, to de-escalate conflict with the U.S. The mythology of an intractable foe begins to look more like the remnants of the past than a sophisticated assessment of current reality.

What a presidential candidate needs to do is call attention to reality (that the cold war is ending almost in spite of the best efforts of U.S. right-wingers to keep it going), break through the knee-jerk language of the past, and insist that America take advantage of the incredible opportunity available at this moment.

Make the next four years decisive in ending the Cold War.

The American people are ready and willing to hear this message only if it is asserted vigorously. If it is provided as an alternative way to understand the current realities of the world, they will respond. But if the candidates provide no alternative framework, then the old language and categories will once again dominate public discussion. The conservatives in both parties will force the discussion back into the same old ruts: Who is *really* "strong on defense" and who is *really* "able to stand up to the Russians." Dukakis may think that he can win even on this terrain. But he should remember that it was far easier to meet this kind of challenge when his opponents were primarily to his left. Once he has the Democratic nomination, he will find himself surrounded by an endless number of Democratic party and media "professionals" who will counsel him to move to the right in order to win the moderates. Yet this advice will keep him contending for votes on the same ground that has a built-in conservative bias. If, for example, he must defend his proposed foreign policy from the charge that he might "lose" Nicaragua or other countries to the Communists, he will be on weak ground, unless he is able to respond by challenging the very terms of the debate, by talking about the need to transcend the old language and grab this historic opportunity to end the cold war.

Failure to shift the terms of debate was the error made by the Carter administration. Surrounded by the Brzezinski and Harold Brown school of cold warriors, Carter set himself up for a right-wing foreign policy assault. Having bought the premises of the right, the liberal is stuck trying to show that s/he has a more effective way to accomplish right-wing ends. The truth is, s/he may not. If Dukakis accepts these right-wing assumptions, he will end up getting hoisted by his own petard, either during the election, or, if he wins nevertheless, during his presidency.

Does ending the cold war mean that America would no longer be committed to any substantive foreign policy goals? Not at all. The U.S. would maintain a vigorous commitment to support democratic change throughout

the world, which includes change in countries that have been described as part of the "free world," not because they have democratic freedoms but because they have a capitalist economy. An unequivocal commitment to the forces seeking change in South Africa, to the peasantries attempting to overthrow totalitarian or repressive regimes in Central and South America, and to a battle against world hunger would offset any suspicions that the change in focus was a result of American indecision or weakness. Ending the cold war is a move from strength. Far from being a retreat from the world, it allows the U.S. to use its resources in a more effective way to shape the kind of world we seek.

Some people will argue that articulating the possibility of ending the cold war shows a dangerous naivete, a willingness to fall for Soviet propaganda and to ignore the past lessons of Soviet expansionism. It's not unreasonable to ask the Soviets to take some symbolic actions that would make it easier for the liberal and progressive forces to convince the American public that an end to the cold war, not just a temporary reduction in tensions, was indeed on the agenda at this moment. Dukakis and other candidates could suggest that they would condition their moves towards across-the-board negotiations of an end to the cold war on the willingness of the Soviet Union to participate in good faith and full dedication to solving at least one major world problem. While there are many that could be chosen, we recommend the Middle East, precisely because it is perceived as so dangerous and so intractable. If the Soviets join the U.S. in creating a permanent peace solution—one that provides for complete Israeli military security within its pre-1967 borders and that dramatically reduces the arms available to all states in the region—that action would overpower the paranoia that still persists within the U.S., and it would empower the liberal and progressive forces to pursue a much broader set of negotiations aimed at ending the cold war and addressing the problems of world poverty and hunger. By picking some such "trigger" mechanism for starting the end of the cold war, liberal and progressive forces would both offer a considerable incentive for helping to bring peace once-and-for-all to the Middle East, and simultaneously show to domestic American skeptics that the plan to end the cold war would not be pursued at the expense of Israel or other allies, and it would not be pursued naively should the Soviet Union not be willing further to continue the march toward peace begun under Gorbachev.

* * *

Every four years we go through an American ritual for a few months while we engage in a horse race between two personalities, one of whom will become the next president. The party conventions this year will almost certainly be dominated once again by boring rhetoric, and we will have to suffer through hours of inane media analysis. Commentators will almost certainly focus, as they always do, on who is winning and what the polls are saying about popularity, doing their best to avoid any substantive discussion of actual worldviews and policy disagreements. Some avoid substance for fear that they will be seen as biased if they attempt to frame the issues in any particular way. The result will be that at both conventions this summer, and in much of the election coverage this fall, we will rarely hear a reporter or commentator asking a candidate: "Tell us what your best reasons are for holding your ideas on issue X." Instead we will hear some variant of "Well, how much support do you think you have for idea X or candidate Y?" Boring.

The only chance for this election actually to come alive is if the underlying issues and disagreements can move from the unconscious to the conscious level. A candidate or a social movement that addresses the issues of the Common Good, the family, and the cold war has a real opportunity to break through the mystification and the deadening of politics that have tended to characterize our elections. In the process, this candidate or social movement will build a majority that will support the kinds of policies that can direct America back towards the best of its founding ideals.

Palestinians: Out of Sight, Not out of Mind

As we go to press, a relative lull in the struggle on the West Bank has come about. Some people are hoping that "quiet" will now prevail and that the problems will go away. Indeed, many people on the Israeli right believe that they can continue the occupation forever by showing the Palestinians that they will gain nothing through any form of struggle. This attitude has led them to support not only harsh techniques of repression against those who engage in rock-throwing, but also the expulsion of Mubarak Awad. Awad's interview in the March/April issue of *Tikkun* raises some legitimate questions about whether it is appropriate to describe him as "the Palestinian Gandhi," but it also shows a man committed to nonviolent struggle. The Israeli government cannot expel this kind of man

there is no one to talk to on the Palestinian side, no one to negotiate with who isn't "too violent." Yitzhak Rabin has insisted that it was necessary to reestablish "quiet" in the territories before dealing with the substance of Palestinian grievances. Otherwise, the Palestinians would have been led to believe that they could gain concessions through armed struggle. Now that relative quiet has been reestablished, it's time for Rabin and others in the right wing of the Labor Party to show what the Palestinians can gain from being "quiet."

It was welcome news in late May that Labor Party activists had selected a slate of candidates for the Knesset elections that gave more places to younger and more peace-oriented candidates. Those peace forces should now call upon Rabin, Peres, and the other more prominent spokespeople of the party to support a plebiscite among West Bank and Gaza Palestinians so that they can select representatives to participate in negotiations with Israel. Such a plebiscite, held under international auspices and with no restrictions as to who may run, would produce a leadership democratically empowered to speak for the Palestinians. Moroever, such a plebisicite would deal with the ambivalence that some Israelis have about negotiating with the PLO, since they wish to negotiate only with people who are the actual elected representatives of the Palestinians.

Israeli leaders would be making a great error to believe that the anguish that the occupation has caused among American Jews has diminished simply because the uprisings no longer get as much media attention. The moral crisis that the occupation has generated will continue and deepen. The contradiction between Jewish values and Israeli policies can only weaken the fabric of Zionist affiliation. We who support Israel and who reject the anti-Zionism that has reared its ugly head in America during the last few months must urge Israel to regain the moral high ground. While we have described our own plan for a demilitarized Palestinian state in the March/April issue, in the current issue Tzvi Marx presents a "unilateralist solution," which shows yet another safe way for Israel to proceed. Solutions are not lacking, only the moral and political will to implement them.

The Palestinians have not escaped our minds simply because they no longer command as much attention in the American media. Our commitment to Judaism, to the Jewish people, and to the survival of Israel makes us insist that those people who did not want to speak out when the uprisings were in full gear speak out now during moments of relative quiet. Ultimately, of course, there never will be a full return to quiet until the occupation ends. Those who tie their willingness to negotiate to achieving some kind of calm in the territories are merely grasping for an excuse to perpetuate the status quo indefinitely.

The main arena for peace activity during the next few months will be the Israeli elections. Peace parties such as Mapam, Ratz, and Labor will need financial support. Despite media predictions that the right will triumph, the outcome of the elections is far from certain and an infusion of real support for the peace camp could make an important difference. Israeli right-wingers have raised large sums from the American Jewish world, and those who favor peace need to make their dollars count as well.

Of course, the Israeli right continues to have one thing going for it that the peace movement cannot overcome: the continuing strategic stupidity of the Palestinian leadership. The uprisings created an unprecedented opportunity for the Palestinians to formulate a reasonable political program to help resolve the crisis. Had the PLO or other Palestinians endorsed *Tikkun*'s plan, or any of the dozens of other possible plans for peace—and done so unequivocally and in their own press, not just to Western audiences—they not only would have strengthened the peace forces in Israel and the U.S., but they also would have dramatically increased the pressure on Shamir to compromise. Instead, the rejectionist and extremist Palestinian forces set the tone again, intimidating the moderates and silencing the voices of reason. This is a classic example of surplus powerlessness: when a group that is in fact relatively powerless acts in a way to increase its own powerlessness. It is the subtle act of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

Israeli rightists must be relieved by this Palestinian incompetence. They understand that maintaining support for their position depends on the rejectionists' continuing to be the dominant Palestinian force. For that reason, they regard Mubarak Awad (and others who organize nonviolent strikes and demonstrations) as a bigger threat than the rock-throwers. They also must have been heartened by the Israeli army's action in May preventing several thousand Peace Now demonstrators from stopping during their peace rally on the West Bank to assemble with Palestinians. This kind of attempt at people-to-people peacemaking, potentially of great importance in building the foundation for a mutually acceptable settlement, is blocked by the Israeli government. The extremists, both within the government of Israel and among the Palestinian leaders, manage to reinforce each other's intransigence. □

A Conversation with Kitty Dukakis

Tikkun editor Michael Lerner met with Kitty Dukakis on May 20, 1988, at the Armenian Community Center in Pasadena, California. The text of their conversation is as follows:

Lerner: According to the *Los Angeles Times* poll of American Jewry released in April, 60% of American Jews support the Shultz initiative, 45% believe that it's appropriate to speak out publicly and criticize Israel when they have such criticisms, and over 70% believe that if peace is to come to Israel, not only will Arabs have to change their attitudes, but Israelis will also. How do you situate yourself in relationship to these positions of American Jews?

Dukakis: I'm in a very different position today than I was fourteen months ago, since I'm the spouse of the candidate who probably will emerge as the party's nominee. When one's husband is likely to be the nominee one has to be, well, not more cautious, but recognizing that what one says is fair game any place in the country and around the world. And I am cognizant of that, so I think you need to know that from the outset. I think it would be foolhardy for me to disagree publicly with the Israeli government, no matter what my feelings. On the other hand, I can't imagine that honest thought in disagreement wouldn't help strengthen Israel. None of us in this country felt very positively about Israel going into Lebanon, or at least people that I talked to. Many American Jews have been concerned about what's happening in Gaza and the West Bank. At the same time, we recognize that there must be a recognition of Israel's right to exist within free and secure borders. I don't think it's going to be an easy situation. The only leader who has been willing to come to the table has been the Egyptian leader. It seems that Hussein is even more intransigent these days.

Lerner: That's why *Tikkun* has called for a plebiscite among Palestinians to allow them to choose their own leaders. Not to assume that it's the PLO, but to allow them to have a vote to choose their own leaders.

Dukakis: What is Israel's attitude towards that?

Lerner: They haven't made a response yet.

Dukakis: I have a feeling they would not agree. The concern I'd have is that the PLO might win such a plebiscite.

Lerner: The argument has been made that during the Vietnam War the U.S. negotiated with the Vietcong.

Dukakis: Yes, but would we have negotiated with Hitler?

Lerner: I would hope we would have, had there been a way to save a few million Jewish lives through those negotiations.

Dukakis: I use him as an example of an evil world leader.

Lerner: And you think that the PLO has to be thought of in those terms?

Dukakis: Look at the past forty-year history.

Lerner: True. At the same time, however, if the Palestinian people, given an election, would choose those people, how are we going to make peace without dealing with them?

Dukakis: I don't know what the answer is. I don't think there are easy answers forthcoming. Let me talk about my attitude about [refugee] camps. My attitude here is colored by my trips to camps on the Thai-Cambodian border, once in 1981 and a second time in 1985. I have been to the camps in Gaza. I am convinced that no camp is a good camp. They are festering holes of cancer. They produce, not just in Israel but all over the world, the worst qualities of human beings.

Lerner: So you can understand the desperation....

Dukakis: I understand the young people's desperation more than anyone else's. We hear a great deal about the Palestinians and the young people hating. I'm not sure that if I were in that position I wouldn't have some of those same feelings. We need to think long and hard about that population and what it's going to do to the fabric of society in Israel.

Lerner: One of the most frequently repeated themes in

the Torah is one or another variation of the following: When you come into your land, do not oppress the stranger; remember that you were strangers in the land of Egypt. So from the standpoint of at least some religious people in Israel—though not the majority of religious people—taking the role of an oppressor is not only bad politically, it is a violation of their reading of Judaism.

Dukakis: How can I not respond? We have had a history of caring for other people, particularly in our own society here [in the U.S.]. I would love to be able to sit down with Rabin—because I know him—and raise some of the issues that are of concern to me in terms of soldiers going in and breaking the bones of elderly people in the West Bank. We can't condone that kind of behavior. That's never been a part of what our people have done in the past. And it can't be now. On the other hand, maybe there's an answer that we haven't gotten through the public press.

Lerner: There is some feeling among members of the peace camp in Israel that Shultz's timing in giving the Memorandum of Understanding with Israel to Shamir at the very moment that Shamir was rejecting all aspects of the plan for an international conference was very bad because it gave Shamir something he could use in the electoral campaign in Israel while Shultz got nothing in return. So how do you think the administration has been doing in advancing the peace process?

Dukakis: I think it's outrageous that it's taken seven and one-half years to take any kind of action. As Michael said, had we spent one-quarter of the time we spent trying to kill the Sandinistas in Nicaragua on peace initiatives in the Middle East, we might be many steps ahead. With the elections six months away in the U.S. and Israel, the chances of an initiative surviving today are not very good, for obvious reasons. Had Shultz begun this process even at the beginning of Ronald Reagan's second term, there might be a difference now.

Lerner: If you get to the White House, do you see yourself helping the peace forces in Israel?

Dukakis: I think what the United States can do is to create an atmosphere in which the antagonists can sit together, without interference from the other superpowers, and begin that process. I think that needs to start early. And Michael has talked about providing that atmosphere. And that's why he has not commented on the fact that there shouldn't be a Palestinian state, and has been criticized for that; but he feels very strongly that Israel and her neighbors should be in a position to make those decisions and not have them forced on them.

Lerner: Let's turn to the American Jewish scene. Many Jews are not affiliated with "the organized Jewish community"—and at least some will tell you that they have been turned off by what they perceive to be its materialism, by people with more money having disproportionate influence, by its conservatism, by repression of honest debate about Israel, and by a lack of creativity around Judaism. Did you experience any of these issues growing up in the Jewish world?

Dukakis: Recently I've had greater and greater contact with the whole Jewish community as I travel around the country. My experience is primarily based on the community that I know in Greater Boston. My dad grew up in a very Orthodox family, had difficulties with his rabbi when he returned from Berlin in 1934, and just was not affiliated again for many, many years. My Jewish education was mostly at the hands of my paternal grandmother and grandfather where we would go for Shabbat dinner and I would often stay the night and go to synagogue with them in the morning. It wasn't until, married to a Christian, and after the first time I went to Israel, that I felt that I needed a more formal identification.

When people write articles, as they have, [in the *Intermountain Jewish News*] about the fact that I would be a bad role model because I'm married to a Christian, what they don't realize is that there are men and women like myself who are much more closely identified with their Jewish roots because they have married outside their faith. And it's an important point to make. My dad lost his temper with a Jewish reporter on this.

You ask about negatives in the Jewish community. I think that all youngsters, regardless of what background they come from, act out or have some period in which they find certain aspects of their ethnic or religious group disquieting. I have never not felt strongly about my Jewish roots in spite of having some of those feelings as a teenager. That doesn't mean that I don't have feelings about the way we operate in this country. On the other hand, we are one of those groups that has reached out to others.

Lerner: When you say you have feelings about the way we operate in this country.... Nobody ever has one-hundred-percent positive feelings?

Dukakis: What did I feel negatively about when I was a teenager? I felt that our people were too materialistic and that they needed to be more spiritual in their thinking and more giving. And I think it was a period

of time when I didn't know what Jews were doing in terms of relationships, for example, between blacks and Jews which had begun to build up in the sixties. I grew up as a musician's daughter, and we had many friends who were Jewish, but we had many friends who were not Jewish. I grew up in a totally Jewish neighborhood—on a street with hundreds of homes and I think there were two Christian families on that street. I think there was a total of sixty students who graduated with me from the eighth grade, and I think there was a total of four Christians in that class. I grew up probably on the wrong side of the tracks, literally and figuratively, in Brookline my first fifteen years, and went to school with many very wealthy Jewish boys and girls, but never did find that fact upsetting, because there was such richness in my family. And I'm proud of the fact that Jews have taken such leadership roles all over this country and have taken difficult positions.

Lerner: We've found that very few of the "Jewish leaders" are articulating ideas like the Shultz plan, even though a majority of American Jews support it.

Dukakis: Because Israel doesn't like that plan. Shamir doesn't accept it.

Lerner: But that may mean....

Dukakis: That they are out of sync?

Lerner: When you go into the White House, will you repeat the pattern of past administrations of working with the most conservative elements in the Jewish leadership, even though they may not represent the majority of American Jews?

Dukakis: I don't think I can answer that definitively, because it's a policy Michael and I haven't discussed. My hope is that any kind of liaison from the White House would be broad-based. We are close to many people—from the organized Jewish community, but also from outside that particular area. I would hope it would be broad-based. I've belonged to the Anti-Defamation League, and that group is traditional and yet it isn't. It's gone way beyond the usual way organized Jews react and think.

Lerner: Some people see themselves primarily as religious Jews and some primarily as cultural Jews—they identify with the history and a certain cultural tradition. I take it that you see yourself more in the latter?

Dukakis: Probably. Yet, I joined a synagogue after my first trip to Israel because I felt strongly about that

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connection. I feel that the religious connection is very important.

Lerner: Could you go a little deeper? What is it about either the Jewishness or Judaism that turns you on, that makes you feel excited, apart from the fact that Jews do good things?

Dukakis: It has to go beyond that. It's a difficult connection for me to articulate. I've always been Jewish—I think I took it for granted for much of my life. My Jewish education was very sparse. I have a very emotional connection with my heritage. I think many other Jews feel this way: There's a connection which is there, and I think people have to work at those connections.

Lerner: Is there some content that you hope to turn over to the next generation?

Dukakis: Yes.

Lerner: What is that? Other than nostalgia, is there some body of knowledge, wisdom, approach, attitude—what is it that you want to pass on to the next generation?

Dukakis: I would hope that our attitude and wisdom in future generations as Jews surviving in a country in

which succeeding generations assimilate more and more, [that a coming generation] recognizes the important lessons of the Torah, like the lesson you just gave a little while ago—that we can make those connections in terms of recognizing the importance of human rights and civil rights as part of our heritage. That's part of the connection that keeps me there. It's a connection to being humane and learning from the lessons of our tragic past. And finding some meaning in the words "Never again." "Never again" isn't meant just for Jews; it's meant for all humankind. We have to look beyond the narrow interpretation of the Holocaust that talks about the uniqueness of the Holocaust. We must broaden those lessons so that they embrace tragedies around the world and make our antennae more sensitive to understanding what's happening when others suffer.

I want Jews to not just care about Israel, and that's very important, but to also care about what's happening in Mozambique, in Ethiopia, and in Cambodia and Thailand at the border. It's fine for Jews to have gone to the Thai-Cambodia border in 1979, but it took time. For example, my friend Elie Wiesel never said anything at that particular moment. We talked long and hard about how important it was for someone in his position to speak out vocally; and he has begun to do that since he received the Nobel Peace Prize and I'm very proud of what he has done.

Lerner: There are those kind of Jews, but they often aren't in the leadership of the organized Jewish community. That's why you could use your position to legitimate other Jews who are not simply tunnel-vision in their position.

Dukakis: That's the beauty of America. We have room for everybody. I should never be criticized because I'm a Reform Jew nor should you because you are more observant. That's why I found the *Intermountain Jewish News* article so difficult to accept, to make a judgment about me. I think we have to be more magnanimous than we've been in the past.

Lerner: I agree. I'd like to switch the topic, though, away from specifically Jewish issues, and ask you about something else. Is there a way in which you identify with either the spirit or the content of the movements of the 1960s.

Dukakis: That's a hard question to answer. I'm fifty-one years old and have a son who is about to turn thirty. I'm part of the generation in which women have been caught in this business of whether or not we work or don't work, are home with our children or not. We were home with our children; there weren't choices in those days. I felt very strongly against the war in Vietnam in the 1960s, from the very beginning. I felt very strongly about the work that Martin Luther King had done, and Robert Kennedy. I think all of us who at least think beyond our own little, narrow lives have reached out more as a result of what happened in the 1960s and early 1970s. I'm proud of much of the behavior of young Americans during those years. I'm not proud of some of it, but I'm proud of young people in this country who made us rethink what we were doing in Vietnam, and where we were going in terms of discrimination. They have really paved the way so often. I'm hopeful that young Jews won't be turned off by what you describe as a conservative network. I can only judge from our Boston community—I think we are probably different from much of the organized Jewish organizations around the country. Maybe I'm at a disadvantage because of that.

Lerner: Part of the claim of the movement of the 1960s was that we needed more than a new president; we needed fundamental structural change. I wonder if you think there are any aspects of American society today that need fundamental structural change?

Dukakis: There's no question that in initiatives like day care there absolutely must be a partnership with the federal government. We need new and affordable housing, new and reconstructed housing. There must be a fundamental change in thinking in terms of those initiatives. We have not in many years provided equal economic opportunity for all of our people—and that's something Michael has done something about in our own state. Welfare mothers, fifty thousand of them, being provided with an opportunity to get out of that ugly cycle of poverty. Changes have to be institutionalized. □

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Nature, Science, and the Bomb

Steven Vogel

When Jonathan Schell wrote in 1982 in *The Fate of the Earth* that "the nuclear peril should be seen as the very center of the ecological crisis," he expressed an idea that was already becoming part of the received wisdom of the post-sixties, ecologically minded, more-or-less unaffiliated left. On one level, he meant simply that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons included environmental ones as well—that the use of such weapons might produce not only widespread human devastation but even the absolute collapse of major terrestrial ecosystems. But on a deeper level, Schell's claim hooked up the political question of nuclear weapons to an ongoing radical environmentalist critique of modern science and technology.

Schell's deeper assertion was that the twin dangers of ecological collapse and nuclear catastrophe share a common source, and that this source lies in a particular modern attitude towards nature, epitomized by the central role played by science and technology in the modern age. The outline of the critique was already familiar in the environmentalist movement: Science and technology, in their very essence, involve the attempt to "dominate nature," to control it and manipulate it. But this attempt to establish a "mastery over nature" is dubious and dangerous, the argument continues. It alienates human beings from nature, making them forget that they too are part of nature. Furthermore, the dream of establishing human mastery over nature is unattainable: Not only our embeddedness in nature but also nature's very complexity makes it impossible for us ever to achieve total mastery over it. As a result, each of our technological interventions carries with it a train of unanticipated ecological side effects that threaten to rebound back onto us. Nature, in a well-known phrase, always has its revenge.

Our alienation from nature produces, in turn, a delusory attitude that anything is possible, that all human problems are amenable to technological solutions ("Star Wars" and genetic engineering are the latest examples). Technological "solutions," however, tend to produce new problems, worse than the ones that they were meant to solve. Schell's point was that the threat to humanity posed by nuclear weapons ostensibly built for purposes of peace must be seen as another step in this process.

Arguments such as these should be familiar to readers of *Tikkun* as well as any of a number of other journals concerned with progressive social movements; indeed, they form an important element in the contemporary *Zeitgeist*. Green politics, deep ecology, New Age science, ecofeminism—all these movements, despite their real and often large differences, offer versions of this sort of account; this account can be found (again, in various forms) in the writings of Fritjof Capra, Jeremy Rifkin, Theodore Roszak, Arne Naess, and many others. It forms the basis for a kind of radical environmentalism that itself now seems second nature to many progressive thinkers. Yet I think it is wrong, and I want to take Schell's version of it, precisely because of its persuasiveness, as an example to help me make my argument.

But I need to begin with an historical detour. The notion that science and technology, as attempts to dominate nature, might be dangerous or double-edged projects is too often presented as a recent discovery of the contemporary ecological movement. In fact, such an idea is not new. Similar arguments can be found in the Romantic tradition, in nineteenth century *Lebensphilosophie*, in phenomenology and existentialism, and elsewhere. One of its central sources in recent intellectual history lies in the tradition of twentieth-century German neo-Marxism known as the Frankfurt School, named for its original association with the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in the 1920s and early 1930s. Marxism's relation to environmentalism is a complex and ambiguous one (see Francis Moore Lappé and J. Baird Callicott's "Marx Meets Muir" in *Tikkun*, Sept./Oct. 1987); but, in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, the questions about the relations among nature, science, technology, and society that seem central to contemporary discussions of ecology and nuclear weapons have formed a continuing subject of scrutiny, and in many ways this tradition serves as an important forbear of recent environmental thought. Yet the conclusions it has reached finally point in a very different direction

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from the radical environmentalist position just outlined, and I need to sketch some of these conclusions before returning to *The Fate of the Earth*.

II

The twentieth-century tradition of "critical" or "Western" Marxism, of which the Frankfurt School forms an important part, has been marked by a fundamental critique of *scientism* and in particular of the view that the methods of natural science can be employed for social inquiry. In this sense, the Frankfurt School radically distinguishes itself from the "orthodox" Marxism of the nineteenth century (still the official philosophy of the USSR and its allies), according to which the truths enunciated by Marx are scientific discoveries, as objective and justified as those of Newton and Darwin. Socialism appears in such a model as a system in which the kind of mastery science has given to humans over natural processes would be applied to social processes as well. Once Marx discovered the basic laws of society, Engels for instance wrote, it became possible for humans to employ those laws consciously for their own purposes, just as the discovery of the laws of electricity made possible the use of electricity in telegraphs and electric lights. But Western Marxism considered this claim deeply mistaken because it was based on a misunderstanding. For society is *not* like nature, not a realm of immutable laws that scientific "experts" must "discover" and can then "manipulate" to insure social happiness. Society is something we *produce*, in and through our interactions, and therefore it is something we can *change*, not by discovering laws, but by transforming ourselves. At the same time, Western Marxists argued, capitalism generates a social structure that does *seem* to be "natural"—an eternal and immutable "second nature" independent of human will or activity. Overthrowing capitalism requires subverting this appearance of society as second nature, unmasking it as an ideological illusion. Orthodox Marxism, with its view of socialism as social engineering, instead perpetuates this illusion, merely mimicking "bourgeois" social thought, which had its own dream of a "value-free" social science that would imitate the sciences of nature.

Yet Western Marxism's critique in fact went further. For as the century continued and Western Marxists found themselves faced with a world of science used for genocide, of technology totalized beyond anyone's imagination, they were increasingly driven to question science *itself*, and not just its illegitimate application to social questions. Thus, thinkers such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse began to suggest that the very model of "technological rationality" underlying science might itself be a chief culprit in the contemporary crisis. Science's hubristic attempt to "dominate nature," they argued, could not be separated from its social consequences.

Science "disenchants" nature (in Max Weber's phrase), they claimed: The spiritual meanings that primitive humans found in nature are systematically stripped from it until it is left as pure matter, passively subject to mathematical laws that we discover and use to manipulate our environment. The discovery and use of such laws become the paradigm of rationality. Anything not amenable to scientific verification in this sense—including questions of ethics, political values, and religious belief—appears as irrational. Reason can answer the *technical* question of how to achieve one's goal; but the *practical* (in the Kantian sense) or *ethical* question of which goals ought to be achieved can be a matter only for nonrational decision. Science, of course, had originally seen itself as part of the project of Enlightenment, overcoming superstition and ignorance to help bring about a world in which justice, freedom, and happiness would be the guiding values. But Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno wrote, was subject to a fatal dialectic. The very values science was supposed to be serving—the values that had inspired the great thinkers of the Scientific Revolution—turned out, under the new paradigm of scientific rationality, to be *just* values, hence literally irrational. Ultimately, power was the only possible justification; thus, rather than a subversive tool for bringing about social change, science became a prop for the status quo. This dialectic is fatal because we need science and technology in order to develop the material preconditions necessary for a social order based on the liberty and equality that Enlightenment promises; yet the very progress of science seems systematically to undercut the possibility of such a social order's ever coming into existence.

Marcuse offered more room for hope, claiming in his writings of the 1960s and early 1970s to find in the emerging counterculture hints of a developing *alternative* conception of nature, a "liberation of nature" he called it, which might supplant our contemporary lust to dominate it. Instead of treating nature as a mere object to be dominated, he said, we had to see it as *another subject*—an equal partner with whom we would have a relationship that was not manipulative, but cooperative and aesthetic, even erotic. The Enlightenment goal of liberation from oppression and objectification was to be extended to nature itself. This nondominative conception of nature was in Marcuse's view incompatible with contemporary science and technology; and he offered instead the vision of a new science and technology that would instantiate this new relation to nature and would, he wrote, "arrive at essentially different concepts of

nature and establish essentially different facts." By moving to such a new scientific relation to nature, Marcuse believed, the fatal dilemma sketched by Horkheimer and Adorno could be avoided.

Both the idea of a fatal flaw implicit in the Enlightenment ideal of scientific reason, and the possibility of a new and nondominative approach to nature as a way to overcome this flaw, are familiar in contemporary environmentalist arguments. Within the Frankfurt School, however, they have been the subject of a searching self-critique, and one that I think contemporary environmentalists would do well to consider. The self-critique has come from Jürgen Habermas, generally regarded as the heir to the Frankfurt School tradition, who has taken Marcuse (and by extension Horkheimer and Adorno as well) to task for blurring the distinction between society and nature too greatly, and thereby unintentionally making the same kind of mistake as the scientism to which they objected. Scientism attempts illegitimately to assimilate all phenomena, including social phenomena, to the model of a law-governed physical system. But this mistake, Habermas argues, is not overcome so much as it is *mirrored* by Marcuse's attempt to assimilate our relations with nature to the model of an interaction between humans. Nature simply is *not* another subject, not a "person" with whom we can engage in "cooperative," "partner-like," or "erotic" relations. We can of course treat it as a person if we wish, and we do so for certain purposes. But no "New Science" or "New Technology" can possibly arise from such a "nondominative" approach.

Science and technology, Habermas claims, are fundamentally connected to a universal project of the human species, deriving from a universal interest in the prediction and control of the physical environment, and therefore they are not in any sense projects that could be given up. Rather, they are built into the very structure of the species and its relation to the environment, built into the system of what Habermas (following Weber) calls "purposive-rational action"—action oriented towards goals and regulated according to results—or *work*. Work simply *is* an attempt to "control" the external environment, and is not an "option" we could just choose to abandon.

But Habermas's position is not a return to scientism. For purposive-rational action, he argues, is not the only form human action takes. The error shared by both the scientism of the technocrats and the romanticism of Marcuse or the ecologists, Habermas argues, is to conflate *this* fundamental mode of human action, work, with *another*, equally fundamental mode—what he calls communicative *interaction*, the social activity (taking place not through work but in language) in which humans through their mutual relations produce and reproduce the social order. The two forms of action are distinct and oriented toward different goals: success in reality (the knife must cut, the bread must rise) in the case of work, mutual understanding (the ritual must make sense, the political structure must be legitimated) in the case of interaction. Technical categories are relevant in the first case, moral categories in the second.

The nuclear threat is not the result of knowledge or original sin. It arises because of a particular set of social *arrangements that make nationalism, imperialism, and war inevitable.*

Thus, Habermas wishes to reassert a duality between nature and society, and to see the modes of human action in each sphere as both equally fundamental and mutually irreducible. He intends this dualism as a counter to scientism, to be sure, but at the same time it serves as a tool for criticizing his predecessors in the Frankfurt School (and perhaps some contemporary environmentalists) as well. The umbrella concept of Enlightenment, Habermas argues, is simply not differentiated enough to capture the complexity of the real historical process: It hides within itself two quite different notions—that of a *scientific* enlightenment, aiming at the achievement of technical control over the external environment, and that of a *political* enlightenment, aiming at a society of free and autonomous individuals capable of undistorted communication. The solution to the contemporary crisis, Habermas contends, lies not in giving up either of these goals or in positing a false identity between them, but rather in asserting and holding to the distinction between them and resisting any attempt at conflation.

This way of putting the problem, Habermas asserts, exposes Marcuse's theoretical error: Marcuse conceptualizes the utopia of a "new" scientific approach to nature on the model of *political* enlightenment (with his talk of "liberating" an "oppressed" nature), thus confusing the two distinct realms. Yet today, Habermas recognizes, it is the *opposite* error that presents the far graver danger: that of a scientism that sees a social utopia appearing as the result of scientific research. Indeed, contemporary thought appears increasingly to view society and politics as realms that need to be "rationalized," in the sense of being made subject to "scientific" organization. The contemporary world,

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ISRAEL UPDATE

The Unilateral Option: Saving Our Soul

Tzvi Marx

MORAL BORDERS

Ze'ev Schiff, defense editor of *Ha'aretz* (Israel's independent daily newspaper), commented in a February 8, 1988, interview with *Newsweek*'s Milan J. Kubic that the worst part of the IDF's performance during the Palestinian uprisings was that "by stooping to indiscriminate beatings of hundreds of people, it widened the cycle of Arab hostility and *violated moral borders that never should have been crossed*" [emphasis added]. This astute perception underscores the notion that the loss of the moral high ground is no less threatening to Israel's well-being than to its Arab enemies.

A critique of Israeli policy in the occupied territories has animated the last two issues of *Tikkun* (Vol. 3, Nos. 2 & 3). Opinions range from the editorial, "The Occupation: Immoral and Stupid," in which Michael Lerner passionately asserts, "Make no mistake about it, what is at stake for Israel is not only its Jewish soul, but its survival"; to Michael Rosenak's "Reflections of a Religious Zionist," in which he argues that "our return to our land was designed to enable us to rule ourselves, not others"; to David Hartman's poignant reflection that "we will never feel fully at home until we build a national existence that does not require the suppression of the Palestinian desire to be a dignified and free nation."

These reactions, as well as the proposals aired in the world press by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, and Rabbi Shlomo Goren, have one thing in common, despite the obvious differences of opinion: They all assume the cooperation of both sides. In other words, all these people believe that solving Israel's problems depends upon finding a political formula that Arab Palestinians will agree to adopt.

It would be wonderful if the parties to the dispute could reach an agreeable resolution to the conflict. But it would be foolish to expect such a resolution. Notwithstanding the good faith declarations of some enlightened "spokespeople," the rhetoric and political posturing as well as the still-official PLO covenantal declarations that Israel is existentially illegitimate make this hope seem realizable only in the very distant future, if ever. In the meantime, how many moral boundaries will we violate? Who will we be and what will we have become when that day of reconciliation finally arrives?

A nation's moral status should not depend upon negotiation. We should not have to wait for the other side to reciprocate in order to extricate ourselves from the moral trap in which we are now caught. We must not be afraid to act alone to protect our integrity and security. If ever we were proud of our "aloneness" ("a nation that dwells alone"), it must have had something to do with our willingness to resist moral turpitude no matter what the moral standards were in other societies.

PROPOSAL FOR UNILATERAL ACTION

Desperately aware that the pace of moral deterioration is accelerating, I propose that we consider a unilateral set of decisions to safeguard our security and our morals. These are the relevant principles:

(1) The Land of Israel is promised to us by God and is our legitimate inheritance.

(2) For the sake of protecting our morality, also required by God's commandments, we will settle for less of that land than we are able to sustain by force.

(3) Since we believe that all people are created in the image of God, it is unacceptable in our day for one people to rule over another, even if the other people were to consent, because of the consequent dissolution of moral dignity. This religious notion is embedded in the modern secular political conception of democracy.

(4) With a concern for our security needs, we will draw borders around the densely populated Arab Palestinian band of settlements in Judea/Samaria and link this territory by a road, probably in the South, to Gaza. Water arrangements for this territory will be carefully worked out to ensure suitable supplies.

(5) Jerusalem will continue to remain a united city under Jewish sovereignty, with the sacred rights of all religions respected, while the Temple Mount continues to be supervised and policed by the Supreme Moslem Council (the *Wakf*).

(6) We will announce a reasonable timetable for our

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gradually relinquishing the administration of this newly bounded territory, enabling the inhabitants to take over the responsibility of self-government.

(7) We will lay no conditions upon these inhabitants except two that relate directly to our security: (a) No offensive weapons such as tanks, planes, or missiles may be brought into the new territory. Any such movement will be construed by us as an act of war to which we will respond according to our legitimate defense needs; and (b) The responsibility to prevent terrorist incursions or activity from that territory into Israel is the responsibility of the inhabitants of that territory. Failure to prevent terrorist activity will allow Israel to take all necessary means to protect itself.

(8) Arab Israelis will have the option of remaining Israeli citizens or of becoming citizens of the new territory. If they choose to remain Israelis, they will be expected to discharge full citizenship obligations, including military service or its equivalent.

(9) Israelis living in settlements that fall within the new territory can choose to dismantle their settlements and be relocated, with suitable reparations, or they can choose to continue to live under the sovereignty of the new territory with the same conditions as Arabs choosing to live in Israel. It must be understood by these Israelis that Israel will not assume primary responsibility for their safety in the new territory.

(10) We invite and welcome the inhabitants of the new territory to have open borders with us and to establish mutually beneficial economic, cultural, social, and even military arrangements with us. We are also ready to have closed borders and only minimal contact between us. Cooperation can be decided only mutually, isolation unilaterally.

(11) The problem of the refugees in the new territory is a problem to be dealt with by the new territory's inhabitants in conjunction with the United Nations. As a member state and as a neighboring state we will want to be helpful in the rectification of wrongs done to all displaced people of the region, provided the discussion takes into account the displacement of Jews from Arab countries. The Western nations are encouraged to be generous in finally solving this problem by helping to establish a rational and compassionate system of reparations.

Footnotes to the Proposal

Regarding Principle 1: There will be those who, like Rabbi Goren, claim that the sanctity of the land prevents its compromise, even for the best of motives (*The Jerusalem Post*, March 4, 1988, "A Jewish Peace Plan"). Such people must be argued with on religious terms and shown how alternative authentic religious options are contained within the tradition, included among which is the legitimacy of deferring ideal fulfillments in order to grapple with political complexity. Such an alternative is offered by Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv Chaim David Halevi in Oz Ve'Shalom's publication, *Kedushat Ha'khaim Ve'Hashetakhim* (*The Sanctity of Life and the Territories*). His argument hinges on an innovative application of the halakhically accepted notion of *pikuakh nefesh*—saving of life—to refer to the life of a nation.

The issue is not getting peace for territory, but giving up a piece for integrity.

Regarding Principles 2 and 4: Some people will claim that we will be forced to bomb innocent people since we will have to react militarily to terrorist incursions that the inhabitants of the territory will be unable to contain. What will we have gained morally in that case? In fact, there exists a moral distinction between our situation in that case and our situation at present. Bombing a terrorist hideaway from the air, though unavoidably involving civilian casualties, does not threaten the moral integrity of the Israeli soldier in the way that indiscriminate use of force over an entire civilian society does. In one case, a soldier is waging defensive war against an enemy, having no choice but to utilize the conventional means of war against well-defined military targets that are located in civilian neighborhoods. In the other case, the soldier acts not as a soldier, but as a policeman, often frustrated, engaged in coercing a subjugated people into obedience.

Regarding Principles 3 and 8: In a situation in which Israel is acting unilaterally to meet Arab Palestinian needs, some people might feel tempted to demand that the other side give up something in addition. Given fears about an eventual demographic problem that could create an electoral majority for Arab Palestinians even inside the new boundaries of Israel, some people will be tempted to argue that Arab Palestinians remaining within these new boundaries should lose their Israeli electoral rights, simply living in Israel while voting in the new territory.

This plan does not coincide, however, with the moral sensibilities asserted in Principle 3, and it also violates the modern political conception of democracy. Furthermore, this plan might cause security problems. By politically disenfranchising the Israeli Arab population, wouldn't conflict break out between the Jewish and Arab populations living in Israel?

Still, this issue remains troublesome. Israeli Arabs were given citizenship from the beginning because there was no alternative Palestinian political entity through which they could express their national aspirations. Moreover, people initially felt that over time, by living together with equal political and civil rights, a natural integration would take place between Jews and Arabs which would enable them comfortably to share a common Israeli political identity. This hope has suffered a beating primarily as a result of the events of recent months; and there are grounds to believe that it has never been fulfilled in the forty years of Israel's existence.

In this light, one might argue that allowing for the creation of a Palestinian political entity through unilateral Israeli withdrawal fulfills Arab Palestinian desires for political rights and that Israel is under no obligation to grant voting rights to Arab Palestinians within Israel proper. After all, the whole purpose of the withdrawal is politically to disengage two ethnic groups that have learned the impracticality of living under one political roof. Wasn't the disengagement of Hindus and Moslems through the carving up of India and the establishment of Pakistan accompanied by a mass transfer of citizenship not always freely chosen by the individuals affected? Couldn't the same principle apply here, too, especially since Israel would impose a change of political identity without forced dislocation? Perhaps compassion should not take precedence over political realism. Nevertheless, the moral problems of forcibly disenfranchising an individual merely because of his or her ethnic identity, as well as the security problems that such a move would create, override these hesitations.

Regarding Principles 6 and 9: Is there a contradiction between the unilateral claim of this proposal and the announcement of a timetable enabling the inhabitants to take over responsibility for self-government? What if the inhabitants do not cooperate? The purpose of announcing a timetable is to allow the option of a decent transfer of responsibility. A lack of cooperation must not deter us from withdrawing on the set dates. If the inhabitants of the territory choose disorderly change within their precincts, that is their choice. Israel is not meant, under this proposal, to impose any kind of political order upon these people. Attempting to do so was the mistake we made in Lebanon. We must be prepared to accept the worst possibility, that the inhabitants of the territory will fight among themselves, establishing tribal-based regions of influence controlled by feud and strife in a manner similar to Lebanon. Although we may regret such a turn of events, we are not the patrons of the region, imposing our political will upon other peoples. That is the whole point of relinquishing our control over the area.

For the same reason, Israelis who choose to remain in settlements within the new region (against, I believe, the better judgment of resettling in Israel proper) must understand that Israel shall not be drawn into a war with that territory in defense of settlements that Israelis chose not to relinquish despite the obvious risks. The whole point of this proposal is to minimize interactions that lead to bellicose responses except, as stated, in the two conditions regarding the security of Israel. This fact, of course, does not mean that Israel cannot bring other pressures to bear.

Regarding Principle 5: Even those people who are ready for territorial compromise will draw the line when it comes to the division of Jerusalem. Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek loves Jerusalem and its integrity. For twenty years he has tried to build that city brick by brick, building by building, park by park, dunam by dunam. The uprisings have shattered his dreams. It appears that if we are to expect a defusing of national tempers, not only must the territory of Jerusalem be shared, but the vision of Jerusalem as well. Nevertheless, security considerations and, even more so, the place of Jerusalem in the Jewish national psyche preclude a division of this city. Yet something must be conceded to Arab sensibilities, the symbol of which is the Old City. The Temple Mount is inaccessible to Jews wishing to pray in groups. The Supreme Moslem Council (the *Wakf*) has controlled it since 1967, by Israeli government arrangement. On this site stand the Golden Dome and Al Aqsa mosques. De facto arrangements for Arab supervision of the Temple Mount do not detract from the Jewish hope that the Temple will be restored. Let us not allow our anger at the inaccessibility of this central Jewish holy spot, though justified, to overwhelm our cool judgment to allow the Arab Palestinians the satisfaction of holding a piece of the vision of Jerusalem under their control. Jewish archaeologists have reported the efforts of the *Wakf* to de-Judaize the Temple Mount by cleverly concealing artifacts and stones that show the essential Jewish origins of the Mount (*The Jerusalem Post*, October 30, 1987). If true, the efforts are childish, since it is clear to all rational people, whatever their culture, that the Temple Mount is first and foremost a place of Jewish significance. Only the disappearance of the Temple Mount could de-Judaize it. We should allow the Arab Palestinians to exercise some control over the Temple Mount so that they may satisfy what they construe to be the needs of their dignity. The messianic vision of redemption is replete not only with plans for the ingathering of our people but with a resolution of this seemingly irresoluble problem. We must build Israel in a tolerable political environment.

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The Israeli Elections: Is a Progressive Majority Possible?

David Twersky

The outcome of the elections to Israel's Knesset, scheduled for no later than November 1988, will prove politically decisive for the peace process. The peace process requires more than support from a U.S. administration and more than Arab and Palestinian interest in cutting a deal. It also requires an Israeli government dominated by the center-left parties.

Unfortunately, polls—as well as the gut instincts of veteran observers—suggest a victory for the parties of the right. These parties, led by Likud, now command a slight majority in the Knesset. Polls show them gaining another few seats and indicate that a coalition may be formed that is dominated by Likud and composed of the parties of the harder right, as well as the Orthodox parties.

Like the Democratic party in the United States, the Labor party—the mainstay of any progressive coalition—is struggling to reconcile the conflicting demands of the various constituencies that once made up the progressive Israeli majority. Like the New Deal coalition, the majority that automatically elected Labor-led coalition governments for many decades has disintegrated. For fifteen years, Labor has failed to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again.

Unlike the Democrats, however, advocates of a turn to the left—that is, of a campaign geared toward articulating the critical differences between Labor and Likud, between compromise and annexation—cannot hope that "unregistered" or nonparticipating voters might be attracted to a more dovish Labor party. All of the voters are already accounted for, since almost nine out of ten eligible voters vote.

Therefore, in order to win, Labor and the center-left must persuade Likud voters to move over to the column of anti-Likud parties. These voters will not go from Likud all the way left to one of the dovish opposition parties, but some might vote for a "centrist" list combining a non-Labor social and economic orientation with a moderate foreign policy.

In short, two to five Knesset seats must move from Likud to Labor in order to turn the political situation around. Recognition of this fact lies at the heart of any serious discussion of the election. And the debate over how to get these Likud voters to move lies at the heart of Labor's efforts to regain political prominence.

"ONLY DE GAULLE"

Private polls commissioned by Labor in the wake of the Palestinian uprisings have produced apparently contradictory results. "SLSA" voters, or "soft Likud/soft Avoda [Labor]" voters, like Peres better than Shamir and are surprisingly open to the idea of talking with the Palestinians about the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. At the same time, many of these voters intend to vote for Likud and company instead of for the parties whose members most closely reflect their views about peace.

How can we explain this phenomenon? The answer is, in part, a result of voting habits that took decades to develop and that fell into place in 1977. Many SLSA voters—we shall call them "soft Likud"—are part of what Amos Oz describes as the "new Sephardi middle class." They have a historical allergy to voting for Labor since Labor's social democratic establishment is perceived to be elitist, domineering, and patronizing. Although the Sephardi middle class is coming into its own in Israeli society, the army, the economy, and the political parties are, for the most part, still dominated by the Ashkenazi middle class.

Moreover, these soft Likud voters point to Menachem Begin's Camp David turnaround from his "not an inch" campaign rhetoric and see Likud as a likely source of Israeli flexibility. Their position can be called the "only De Gaulle" thesis: only leaders of the right can defuse right-wing opposition and display diplomatic flexibility. Only De Gaulle could grant Algeria independence, only Nixon could go to China, only Begin could give Sinai back to Egypt.

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The reason, the thinking goes, that Likud is indispensable to the peace process is that if it is in the opposition and Peres brings Israel to an international peace conference, Likud will go "wild in the streets." In fact, the argument continues, if Labor puts together a slender coalition majority after the elections, the right will bring the country to the brink of civil war, and maybe over the brink, to block an international peace conference. If, on the other hand, Likud is in the next government, the "moderate," reasonable half of Likud, supported by Labor, will manage to reach some kind of settlement, just as Begin did at Camp David. Likud may then split, with the "Kahanist" half moving rightward and uniting with Tehiya, perhaps under Ariel Sharon's leadership.

Peres has tried to meet this argument head-on in recent months, maintaining in interviews that democratic governments usually make important decisions with a small majority of two to five percent, and that a narrow Labor-led coalition would be strong enough to make the tough choices about peace and territory.

In any case, even those who doubt Peres' ability to remain firm in the face of fierce right-wing pressure should not fall for the "moderate Likud" line. In the wake of the uprisings, Meir Kahane's absurd, immoral, and disastrous ideas about expelling Palestinians have begun to filter into mainstream Likud politics.

A Likud government will depend on the coalition support of the annexation-fixated National Religious Party in addition to Tehiya, Tzomet, and Kahane's fascist Kach. This March, Herut's platform committee reaffirmed the Jewish claim to both sides of the Jordan river, laying the groundwork for a "historic compromise"—a partition of Palestine along the Jordan River, with Israel keeping the West Bank! (Herut is the principal party in the Likud bloc.) Herut members who dared to explore other options, like Aryeh Naor and Moshe Amirav, have essentially been expelled from the party, while Deputy Defense Minister Michael Dekel—a Herut veteran—was not even rapped on the knuckles for embracing the "transfer" proposal, introduced by Kahane.

A coalition that includes the far-right will not be able to agree on a program based on Camp David, since the far-right has been opposed to Camp David autonomy and the territorial concessions to Egypt—which led to the creation of Tehiya and Tzomet and which account for their continued existence separate from Likud.

If Likud participates again in a unity coalition with Labor, what is to stop it from continuing to frustrate the real possibilities of advancing the peace process? It is now clear that Likud prefers to remain a party of the hard right, since the Palestinian uprisings in the territories and the Shultz initiative are the bitter fruits of Likud's veto of the Peres-Hussein agreement in April 1987. Had a few Likud moderates crossed over and supported Peres, Israel might by now have passed through the international phase to direct peace negotiations with a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation.

Only the Sephardi middle class, increasingly weary of the rising costs of the occupation, might prove to be a voice of moderation within Likud. But within Herut the channels for progress are largely blocked, unless there is a major Arab initiative, à la Sadat. What is called for now is an *Israeli* diplomatic initiative.

A Referendum on the Uprising

It seems strange that more voters have not interpreted the Palestinian uprisings in the territories as a death knell for the occupation and especially for the no-way-out policies of the annexationist right. But polls indicate that voters have tended to assimilate the events of the last few months as positive proof of the validity, not the bankruptcy, of their preuprising views. They have become, if anything, radicalized, not converted. Only the idea of the status quo, of occupation on the cheap, has been dealt a fatal blow.

Thus, while moderates (who already vote for anti-Likud parties) might be more open to concessions and even to talking to the PLO, Likud supporters are more open to Kahane's insane thesis that the demographic time bomb can be defused only by expelling hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to Jordan. Polls show that most of the decline in support for Likud has meant an increase in support for parties of the harder right. (A poll published in *Ma'ariv* on April 1, 1988, confirmed the polarizing impact of the uprising: Likud and the hard-right parties of Tehiya, Kach, and Tzomet combine with the Orthodox parties for a comfortable majority.)

The uprisings have also led Labor to change its mind about early elections. Given the hard-line reaction to the uprising, Labor no longer prefers an early election date, hoping that soft Likud voters will tire of paying the increasing costs of the occupation (including increased reserve duty, which for many people was doubled this year to sixty days) and will shift to the left. At this point, it appears the elections will be held on November 1, the scheduled date.

A Strategy for the Center-Left?

Labor strategy has assumed the fundamental irreconcilability of appealing simultaneously to soft Likud voters and Arab voters, Peace Now activists and moshav settlers, hawkish blue-collar Jewish workers and the dovish Ashkenazi middle class. As a direct consequence of the overriding need to sway previously Likud voters centerward, Labor tends to downplay its leftist and dovish baggage. Thus, in the 1984 campaign, Abba Eban and kibbutz movement leaders were kept largely

under wraps, barred from the party's high-profile television advertisements.

The Palestinian uprisings have neutralized this strategy, however. Whether or not, as his allies maintain, Shimon Peres has put all of his cards on the peace issue, more than in any election since 1973, at least, the 1988 election is being fought over foreign policy. Taken together with the fact that the two major parties will be running against each other following a four-year collaboration (however stormy) in the national unity government, the riots have guaranteed the primacy of the "foreign policy" issue when voters go to the polls. Neither party can be blamed or rewarded for the gradual but palpable economic recovery. The choice voters will face will center on the issue of the peace process, with domestic issues fading into the background.

Given Israel's proportional system of elections in which votes are cast for party lists rather than for individual Knesset members, and the low one-percent threshold required to secure a Knesset seat, neither major party expects to gain a majority. In fact, no one seriously expects more than a small shift of one to five seats between the blocs.

Few Labor voters will move rightward to Likud, and most Likud voters will either remain with Likud or move further right; but there are a few Knesset seats that potentially could "float" centerward. Parliamentary arithmetic makes the contest for the soft Likud voters the critical center ring of the multi-ring election circus.

Labor, however, is not only trying to win the support of soft Likud voters; it is trying to maintain its current support in the face of threats from the small parties that siphon votes off to the left. (These close-to-Labor satellite parties, as they are referred to, include Mapam, a socialist-Zionist party based around the Kibbutz Ha'artzi federation; Ratz, a dovish liberal party led by Shulamit Aloni; and Shinui—now called Mercaz—a liberal party, dovish on foreign policy and right of Labor on economic affairs, led by Amnon Rubenstein.) These parties "run" against Labor and concentrate their efforts on prying disaffected Labor doves loose.

Gaining a soft Likud seat more than compensates for losing a seat to the left. It matters to a certain extent whether Ratz picks up a seat's-worth of votes from Labor, but it is essentially a redistribution of the pie. In other words, since Ratz will join in a Labor-led coalition, the coalition does not lose votes when a seat moves from Labor to Ratz. But when Labor wins a seat from Likud, the pie is enlarged since the coalition itself gains a seat. That is why when Peace Now activist Janet Aviad argues (*Tikkun*, March/April 1988) that unless Labor "articulates a clear, peace-oriented perspective, many of its most faithful cadre and voters may break with it and support the left parties (Ratz and Mapam) in the coming election," she fails to recognize that losses to the left are less important than gains from Likud, and certainly much less devastating than losses to Likud.

Nevertheless, Labor does not like losing seats to the left because the president's decision about who gets the first nod to form a government (and therefore serve as prime minister) depends largely, though not exclusively, on which party wins a plurality of the votes cast.

Labor is tied to the old age homes, Likud to the high schools.

Furthermore, although the position of these left parties on the peace question is often better than Labor's, there is reason to question some of their political decisions. Following the 1984 elections, for example, had Mapam and Ratz entered the national unity coalition along with Shinui—as Amos Oz, A.B. Yehoshua, and other writers implored them—Labor wouldn't have given in on "rotation," and Peres would have been prime minister for the duration rather than for only half a term. In this light, it makes sense for Labor leaders to want to hold on to the voters that the left parties threaten to take.

Unfortunately for Labor, the two efforts—holding on to the flanks and appealing to the center—dictate conflicting strategies. For Labor to broaden its appeal to the soft Likud voter, it must appear tough yet flexible; in order for it to prevent an exodus on its left flank it must be more dovish. What emerges is the both-sides-of-the-mouth "yes and no" which Peres used to convey Labor's "complex" approach to security issues in the last election and which became instead a metaphor for what Likud continues to portray as his indecisiveness and vacillation. Labor must be dovish enough to be different from Likud, yet tough enough not to be dismissed as too much of a risk. The results leave almost everyone dissatisfied.

Still, Peres' habit of ambiguously expressing his essentially dovish views is not an electoral asset. Since the Shultz initiative focused attention on the "land-for-peace" formula, Peres has spoken of the need to trade territory in the context of a negotiated settlement. "Only Chagall," he said, "has succeeded in separating people from land." But up to that point he had been using the grammar of a functional compromise, talking about dealing "people" not "land."

Both the right and the left criticized Peres for avoiding end-game scenarios, as if he were trying to sneak something by the electorate, or avoid telling them the "bad" news. When Peres described the international peace

conference as merely a "matchmaker" that would bring the sides together and then leave, Abba Eban faulted him "for not telling the bride what happens after the chupa."

Peres is a bit more forthright now, although he still clings to the "Jordanian" option, despite six months of uprisings that would appear to have, if not buried that alternative, at least established the unavoidable necessity of involving the Palestinians in the peace process. But he feels it necessary to surround himself with retired generals to help buffer him from charges that he is "soft" on Arabs. His party has also pledged that while it would be free to act on its approach to peacemaking, it would submit any land-for-peace settlement arrived at to a national referendum.

Peres' rehabilitation gives Labor a slight advantage over its position in the last two elections. Nevertheless, many observers doubt whether Peres is "electable." His tenure as prime minister softened the hostility towards him, but this change in attitude does not necessarily translate directly into votes. While Shamir is less popular than Peres, Likud is not less popular than Labor.

Yitzhak Rabin has fared better in the polls among Likud voters than has Peres. This discrepancy was apparent even before Rabin's get-tough policies in the territories, in part because he was IDF chief of staff and the hero of the 1967 War, and in part because of his gruff, no-nonsense army approach to management. To Israelis, these qualities look more like leadership than the assets Peres brings to the job. But one doubts that Rabin can win many of these voters over to Labor; people like him in a sort of "he's a good old boy, but what's he doing in Labor?" sort of way.

Peres could have backed away from Rabin over the army's role in suppressing the uprising, but that would have upset the delicate balance of power within the party—something Peres was loath to do, even at the risk of further alienating party doves. Party peace is predicated on Peres and Rabin's not fighting, which means that Rabin must be given a free hand regarding defense.

If Labor were more forthright, even within the framework of its own positions (Labor opposes an independent Palestinian state solution), the party would, at worst, not lose any votes; it might even gain some, and in any case it would emerge from the elections stronger internally and more self-confident. For now, the right, and not the left, exudes self-confidence.

Postelection Prospects, Preelection Tactics

If in the elections one of the parties gains only marginally at the expense of the other, the odds will rise against the formation of a narrow coalition. (In Israeli political terms, a "narrow coalition" refers to one dominated by Labor or Likud in which the opposing bloc does not participate.) Likud will count on the active support of Tehiya and the passive support of Kach. Likud may be too embarrassed to accept Kahane's open support, but he could support a Likud government against motions of no-confidence without actually being part of a coalition.

Labor will count on support from the parties of the moderate left, including Ratz, Mapam, and Shinui, and on the additional support of the hard left for an anti-Likud coalition (i.e., to vote against a Likud government but not necessarily to be part of a Labor government).

The trick here is that if Labor does not have enough seats for a coalition (the minimum number of seats required is sixty-one), it may be able to form what we might call an "anti-Likud coalition" with the hard left, which should net about seven seats. If that formation can block a Likud government—by totaling at least sixty seats pledged to vote against a Likud-dominated coalition—Labor will have an easier time courting the swing Orthodox parties into a coalition with the center-left.

Orthodox Jewish and Arab Votes

To the extent that they do not commit themselves to either bloc beforehand, the Orthodox parties—which usually get about ten percent of the vote, or twelve Knesset seats—will hold the balance of power. The trouble here is that the forces that oppose the left on issues like Sabbath observance are ready to compromise on the territories, while those that are soft on the purely "religious" issues are hard on the territories. Labor is now thinking of allowing two of its Knesset members—Rabbi Menachem Hacohen and Aharon Nachmias—to split off and run on an independent moderate religious list, on the assumption that a couple of Knesset seats of religious voters dissatisfied with their options are up for grabs.

The National Religious Party (NRP)—traditionally moderate on religious issues like Sabbath observance—has significantly hardened its foreign policy stance and has lost the centrist or balance-of-power status that makes it coveted by both parties. By losing its Labor option, the NRP has transformed itself into little more than a religious section of Likud and Tehiya, a party no one really needs. This problem has been recognized by certain religious figures, as evidenced by ex-NRP party leader Zevulun Hammer's attempts to keep the NRP Labor option through the "new elections formula": We can participate in a Labor-led government, he said in a recent interview, until a decision is made to withdraw

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The Common Good

Robert N. Bellah and William M. Sullivan

For a generation American politics has been bogged down by a debilitating argument as to whether welfare liberalism or free market capitalism is the best solution to our problems. The 1988 presidential campaign presents an opportunity for the discussion to be opened up in dramatic new ways by questioning many of the assumptions that both Democrats and Republicans have taken for granted for a long time. Both parties have seen the task of government as furthering the aggregate interests of individuals while providing a degree of security for our nation in a dangerous and complex world.

Reliance on welfare liberalism and free market capitalism as our only visions for guiding public deliberation has narrowed the ability of our political parties to confront changed realities. Both of these visions rest almost exclusively on a combination of cost-benefit analysis and interest-group mediation, techniques that allow manipulation of existing structures but do not permit discussion of the nature of those structures or the ends of society as a whole. The discussion of "the common good," a discussion that would allow us to consider critically the present structure of our society and the directions we have previously taken for granted, would open up new possibilities, possibilities that might allow us to escape the debilitating impasses into which we have fallen both at home and abroad.

Our recent difficulties have arisen because of problems that come at us from many sources and from all directions. Chief among them are two related problems involving our economy and our position as a world power. While our economy has continued to grow, that growth has been very uneven, involving high levels of consumption by the affluent while our country's infrastructure has been allowed to deteriorate. Furthermore, this growth has been sustained by unprecedented borrowing from abroad, turning the United States, in a breathtakingly short time, into the world's largest debtor nation. Even more serious than our loss of international economic competitiveness is the fact that our economic growth has caused grave problems, not only for the "truly deprived," but for the affluent as well, whose lives seem to lack personal meaning and social cohesion. At the same time, we can no longer consider ourselves the dominant military power, despite our largest peacetime military buildup. Massive unsettling economic and military changes seem certain to mark the next administration's tenure of office.

Things have not been going too well for the Soviet Union either. Yet the last couple of years have brought a surprising breath of fresh air from Russia. We have heard about *glasnost*, openness, and *perestroika*, restructuring. And we have seen a rather attractive man, Mikhail Gorbachev, eloquently arguing for and attempting to embody those terms. Could it be, despite our legitimate skepticism about these changes, that the new leaders of the USSR are sincere, that they believe that the conditions of an increasingly technologically sophisticated and interlinked world economy require that international relations, in Gorbachev's words, "can and must be kept within a framework of peaceful competition which necessarily envisages cooperation"? Could the present moment mark a really new situation—one that poses difficulties for the United States because it requires major readjustments in thought and behavior, but also a moment of historic opportunity? The opportunity we speak of is the chance to lead this nation in a much more hopeful direction as we approach the year 2000.

In the face of our own seemingly intractable problems, but with these new opportunities in mind, it is appropriate to ask whether we too could use a change of direction, an opening up and a restructuring. Of course, our problems are different from the Soviet Union's, and their agenda is not ours. Nevertheless, the theme of "the common good," if attractively represented in the words and actions of the Democratic candidate, could be the breath of fresh air that we need, the "*glasnost*" that would allow us to consider our problems in a new way. Pope John Paul II was correct when he said in his recent encyclical, *On Social Concern*, that liberal capitalism is in as much need of fundamental reform as is Marxist collectivism, a remark that caused howls of pain among neoconservative intellectuals, but one that the Democratic candidate ought to take to heart.

There are two ways out of the double-barreled weakness in our economy and in our position as a world

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power. We can embark on a frenzied effort to "regain the competitive edge" economically and to increase our military invulnerability, or we can work for a new system of world order that would relieve the pressure both on us and on others. The former strategy is self-defeating, while the latter strategy involves the search for the common good at home and abroad.

Before sketching the *substance* of a vision of the common good, we would like to emphasize the importance of the vision itself, and the need for the Democratic candidate to challenge the rhetoric both of the Reagan administration and of some of its previous Democratic opponents. Ronald Reagan has consistently projected a fantasy image of an America immensely rich and powerful because of unrestrained free enterprise, an America in which small-town virtues can flourish "without government interference." Americans have grown distrustful and cynical because this fantasy obviously has not produced what it has promised. But the Democrats have responded either by talking solemnly about "an era of limits" in which taxes must be raised, to which Americans have generally preferred the fantasy, or by embracing the Reagan promises and the agenda that the Republicans popularized and contending only that Democrats have better ideas or techniques to realize them.

Some strategists believe that the Democratic candidate should say as little as possible in the fall campaign about how he intends to govern while hoping to exploit any error or indiscretion committed by his opponent.

Such a strategy would be a grave error for the Democrats regardless of the electoral outcome. It is incorrect to assume that a candidate and a party can win only in the way consumer products succeed—by becoming increasingly bland so as not to offend anyone. If he fails to articulate a vision of national life, the Democratic candidate will risk imitating recent administrations, which all too often have engaged in a pattern of merely reacting, adapting in an increasingly random manner to a bewildering environment.

A vision is necessary, in the first instance, because a candidate needs to project a vision of governance to be able to govern effectively. A coherent vision, a public philosophy, provides citizens with the means for understanding and sympathizing with the aims of the president and his party. Vision shapes public opinion. In this sense, vision is power to govern. More important, the role of the president, and consequently the greatness of a president, is measured by his ability persuasively to advocate a strong sense of the public good. Only in this way can a basis be laid for significant structural reforms as opposed to technocratic fine-tuning.

In a democracy the president must be more than the manager of the national administration and more than the shaper of public opinion. The president must also act as the teacher, in the best sense of that term, by reminding his (or her, in the future) fellow citizens of their common commitments and standards. The president can do this by recalling common history: the record of our achievements, but also of our failures and defeats. The president teaches best when s/he encourages citizens to join actively with their fellows in considering the course of public life for themselves, when s/he generates vigorous debate. Thus, the Democratic candidate can be a catalyst for significant and enduring change in the nation's political climate. The debate between the free market and the welfare state has exhausted its utility. New times demand a broadened focus. The notion of the *common good* can provide a new vision through which public deliberations can take focus and radical reform can take shape.

Consider the present international situation from the perspective of the common good. The Reagan administration has made significant inroads in nuclear arms reduction agreements with the Soviets, an achievement so historic that it may well be remembered as this administration's most significant accomplishment. Testing the sincerity of the Soviet Union at every point, we can press ahead to further reductions, including reductions in conventional armaments. Of course, we should use the Strategic Defense Initiative as a bargaining chip—it probably will never work anyway. What we don't need is to drop another trillion dollars in the black hole of a highly dubious weapons system.

Arms reduction is a vivid example of a policy motivated by the common good. It benefits not only the Russians and us. As Pope John Paul II recently pointed out, the enormous amount of money the Russians and Americans spend on armaments has a big impact on the suffering peoples of the third world. Although the pope's concerns are moral and humanitarian, his point actually makes a great deal of economic sense, as many have argued recently. Capital transfers from the industrialized nations to the third world are on the agenda and are not just a matter of charity. Significant growth in the third world will provide the best possible market for our own reviving economy and will help to head off a depression caused by overproduction and overcompetition in the advanced nations.

All of these proposals will require prolonged and complex negotiations leading to a whole network of agreements. Any effort to strengthen the economies of third world nations must guard against neocolonial interference, on the one hand, and corruption and distortion in the receiving countries, on the other. The United States cannot dictate these agreements: those days are over. But we are still strong enough to take the lead in working out cooperative agreements and putting

pressure on recalcitrant allies to do their share. With vigorous leadership we can prove strong enough to help set up a cooperative world economic order that would replace the outmoded notion that a single great power must dominate the globe in order to ensure favorable economic conditions.

The notion of the common good could provide the touchstone for a domestic program that is hopeful and realistic as well. The international picture sketched above would have a great impact on the domestic scene. Reductions in the military budget would provide significant help with the deficit problem. Yet more needs to be done. We have been consuming a lot more than we have been earning (some of us have been consuming a lot more than others), and we are not making things as well or as inexpensively as others in the world. At a time of severe budget deficits, we must spend much more money on education and other parts of our social and material infrastructure if we hope to live in a viable and decent society in the twenty-first century. Above all, we need to concentrate our national energies on investment and on the prudent stewardship of our resources, and, even more important, on the human consequences of the material development of our society. In other words, while we have learned that the market is an effective mechanism of economic growth in all societies, we are still faced with working out the creative mechanisms for more effective social control of the economy, so that the market contributes to society's good rather than falsely defining it.

It is worth looking at the Reagan administration's rhetoric and its policies in order to understand why they generated great optimism and enthusiasm at first, only to lead eventually to confusion and cynicism. From the beginning, Reagan conveyed a double message: He legitimated the pursuit of self-interest in the form of large-scale private acquisitiveness, while eulogizing family, neighborhood, religion, and work—as they were understood by the new Christian right. One could say that he combined permissiveness with repression. Actually, the permissiveness was the real policy and the repression was largely window dressing, except for some significant changes in the judiciary due to Reagan appointments. Permissiveness toward the rich and the Pentagon has left us with an unbelievable debt, a huge debt service, and the sale of our assets to foreigners on a scale that threatens to make us a dependent nation—while family, neighborhood, religion, and work are as problematic as ever.

Perhaps even more destructive has been Reagan's continuing attack on the idea of government as a positive force—a campaign that according to recent opinion polls has been only partly successful. We have had enough of hypocritical populism, of candidates running against the government they are seeking to lead. We need government. How else can the United States possibly organize and direct its scattered energies during this period of difficult international restructuring? But we must innovate to make government more effective. From the perspective of the common good, innovation means reexamining the relationship of government to the larger society of which it is a part. In America, nongovernmental institutions that are in many respects more public than private are critical to the effective functioning of our political life.

A coherent vision, a public philosophy, provides citizens with the means for understanding and sympathizing with the aims of the president and his party.

The partnership of government with what is often too loosely called "the private sector" should not be confused with a merely reactive "privatization." Government is not always inefficient—think of the TVA—nor is business a paragon of efficiency—think of the automakers in the 1970s before the government's loan to Chrysler. We need to engage the energies of both the public and private sectors, or rather to see that "government" and "public" are not synonymous. Business is "private" only in the sense that it is partly independent of government, but it remains an important part of our public communal life. So do the organizations of working people and the myriad nonprofit organizations of intermediate scale. The involvement of all of these vital elements in our national life is critical to a renewed effort toward attaining the common good. Effective government does not replace other forms of organization; rather, it assists them to do what they do best. That is one way that the common good is realized.

The current Democratic candidate must project a strong positive program, calling on all Americans to share in the task of making our nation sound again, and promising to ensure that whatever sacrifices are required will be shared fairly. In particular, he must promise that labor will not pay the whole price for making our economy more efficient. As the military budget declines, the government must develop agencies to encourage investment in human as well as material resources that will make for a socially healthier economy. If the Democratic candidate can involve the nation in a major effort to rethink the place of work and the economy in our lives, Americans will respond positively.

The "common good" argument can be used to support

significant shifts from recent policy. Such shifts do not mean simply a return to an earlier day, characterized in the popular imagination, however unfairly, as the period of "welfare handouts." Problems that the "truly deprived" face can be linked to problems that affect all Americans. The task is to build a better society for all of us, and, where possible, advantages should be broadly shared. Social Security is a good example. The middle class defends this form of welfare because it shares in the return. For this reason, means testing for Social Security would be a disastrous move that could easily lead to its severe curtailment for the poor. Removal of tax exemption of Social Security income for those above a certain level of affluence would, however, be an appropriate reform. But the notion of a government that simply services more effectively the vast client constituencies (some of them deprived, but most of them middle class or affluent) that have been growing during the last fifty years is not what we have in mind when we speak of a dramatic new turn.

A healthy nation in a healthy world requires the full participation of all of its citizens. The issue is not "welfare," which is a phony issue since most Americans are in some way or another dependent on government payments or services that effectively put us all on "welfare." The issue is whether we can afford as a nation to let a significant proportion of our citizens, most of them children or young adults, sink into illiteracy, skillessness, addiction, and crime. And it is not only the poor who suffer. Burglary, unsafe streets and public transportation, and the high cost of public and private security systems affect us all. But the moral costs of these problems outweigh the material costs. For a society that does not keep its promises to a significant number of its citizens weakens all its citizens, not only the deprived.

The common-good position can enable the Democrats to link the programs they propose more explicitly to the general aspirations of American citizens. The housing situation is a clear example of the need for a change of direction. As with everything else, the Reagan administration has argued that the free market would take care of housing needs. It has eliminated long-standing government programs in support of low-cost housing. In truth, the free market has eliminated inexpensive housing units or left them to decay and abandonment because the return was inadequate. Whatever the smokescreen of excuses, the major cause of homelessness is the lack of affordable housing.

But housing is a problem not only for the poor and the near poor. The middle class spends a much larger percentage of its income on housing than it did a generation ago. Fewer people can look forward to owning their own homes than their parents could, and the rate of mortgage foreclosures is rising. Clearly, housing is not an area where the market, left to itself, produces tolerable results for anyone but the very rich. A broad-based housing program that would link the needs of the poor to those of the middle class is urgently needed and would have massive public appeal. "Home" is a fundamental symbol of American life. We are shocked when people are deprived of it, when they have to make do with overcrowded and inadequate housing, or when they are hard-pressed financially to pay for what they have. Furthermore, we are not apt to be effective workers, good citizens, or responsible parents if we are without adequate housing or are worried about our ability to hold on to it. Here is a common-good issue with wide public appeal.

Yet to phrase policy discussion only in terms of meeting wants and needs, even the most legitimate wants and needs, is to remain locked into the assumptions about our life together that most need to be questioned. Granted, we need to return with renewed vigor to eliminating what Albert Borgmann calls "brute poverty," the poverty that is simply not necessary in a nation as rich as ours. But we also need to address the problems of what Borgmann calls "advanced poverty," what in *Habits of the Heart* we called "the poverty of affluence." The notion of the meaning of life as consisting of competition, consumption, and security produces stunted lives and cultural deprivation in a different form from brute poverty, but in a way more disturbing since advanced poverty is the primary cause of brute poverty.

One might be tempted to ask what governments can do about something that is primarily a moral sickness; yet we must remember that our institutions, both economic and political, create the conditions for this moral sickness. Specific proposals, well within our political tradition, could combat this problem. We should consider, for example, requiring two years of public service from all our young people at the end of high school. This requirement should include a wide range of options. The armed services would be one possibility, but programs such as VISTA and the Peace Corps, as well as a set of designated and monitored nongovernmental programs, could meet the requirement. What all the options would involve is service, with minimal material compensation, that would contribute to the good of others while postponing the individual's own career advancement. Such a program should not be adopted without wide public discussion and the achievement of an effective consensus that it would strengthen an ethic of public service.

As this example indicates, the Democratic candidate, in focusing on the common good, will be advocating particular policies, but will also be doing something

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Why Jewish Women Rebelled in Old Regime Berlin

Deborah Hertz

When Moses Mendelssohn died in 1786, he was convinced that his daughter Dorothea was happy in her marriage to Simon Veit. The couple had two sons, Veit was successful in business, and Dorothea had loyal friends and hosted a lecture society whose members included the most modern Jews in Berlin. Dorothea's life appeared to fit a pattern appropriate to her famous father. Mendelssohn had been far and away the most illustrious Jewish intellectual in Enlightenment Europe: He articulated a modernized interpretation of Judaism that was in many respects the foundation for both Conservative and Reform Judaism.

In truth, at the time of her father's death, Dorothea Mendelssohn was already miserable in her marriage, but she did not want to burden her father with her sorry news. Thirteen years later Dorothea left Simon for the literary star Friedrich Schlegel, converted to Protestantism, and married Schlegel. Later, both of them converted to Catholicism. Dorothea Mendelssohn's friends' lives followed a parallel road, even if their fathers and gentile husbands were not as famous as Mendelssohn or Schlegel. Rahel Levin Varnhagen, Henriette Herz, Amalie Beer, Sara and Marianne Meyer, Sara Levy, and Rebecca Friedlaender belonged to a circle of wealthy Jewish women who rebelled against the traditional Jewish way of life of their time, place, and class. Their lives began conventionally enough given how acculturated their families were: They learned French and piano, read novels, and were married off when they were still young to Jewish businessmen. By the time they were in their mid-twenties most had become popular hostesses, and this fact changed their lives. Many proceeded to leave their husbands and convert to Christianity, and some married again, often to prominent noblemen. These women led tumultuous, complicated lives, but their story has all but disappeared from history's view.

However unknown or obscure they are to today's American reader, the Jewish women of old regime Berlin were famous in their own day. This became clear to me when I was in West Berlin choosing the illustrations for a book on Dorothea and her friends. I overheard an archivist describing my topic to a colleague. "She works on the *Rahelzeit*," he explained. His offhand naming of that period after Rahel Levin was illuminating. It is not that rare for Germans to carve up their history by reference to individuals. King Frederick the Great, Otto von Bismarck, and Adolf Hitler dominate the history of their eras. But it is unusual for an era to be named after a Jewish woman without any standard claim to fame. That the last decades of the eighteenth century, central years in Germany's intellectual legacy, were referred to by the name of a Jewish woman tells much about the special atmosphere of those years: In late eighteenth-century Berlin, an era could be named after someone without that person being a gentile or a man; without her having a title, civil rights, or a public position; and without her publishing her words.

But why bother to resurrect these women today? After all, ours is a time when many Jewish women see their most important fight to be struggling for equality within Judaism. And many historians already try to uncover the plight of the obscure and the impoverished. For both reasons, telling the story of Berlin's rebellious hostesses, most of whom were wealthy and left Judaism, may not seem the most urgent project. Yet the extremely high level of success these women achieved in Berlin's high society is startling. The visitors to their salons—which were kinds of intellectual open houses—included the top princes, diplomats, writers, and artists of the day. That so many of the women in this circle went on to marry their powerful and prestigious guests was all the more remarkable.

The surprising social mobility of this circle calls into question the traditional picture of German and Jewish pasts. In this way, the story of these women is provocative as well as startling. Why were Jewish women so sought after in a land and time noted for its disdain towards both Jews and women? Why did this circle of Jewish women leave Judaism in such dramatic fashion in precisely these years, whereas men of the same class did not begin converting in comparable proportions until well into the nineteenth century? What was it in the Jewish world that repelled these women and why did a noble gentile world take them in?

The story of the Berlin *salonieres* began in 1780,

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when Henriette Herz opened the city's first real salon. Compared to London or Paris, Berlin was a provincial backwater. But even without a royal court, a university, or many publishing houses, the city by 1780 had attracted enough dissolute noblemen and hungry writers to populate salons. But without the rich and cultivated Jewish women to host them, Berlin would never have had so many salons, or perhaps would have had none at all.

Making a salon, at least at the outset, was often a family affair, as the case of Henriette Herz indicates. When they married in 1779, Markus Herz was thirty-two and Henriette de Lemos was fifteen. Born the son of a poor Torah scribe in Berlin, Herz had attended medical school in Koenigsberg, where he also studied philosophy with Immanuel Kant. When he returned to Berlin to practice medicine, he became a friend of Mendelssohn and of Henriette's father, the director of the Jewish Community Hospital. Even before her early marriage to Herz, Henriette showed a spirit and an attractiveness that later proved useful in her salon career. When the children of wealthy families were forbidden by the community elders to present secular plays in theatres in private homes, twelve-year-old Henriette went in costume to plead with the elders and won their permission for the play to go forward. Later, her parents decided to withdraw her from a private girls' day school because her dark beauty attracted so much attention from young men in the streets.

Henriette Herz's beauty, her intellectual talents, her passion for avant-garde literature, and her many friends all contributed to her eventual social success. Yet Markus's income, his professional contacts, and above all his lecture series on natural science also were crucial in the making of their double salon. The salon began when he started to have some "very respectable families" as clients in his medical practice. Some of these patients began coming to his lectures, which took place at the Herz home. The Herzes started to invite the most interesting people from the lecture audience to dinner beforehand. In this way, their double salon evolved, as Henriette discussed poetry and novels with the young romantics in one room while her husband led dialogues on reason, science, and enlightenment in the other. The double salon came to an end when Markus died suddenly in 1803. Because she and Markus had been spending so much money on entertaining, Henriette was too poor to continue hosting in grand style. And her reluctance to convert until her mother died limited the ways that she could support herself. She turned down offers of marriage and governess posts, and simply boarded country girls who had come into Berlin to prepare for jobs as domestic servants. She did convert after her mother died in 1817, but her social life never regained the splendor of the days before her husband's death.

A decade after the Herzes first opened their salon, Henriette's childhood friend, Rahel Levin, opened the city's second and ultimately most famous salon. Levin's story shows that although a rich and learned husband was definitely an asset in opening a salon, the absence of such a man did not doom a salon career, provided that one's parents had connections and money and one had a charismatic personality. When she was an adolescent, Rahel Levin used to sit in on her father's dinner parties with nobles and actors, feeling like a *schlemeil*, a "nobody," around such elegant guests. She blamed her misery then, as she did later, on her Jewishness. When she was in her twenties, she wrote to her cousin David Veit that "it is as if some supramundane being, just as I was thrust into this world, plunged these words with a dagger into my heart: yes, have sensibility, see the world as few see it, be great and noble.... But I add one thing more: be a Jewess! And now my life is a slow bleeding to death." She concluded that the best way to avoid being treated like a Jew was to avoid cities and situations populated with other Jews. She prided herself on flouting Jewish customs, openly riding in a carriage through the streets of Berlin on the Sabbath. By refusing to marry the suitable Jewish businessmen proposed by her family, she risked the loneliness that resulted from moving away from the Jewish world while still being rejected by the noble, gentile world.

Yet slowly, during the early 1790s, Levin tentatively began to enter the elegant noble circles she had worshiped from afar as an adolescent. She spent mornings writing letters, afternoons learning English and mathematics, and evenings often at the opera or the theatre. Afterward, her increasingly wide circle of gentile friends was delivered by carriage to her mother's home in the center of town, where these friends climbed the stairs to her attic apartment. There they gossiped and discussed Iffland's plays, Goethe's novels, and the course of the French Revolution. In spite of her social success, Levin had difficulty in her private life, losing two noble suitors in the years around the turn of the century. She remained single until she was forty-two. Her salon dispersed after the French invaded Berlin in 1806, and she was bitterly lonely until she converted and married diplomat and writer Karl Varnhagen von Ense in 1814.

Not all of the salon women were beautiful like Henriette Herz, or bold and opinionated like Rahel Levin. Sara Levy's father, Daniel, belonged to the most powerful and privileged Jewish family of the time. Both her sisters married wealthy Jewish financiers in Vienna, where they opened salons in the Berlin style. Sara, too, married within the faith, stayed married to her husband, and never converted. The Levys entertained regularly in their grand home across from the stock exchange.

Every Thursday a group of ten to fourteen guests was invited for a noon dinner, and on Sunday afternoons the Levys held an open house for tea. Frau Levy spoke French like a native and played the piano for both Hayden and Mozart, two of her most famous guests. To be sure, Sara Levy did not have the reputation of a scintillating hostess; people complained that her salon gatherings were boring, that she was a bit of a philistine, and that she was a name-dropper. But to host a salon that was prominent enough even to attract such criticism was itself a major accomplishment.

A glamorous salon that ended quite abruptly was hosted by Philippine Cohen, who entered the world as Hitzel Zuelz. Hitzel's father owned a large silk factory that once employed Moses Mendelssohn. With her huge dowry of 100,000 talers, she married an entrepreneur from Amsterdam named Ephraim Cohen, dubbed the "English Cohen" because he introduced English spinning machines into Berlin. Husband, wife, and two children all converted in 1800, and Hitzel became Philippine. Their opulent household adjoining Herr Cohen's wool factory was large and included tutors and clerks. Philippine's mother and her sister, who had divorced her Jewish husband and married two nobleman in succession, were frequent guests. Almost daily, a wider society joined the Cohens for lunch, gossip, piano-playing, and the reading aloud of novels and personal diaries. The good times came to an end in the summer of 1804, however, when Herr Cohen's mismanagement of his business led to its collapse. He went bankrupt, and the court took over his factory and issued a warrant for his arrest. He escaped to Holland, his family lost its fortune, and the Cohen salon was no more.

These brief glimpses of Henriette Herz's, Rahel Levin's, Sara Levy's, and Philippine Cohen's salons suggest the kind of social life the Jewish women created around themselves. But why were upwardly mobile intermarriages the consequence of salons? To begin with, salon friends and salon performances stimulated these women to master German and French, useful tools for falling in love with men who spoke these languages. Nevertheless, it was surprising that so many of these men ended up marrying the Jewish women with whom they spoke about literature. Little would change the Jewish women's lives more dramatically than intermarriage, for marriage was the central social act for women in the eighteenth century. These women's first husbands had been carefully chosen by their own fathers, based largely on family wealth and status. Love rarely played a role. In spite of all the social advantages a lasting marriage provided, nine of the twenty salon women eventually divorced their Jewish husbands.

Prior to embarking upon the path of divorce, conversion, and intermarriage, the Jewish salon women had committed only part of their lives to a glittering gentile world. By catapulting themselves almost completely out of the Jewish world, they gained tremendous personal freedom. But with this freedom came loneliness as well as condescension from the same friends they depended on in order to build their new lives. What, we might ask, enabled these women to venture beyond balanced acculturation to heady, perhaps risky, integration?

The answer to this question is not simple, and only one part of the answer can be discussed here. Many noblemen had an economic motive to marry wealthy Jewish women. On one level, the men married for money, beauty, and cultivation, and the women married for status—certainly rarely for looks. But in any case, neither the noble nor the commoner gentile grooms whom the salon brides married tended to be the most eligible of their class. Having been rejected by two noble suitors, Rahel Levin had to abandon her hope of gaining overnight social legitimation by becoming a countess. Varnhagen was fourteen years her junior and without secure career prospects when she married him. Marianne Meyer's nobleman, Prince von Reuss, was much older and "ugly as the night." When he died, his family succeeded in denying her the title that was hers by marriage, and she was forced to petition the Austrian crown to be allowed to call herself Frau von Eybenberg. Similarly, Friedrich Schlegel may have been a young literary lion, but he was decidedly underemployed. By running off with him, Dorothea Veit may have escaped from the leisured boredom of a life with Simon Veit, but it was an escape into the frantic copying, translating, and writing necessary to keep them afloat financially. Without Simon Veit's generosity, their situation would have been even more tenuous. And Baron von Grotthuss, Sara Meyer's noble husband, lost his fortune during the Napoleonic invasion, and the couple ended up living modestly in Oranienburg, where the baron was employed as a postmaster.

Regardless of how poor or unattractive a noble groom might have been, his title was valuable to a prospective Jewish bride. Her Jewish origins, on the other hand, even if formally covered over with a new religion, were undoubtedly a source of embarrassment to the groom and his family. In an era when the status of a new in-law had a huge effect on both mates' families, taking on a converted Jewish relative was a major decision. The woman's compensatory qualities were crucial for easing the pain. To be sure, sometimes Jewish fathers went to court to try to prevent their daughters from bringing inheritances into an intermarriage, but, as one protracted trial showed, the daughters had the law on their side.

On the most basic level, the Jewish-noble inter-

marriages represented the exchange of status for wealth, an exchange that reflected the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the noble and the Jewish estates in Prussia. Many noble families suffered from a capital shortage in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Landed estates were divided among all the sons, city living increased the nobles' expenses, and high land prices were an incentive to get the needed cash by selling off plots of large estates to commoners. The result was short-term solvency and long-term crisis. As for the rich Berlin Jews, their fantastic wealth was necessary just to be in Berlin at all. Prussian kings tried mightily to restrict Jewish immigration to those Jews who already possessed large amounts of liquid capital and who had the connections in Eastern Europe to make far more. The fortunes they made in service to the crown paid for the leisure, the tutors, the books, the theatre tickets, and the silk dresses that made their daughters so attractive. Thus, the coincidence of noble poverty and Jewish wealth, and the absence in those years of a public banking system that could lend money anonymously, help to explain the Jewish-noble intermarriages.

Economic explanations for intermarriages do, of course, have interpretive limitations. For one thing, the noble need for cash sometimes led to anti-Semitism as easily as to intermarriage. A second limit to the economic interpretation is that too little is known about the individual finances of every intermarrying couple to be sure that all these marriages actually involved a wealthy Jewish bride and an impoverished noble. There were, moreover, powerful ideological trends in Berlin in those years that also played a role in motivating Jewish women and noblemen to intermarry. In the 1780s, the optimistic deism of the late Enlightenment made religious differences seem rather temporary. The notion that Judaism and Christianity would soon merge provided an intellectual justification that reinforced the Jewish women's personal motives for conversion. The absence of a Reform movement within Judaism also contributed to the women's decisions to convert, since in the late eighteenth century the choices were simply Orthodox Judaism or Christianity. And as the romantic movement, with its praise of the dark stranger, gained ground among Berlin intellectuals in the 1790s, the exotic, soulful beauty of many of the Jewish salon women made them all the more attractive to their noble suitors.

By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century, the delicate combination of economic needs and ideological trends that had culminated in the Jewish salons disappeared. The reaction to Napoleon's occupation of Prussia was a new nationalism. Jews, French cultural styles, sexual freedom, and intellectual women were all attacked as un-Prussian. After her salon friends had deserted her, the once popular Rahel Levin cried: "Where are our days, when we were all together! They went under in the year 1806. Went under like a ship: containing the loveliest goods of life, the loveliest pleasures."

From our perspective, the disappearance of the Jewish salons may not seem like the disaster that these women considered it to be. For even if their salons had made possible a socially useful second marriage, their wider social world did indeed begin to break apart in 1806. Their short-lived successes were, moreover, historically unique. Successive generations of Berlin Jews followed the salon women's footsteps, converting, intermarrying, and actively participating in secular high culture, but after this generation Jewish men were more successful than women in assimilating. Furthermore, no Jewish circles again achieved the salon women's level of intimate integration into the elite of German society.

Jewish historians in the past have not been particularly saddened by the passing of the Jewish salons. After all, these women abandoned Judaism, apparently without much regret, merely to advance themselves socially. For anyone whose focus is Judaism itself, the salon women can hardly be a model for Jewish women to follow. But for the many Jewish feminists ambivalent about religion and in search of a usable past, the issue is not so simple. The salon women needed a great deal of intellectual sophistication to succeed with their salons and a great deal of courage to leave their families for a noble social universe that was, at best, ambivalent about accepting them. They had an unusual historical chance, and they took it.

In our time, Jewish women try to "have it all," expecting creative fulfillment in work, romantic love, a vibrant family life, and perhaps also success in achieving sexual equality in Jewish life. Two hundred years ago, even the wealthiest women from one of the world's most sophisticated Jewish communities felt themselves lucky to realize one of these dreams, and certainly never imagined realizing all of them.

So while the *salonières* may be no one's model for the future, their story teaches us much about the past. German society was not always closed to women intellectuals, and Jewish women were not always at home being traditional while their brothers and husbands entered the secular world. Jewish women were able to create a new life, even if they paid an enormous price in the process by repudiating family and faith. □

Making It in the World Capital of Art: The Work of Art in the Age of Commodity Production

Marx W. Wartofsky

It's all over. Modernism is dead. Art history is finished. The end of art has arrived (once again). Communiqués from the cultural front lines keep arriving by the month, by the week, almost by the hour. Depending on what you read and whom you listen to, the artworld is going through either an apocalypse or a revolution or its death throes or a rebirth or a case of the giggles or one damn thing after another. The bewildering multitude of "endings" is matched by an equally bewildering plethora of "beginnings," since each "ending" seems to entail, dialectically, a beginning which serves as its negation: for every *x* there is a post-*x* which supersedes it, transcends it, or otherwise replaces it. Frontline reporters from the trenches in Soho, Tribeca, the East Village, or from the besieged fortresses on Fifth Avenue's "Museum Mile," or at MOMA, tell breathlessly of breakthroughs, near-breakthroughs, breakdowns, innovations, borrowings, derivations, references. The operative categories are "movements," "styles," "schools," "directions"; or the anticategorical: belonging to no movement, being "post"-style, not assignable to any school, not going anywhere because already "there"; being unique, authentic, identifiable, nameable, recognizable the second time around. Everybody's waiting to see What Will Happen Next, where the next wave is coming from, who's going to make it big. Or we are being assured, postmodern fashion, that there is no longer any "next," that the art-historical ideology of continuity, development, and the dialectic of problems and solutions is *passé*.

All of this *angst* is apparently good for business, however. Lots of blockbuster shows in museums, lots of galleries, lots of sales. At Castelli, Chryssa's "industrial pasta wall pieces" are on exhibit. One of them, "City Landscape: Mott St. no. 2," is going for $180,000. Elsewhere, an abstraction by the Russian modernist Alexander Vesnin is on sale for $300,000. One of Ben Shahn's social-critical series on the Sacco-Vanzetti case—"The Four Prosecutors," (1931–32)—can be acquired for only $100,000. Small change! Just a year ago, Christie's auctioned off Van Gogh's "Sunflowers" for a cool $39.9 million, and last fall Sotheby's pushed the same artist's "Irises" for a record $53.9 million. (If Van Gogh were alive today, he would turn over in his grave!) A recent article on art theft in New York is full of thought-provoking social significance (apart from the scale of the thefts, e.g., the ten-million-dollar-heist from the Colnaghi Gallery last February): "Gilbert Edelson, vice-president of the Art Dealer's Association, estimates that art in New York City has grown from a two-billion-dollar-a-year industry five years ago to a five-billion-dollar-a-year business today." Never mind the figures; reflect on the locutions: "art industry," "five-billion-dollar-a-year business."

Somewhere in the narrow space left between art-talk and artbiz—between art-critics, art-journalists, art-historians, on the one hand, and the marketplace on the other—there is the artwork: the *sine qua non* without which there would be nothing to talk about and nothing to sell, no movements, no endings and beginnings, no auctions, no galleries, no museums, no critics, no art-historians, no art-groupies, no Soho. After all is said and sold, what counts is art. It is the work of art, the work of artists, that creates the possibility of a market. But here comes the converse, in the form of a question: to what extent does the market create the possibilities of the artwork? And what possibilities are they? To put this question a different way: In what ways does the art market affect the contemporary proliferation of "styles" and "movements" in art?

Artists have been producing for one market or another throughout history and across cultures. So it would be a bit precious and coy, and also wrong, to claim that only now, in the den of finance-capital, has the artist become a seller, or a sell-out artist. The artist as a craftsperson, as a decorator of architecture, as a celebrator of civic virtues, as a recorder of wealth or power, as illustrator of God's word or the Church's authority, or

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the worldly status of newly wealthy burghers, or as portraitist in the service of family memory, or as advertising agent, has, in all these and other ways, always worked for a boss, a patron, a subcontractor. Often, patrons would decide not only what subjects they wanted to have painted, but how much paint should be used, and what colors, and what the position and size of the figures to be represented in the painting should be. A commission is a commission, after all, and the customer knows what s/he wants. This never bothers us much about, say, Egyptian or classical art, or about medieval or Renaissance painting. Somehow, there is the vague vision of the artist as part of some organic community, a servant of higher powers, a craftsperson among craftspeople, whose name we do not know and perhaps cannot know, since the work is in large part communal. But we have been brought up, especially since the nineteenth century, on an alternative story: of the artist as creator, as free and autonomous agent, bound first and foremost by the urgencies of expression or by canons of beauty or visions of perfection, or by the forces of aesthetic necessity and artistic truth. Here, the authentic individual creator leaves us the autographic imprint of personal genius, virtuosity, vision. Modernism breaks the traditional bonds of incorporation of the artist in a fixed and acknowledged social role. He (rarely she) is cast adrift (or breaks loose) to become a free agent. Like free labor, loosed from indenture to the soil and to feudal obligations at the inception of capitalism, the artist owns nothing but the ability to work. Unlike free labor, however, the artist retains the small-craftsperson's prerogatives. In many cases, where the artist is not simply the commissioned worker hired to produce some artifact already owned in advance by the contractor, the artist also owns the product of his or her work and therefore can sell it. Or refuse to. Or give it away. Or trade it for fish or beer. The starving artist in the garrets of Bohemia, in that romantic fantasy that clouds our vision of the nineteenth century, has to live, after all. And unless one has a rich brother, or an indulgent family, or an independent income, or teaches a little on the side, or paints flowers on dishes in a ceramic factory, one has to show in order to sell. To show, one has to get into the showplace. The salon, the gallery, the drawing rooms of the rich and of the connoisseurs develop as a marketplace for the free artist. Or prospective buyers can be invited to one's own studio, to look over the goods.

Quality is presumably judged by price, and ideally price and worth coincide. But if the classical economists have already come to grief in attempting to distinguish "natural price" from "market price" in the ordinary precincts of truck and barter, imagine how little they have to say about the vagaries of the commodity market in artworks. Marx's distinction (borrowed from Aristotle) between use-value and exchange-value doesn't provide any enlightenment either. Analogies between artworks and rarities or scarce items help only if there is a good theory about the latter; and there isn't, except to say that if something is rare and lots of people with money desire it, its price will be high. No kidding! Therefore, some social certification and authentication of the worth of artworks is needed.

With regard to collectibles—antiques, rare coins, statues and paintings whose stock is severely limited because the civilization they come from no longer exists—art history becomes the *Mashgiakh*, the certifier of what is kosher, authentic. Aesthetic quality is another matter, however. Here, connoisseurship and art criticism enter in. Historically, such criticism is itself a high art, represented by such seminal minds as Diderot's, in his *Salons*, or Ruskin's. Taste and judgment in art become subject matter for the subtlest epistemological analyses, e.g., in Hume ("Of the Standard of Taste"), or Kant, (*Critique of Judgment*).

The history of art itself becomes more than a chronicle, and is reconstructed as an aspect of the progressive enlightenment of the human species, or indeed as an all but final achievement of Absolute Spirit, and therefore it is cosmic in its import. (The final stage is reserved for philosophy, by Hegel, who, one must remember, is a philosopher and not an artist.) Now with such friends among the critics, historians, and philosophers of art, who needs enemies? The artist can now learn from them what is worthy, what an authentic aesthetic judgment is, and what place one's work is assigned in the dialectic of enlightenment. In short, the artist is reincorporated into the social structure by the theorist and the historian.

Art, to be accepted, must be understood. If the artist is doing something "difficult," i.e., outside the easier and more familiar canons of the artworld at some given time, then that needs to be explained, both in terms of its own project, and in its connection with other works of art, styles, periods. Originality and progress are after all hallmarks of genius, that faculty which abides by no rule but sets its own terms. So far so good. Things are nice. The taste of connoisseurs and curators, of collectors and art buyers (a new class of middlemen who buy in order to sell) is assured by an aesthetic rationality grounded in the aesthetic continuities of form, color, drawing, and composition, yet urbane and flexible in its appreciation of innovation, of the *avant-garde*. As for the crazies, the wild animals of art who are obviously outside any canon, and whose purpose is not art but disturbance, why, keep *them* out!

The nineteenth century rolls along majestically, with some minor irritations, several revolutions, a war between France and Germany, the Paris Commune, and the extraordinary development of Paris as the Capital of the Nineteenth Century and the world capital of art. In his brilliant study of this period, Walter Benjamin sees Baudelaire as the paradigmatic figure of the contradiction between traditional modes of art and the radical break which modernism represents. However radical that break is to become, it starts slowly and takes most of a century to build up steam. Its exemplars and nearest ancestors are by now so well-known and appreciated as to have lost their freshness and audacity for our eyes; we need to shock ourselves into (relative) visual innocence again, to be able to see them: Corot, Courbet, Turner, Delacroix, Géricault; then Manet, of course, and Pissarro, and Sisley, and Monet, and on and on through the impressionist, "post"-impressionist, expressionist, symbolist, pointilist, constructivist, cubist, analytical cubist, dadaist, futurist, abstractionist, nonobjectivist, etc., etc. All of which we may call "traditional modernism" if it weren't so patently oxymoronic. This art certainly wasn't traditional in its time, though its deep links with tradition are clear, and become clearer with study. (An instructive gem of an exhibit, "Cezanne's Basel Notebooks," recently at the Museum of Modern Art, shows the Basel Museum's collection of Cezanne's sketches, in which he, in effect, 'Cezannizes' antique sculptures, Rubens, Coysevox, Poussin, Chardin and others, by his distinctive line.) But so untraditional was "traditional modernism" in the nineteenth century that it was refused showing, so that the artists had to rent their own exhibition space and canonize the dialectic of opposition, of being "post," "anti," and "non," by calling it the *Salon des Refusés*.

Then comes the Armory Show in New York, in 1913, and all of this stuff is seen on this side of the Atlantic, and the fat (or the oil?) is in the fire: modernism strikes in the U.S. of A.! Some wealthy, prerevolutionary Russian merchants of cultivated artistic taste bought a lot of it from the artists in Paris, and, to this day, there is no more stunning display of French modern painting, outside the present consolidated collection in the Musée D'Orsay perhaps, than there is in the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad. In the U.S., Alfred Barr of the Museum of Modern Art, and some savvy private purchasers like Alfred Barnes and Joseph Hirshhorn, bought enough of the stuff at bargain rates in the early days to build major collections here. Now, if you want a really good Van Gogh, or even a moderately good Picasso, you're going to have to go to seven or eight figures. And why would anyone want to spend that kind of money to own something, the equivalent of which or, better, can be seen for free (or for $5) any day of the week except Monday? Certainly not because they want to enjoy looking at it in solitude. Nobody with that kind of money puts that much value on either aesthetic experience or solitude; if they had, they wouldn't have made that kind of money, Q.E.D. Therefore, question number one: How come a painting by Van Gogh is worth (in the marketplace) $53.9 million?

Everybody's waiting to see What Will Happen Next, where the next wave is coming from, who's going to make it big.

Question number two: How come modernism is dead, art history is finished, and it's the end of art? If it's dead, why is dead modern art so expensive? If art history is over, why are there so many "new" styles and schools and movements vying for hegemony and elbowing each other in the corridors of the artworld? And if it's the end of art (once again, again) why do the post-art genres—say, conceptual "art," or installations, or earth art, or performance art—keep imitating the old game by exhibiting, selling, signing names to works (OK, Mark Kostabi has other painters do "his" works, and he even has what he calls "my signature person" to sign them, thereby sending up "signed originals" by the use of quotational contexts) and doing all the old things artists used to do before art ended?

My brief and shamefully flawed excursus into how art became a commodity on the market left off at the point where "refused" modern art arranged its own salon, and began to gather some heavy critical support on its side, so that forward-looking collectors started to buy, and informed dealers started to represent the new movements. Taste, as we know, had to be educated to appreciate the new artforms, and to discriminate wheat from chaff, art from junk, within these forms. But this has all happened, so that the only thing shocking about a Van Gogh or a Picasso these days is its price; and we will get used to that too, just as we have gotten used to dollar-a-gallon gasoline and the fifty-five-cent Hershey bar. (Imagine, a six-cent bar of candy selling at more than nine times its natural price!)

But what about the new stuff? What about the proliferation of "styles" in the present? Isn't this simply a second wave of modernism—"post" in that sense only—in which some radical breaks with what has become currently traditional take place just as they took place a century ago? I think not. Let me suggest some differences: First, modernism, in painting

at least, developed its styles—say, impressionism, abstraction, German expressionism—largely as part of an internal dialectic of forms and concepts in art. Though these movements are deeply related to social, political, and intellectual currents of their time, they are not yet crucially and essentially related to economic life, and especially not to the political economy of the artworld. This by reason of the open possibilities of marginalized existence, and the very roots of the movement in rejecting and being rejected by the prevailing market structures. (Countercultural hippies surviving by doing odd jobs in a Vermont farm community—an existence possible in only selected cultural time warps for limited periods—may be one analogy; another: Greenwich Village in the 1930s.) The vaunted alienation of the artist from society, the detachment from establishment ties and social (even moral!!) obligations that is presumed to give the artist autonomy, is in fact a *dis*alienation: the artist alienates him/herself *from* an alienated society, is at home with the community of artists, and with anti-establishment politics, and with free spirits everywhere. Radicalism, especially after the First World War, made the autonomy of art a matter of principle, and where it was fought out as an issue, the opposition wasn't between aesthetic freedom and selling out on the market; it was, rather, between *L'Art pour l'art* and social realism in the interests of the proletarian revolution. The Great Depression solved the economic problem for artists by providing them with the State Support they wouldn't have dreamed of earlier. In the U.S., the Federal Arts Project, with its populist ideology, supported a wide dissemination of public art, but it also supported easel art, so that art production covered not only post office and federal building walls with murals, but also gave a generation of American artists a chance to stick to their painting and to develop a wide range of personal styles. Take a typical case: the late Philip Guston started with the Federal Arts Project, went to Mexico to study with the Mexican muralists and social painters, came back to New York, later became a pillar of so-called Abstract Expressionism, then in his last years developed an outrageous and original kind of New York sidewalk kid's drawing style, enormous in its energy and humor, graphic and direct and offering the kind of sophisticated naïveté that transcends the usual canons of aesthetics, as Matisse also does. Guston made a living painting and teaching, but by the time the New York market became judge and jury, he had already made it. He was an old-timer.

The system no longer worked that way for new entrants. Marginal existence in New York is brutal and unlivable. New York, the art capital of the world, is tough on poor people, artists included. Because New York is also the media center of the U.S., there is lots of art-related work that filters through in advertising, film, publishing, TV, even in city agencies. That's so-called "Commercial Art," and one reason much of contemporary media stuff is artistically good, even as it is substantively banal and degrading, is that there is so much talent around looking for an opening. An opening into what? The artworld proper. The "Fine Arts." But because the art market has changed in a radical way, doing art the old way, i.e., the "modern" way, won't work any more. What's on sale is no longer the artwork, but the artwork as emblem of a style, a school, a movement. And because artworks in a given style soon saturate the market, once they have "hit," there is an internal compulsion for the market to deliver something "new." True, there is all the great old stuff, the old masters and the "modern" masters. But much of it is in the hands of museums, by virtue of the reputation of the older schools; and it will come on the market again only in deacquisition, a difficult and tricky route for museums. And, more important, all the old masters are dead. No possibility of replenishing inventory there (except by occasional forgery). A market without a source of supply, without production of commodities, is no market at all. But the new art market commodity is a strange one: it is an investment. Therefore, it is bought neither for the use-value of enjoyment; nor for the purpose of exhibiting one's wealth and social power by the show of one's possessions in art; nor for the sake of endowing an institution to assure one's posterity or one's reputation for generosity and public service. Art is bought because of the return on the investment that is likely to ensue, and for this purpose, reputation is all: the investment is worth whatever will be paid for it. There is no "fair" price, no overprice and no underprice. There's just price. In a market of limited buyers—i.e., in every possible market—what comes to attention, what shows, sells. In the game of show and sell, hype outmaneuvers connoisseurship, by far; but that's not because the connoisseurs can't tell good art from bad. Rather, it's because that doesn't matter any more. It's not "good art" that's on sale; it's what's "hot," what is constituted as the object it is by what gets said about it in the right places.

The neat thing about this is that it doesn't discriminate against good art. If the hype is right, it has just as good a chance to get sold in this investment market as does obvious junk. But then, that means that the artwork, in a society where marginal existence by the artist is no longer easily available, is tied more and more firmly to the market in investment futures. At least in the art capital of the world. □

Nostalgia, Under the Sun

Some summer days are perfect.
Summer is a state of mind:
Sunlight and absolute play.
In the North, in Scotland, too,
The balance of noon provides.
I watched the cattle drinking
Where their field slopes to the burn.
How old? About five or six.
One day, was it, or many?
The ash-tree's leafy filter
Mixes sky and mid-day glare,
Marsh-marigolds and cow-cack
With its khaki-orange flies,
The heifers' herded, placid—
Nervy mass—such bulk and flux
Grazing the stream with blowing
Slobbering breath, flared nostrils, coughs.
They tread the earth, they charge it,
Fertile soil—they make it flood:
River where the Lake Burn ran,
The Nith, in its course, the Nile.
Each place has *some* summer days
It feels how the world was made.
Sky-cow: Egypt in Scotland,
In an unformed wandering soul;
Cleopatra, "like a cow
In June"? That would come later.
Life enough, then, innocent
Of Shakespeare, cosmology,
Or aim: seeming—something—free.
Water, warmth, ammoniac mud,
I am back where summer starts,
A magical amalgam
Almost out of reach—but not:
Not quite—it is there—not yet ...

Venice Revisited

Once it was slow things—snails: now, what is quick—
Lizards, the glancing sideways-shifting flies,
Stirring into words this garden, my brain ...
Twelve years to Venice and this hard-based house,
A bagatelle, a puff of air, no more ...
To me an age of life and what is left
(A quarter almost of it all so far—
And how do *I* know anything's to come?).

I watched a wasp this morning seize its prey—
A gripping curve of mandibles and sting
Attacks the hovering stripy cousin-fly,
Bears it down to the flagstones and the shade.
It sets to work with systematic aim;
It chews; the thorax breached, one wing drops off.
Machine-like then, such strength of lift and flight,
It flies the body upwards to a leaf
And there goes on with its dismantling meal.

Later—it's lunchtime—I enjoy the sun,
Sitting where just above me grow some figs.
How fast they turn and ripen one by one:
A race, slow-motion, but each hour they change.
The great green beetles know it, watch and wait,
Already parked, embedded, packed in pulp,
Inside the flesh, dark seeds, what's left, the first fruit ripe.
Hard casings glint in wrinkled sticky skin:
Scarabs in form, in pace, they measure time,
Egyptian ages but the pressing moment too.
It seems like speed to me; time hurries on,
Life quickens—quicker, sharper: what a joke, but true.

—Christopher Salvesen

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In recent months, the tension between blacks and Jews has once again become a focus of national media attention. The New York presidential primary was dominated by discussion about this issue, precipitated in part by Mayor Koch's pronouncement that any Jew would have to be crazy to vote for Jesse Jackson. At the same time, large numbers of blacks on college campuses have shown up to cheer Louis Farrakhan, displaying particular enthusiasm at moments when Farrakhan explicitly chides the Jewish people. Last fall, hoping to put the "Jewish issue" to rest by allowing Jesse Jackson to explain his views in considerable detail to the Jewish world, Tikkun *printed a lengthy interview with the man who would go on to be the first black presidential candidate to amass millions of white votes. Unfortunately, the interview itself became the subject of controversy. Some readers found evidence of the very problems they had most feared, and others were upset that the questions* Tikkun *asked pushed Jackson too much and ultimately caused him to give unsatisfactory responses.*

We present here some reflections on the way that problems between blacks and Jews have developed historically, hoping that these reflections will provide a context for further discussion. In future issues we will present other perspectives on the history of black-Jewish relations, as well as further discussion of ways that blacks and Jews can work together.

Blacks and Jews: An Historical Perspective

Jonathan Kaufman

One morning in 1984, Black Muslim minister Louis Farrakhan, who had angered many Jews by saying that Hitler was a "great man ... wickedly great" and denounced Judaism as a "dirty religion," spoke at the *Boston Globe* where I work. For several years, at the *Globe* and at the *Wall Street Journal*, I had written about black issues: poverty in black families, problems facing black executives in business, and violent attacks against blacks in Boston. I had just finished a series on job discrimination and racism in Boston. Soon I would be working on a major story on Jews in politics. I was anxious to hear Farrakhan in person.

His speech, from a news point of view, was unremarkable. Farrakhan said more or less what he had been saying in public all year. But what happened after Farrakhan left overwhelmed me. Within minutes, shouting matches erupted between blacks and Jews in the newsroom, many of them reporters and editors who had worked together for years. How, black reporters asked, could Jews claim to be political allies but be so opposed to quotas and critical of affirmative action? How, Jewish reporters responded, could blacks be so blind to the impact of the Holocaust and brush off both the terror Jews experienced when hearing anti-Semitic slurs and their feelings of vulnerability in a world that could turn hostile at any moment? The arguments were as much over personal responses as they were over politics. I stood in the newsroom arguing with a black college intern that banks and newspapers were not, in fact, owned by Jews. A black friend of mine stood in the parking lot for forty-five minutes saying that no one—no white, no Jew—could understand what it had been like to work for a white-owned newspaper for fifteen years. Allies in so many causes, friends at so many levels, it was clear how little blacks and Jews knew about each other.

As a young Jew—I was born in 1956, two years after *Brown v. Board of Education* outlawed segregation in public schools, the year of the Montgomery bus boycott and the 1956 Arab-Israeli war—I grew up taking black-Jewish cooperation for granted. I knew how the two groups had marched together in Mississippi and had sung songs together along the road from Selma to Montgomery. I knew that Jews had contributed money to black organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). The first two presidents of the NAACP had been Jewish brothers, the Spingarns. Jack Greenberg, head of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and architect of many landmark cases establishing civil rights, was a Jew. And two of the three civil rights workers killed in

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Mississippi in the summer of 1964 were Jewish: Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman.

James Baldwin once wrote: "The Negro identifies himself almost wholly with the Jews, [considering] that he is a Jew, in bondage to a hard taskmaster and waiting for a Moses to lead him out of Egypt." Baldwin's words made sense to me. I knew that, as Jews, my family and I would always be outsiders. Blacks were outsiders, too. Returning to my parent's home in 1986 for Passover, I watched as friends of my parents—longtime liberals whose oldest son, now nearing thirty, had passed out leaflets as a toddler for John F. Kennedy—led everyone at the table in a chorus of "We Shall Overcome." I know how proud my father, an advertising executive, had been back in the 1960s when he was asked to write some advertising for the NAACP. And I knew how hurt he was one day when he came home and said he had been fired from the account because he was white.

It was clear long before 1984 that the alliance that fought for civil rights in the South in the 1950s was becoming weaker. The growth of Black Power, coupled with the increase in city crime, much of it committed by blacks, unnerved the residents of my neighborhood on the Upper West Side of Manhattan and disrupted our lives. The killing of Martin Luther King in 1968 seemed to break the final link many whites felt with a black movement that was becoming more angry and more frightening, filling the TV screens with images of people carrying guns and demanding reparations. The disputes over Israel in the 1970s and 1980s and the debates about affirmative action were added evidence that blacks and Jews were drifting further apart.

In the 1984 presidential election, blacks and Jews were two of only a handful of groups—the others being Hispanics, Asians, and the unemployed—who deserted the Reagan landslide to vote for Democrat Walter Mondale. But that electoral coalition masked deep fissures in black-Jewish relations. Jesse Jackson's campaign and the controversy over his "hymie" and "hymietown" remarks aggravated the pain and anger that had been brewing for a long time.

Still, the passions unleashed by Farrakhan at the *Globe* surprised me. I wanted to find out what had happened. What was it that first brought blacks and Jews together and why have they now split so bitterly apart?

* * *

In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s blacks and Jews shared a common enemy: the prejudiced, white gentile. It was not preordained that Jews would enlist in the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s or embrace the liberalism of the New Deal, the Great Society, and the Democratic party. Reading from a prayer book and being exposed to Jewish values did not guarantee a political commitment to helping blacks or other minorities. Unlike the Quakers, or even the blue blood Protestant Brahmins of Boston, American Jews did not have a history of becoming involved in liberal causes, even during the Civil War. Rather, several strains in the history of Jews in America came together and set the stage for the liberal outlook that dominated Jewish political life from the end of the Second World War onward: the flood of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe that began in the latter part of the nineteenth century; the rise of anti-Semitism in the United States; and the Holocaust in Europe.

Black attitudes towards Jews were intimately tied up with their attitudes towards whites.

The influx of more than two million Eastern European Jews between 1880 and 1920 overwhelmed the Jewish community already in the United States and transformed its politics. The first wave of Jewish immigrants from Germany had arrived with business on its mind and success in its future. Politically, these Jews clung to a conservative outlook that they had brought with them from Europe. The new arrivals, however, were overwhelmingly poor and working class, and they brought with them a new ideology, largely unknown in America: socialism. Thus, a Jew growing up in a Jewish neighborhood between 1910 and 1950 did not have to be a socialist or a communist to inhale the talk of socialism and equality that blew all around. It permeated life, creating a worldview in which blacks were objects of sympathy rather than hate, potential allies rather than foes, people who could be helped and who could make Jews feel good for having helped them.

The rise of anti-Semitism in the United States, beginning in the late nineteenth century, reinforced the sense that Jews were outsiders. Exclusions from country clubs and quotas at universities, the rantings of Father Coughlin and Henry Ford—all these things pushed Jews towards demands for greater tolerance and change. One of the many legacies of the Holocaust was the belief among Jews that what happened in Germany could happen again anywhere. In 1946, only months after the discovery of the Nazi death camps, a poll showed that twenty-two percent of the American people considered Jews to be a "menace to America." As the twentieth century's ultimate victims, Jews could easily identify with other victims of oppression and injustice. So, when Martin Luther King called for a society that judged men "not by the color of their skin but by the

content of their character," he spoke a language that touched not only blacks but Jews.

Among blacks there was a strong history of positive feelings towards Jews, rooted in the biblical story of the Exodus which resonated among slaves, in the charitable work of businessmen like Julius Rosenwald (the founder of Sears Roebuck, who funded the so-called Rosenwald schools across the South), and in the political activities of Jews like William Liebowitz, who defended the Scottsboro Boys.

But there was also a strong history of ambivalence. St. Clair Drake, one of the country's leading black sociologists, recounts the story of walking down the road in Staunton, Virginia, in the Shenandoah Valley with his grandmother one day in 1920. Drake was accompanying his grandmother to a school for white girls where she worked as a maid. They passed the house of one of the only two Jewish families in town—a wealthy family that owned a chain of stores. The sun was beating down. The Jewish woman on the veranda invited Drake and his grandmother for a glass of water. Drake knew that the two Jewish families were the only white families in town to allow a black on their veranda. Yet Drake recounts that at home it was common for him and his family to talk about the Jewish family stores "Jewing" them. "They'll cheat you. You got to be careful," people would tell him.

In many ways, this story is a paradigm for the way many blacks looked at Jews. Jews were both good and bad. They were some of the best friends blacks had. They were also some of their most humiliating exploiters. The contradictions often existed side by side.

Black attitudes towards Jews were intimately tied up with their attitudes towards whites. Reaching back to the nineteenth century, with the growth of the first back-to-Africa movements, the black community had been pulled between the competing strains of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, cooperating with whites and trying to integrate versus separating from whites and going their own way. Just as the growth in popularity of Malcolm X after 1964 signaled the start of what would become the Black Power movement, with its strong overtones of black separatism, so the emergence of leaders like Martin Luther King in the 1950s signaled the ascendancy of the cosmopolitan strain. With blacks seeking cooperation from whites, Jews were a welcome choice for allies. They were willing to help, and they had access to money, influence, and intellectual circles. The ambivalent feelings many blacks held toward Jews could be buried. The positive could be emphasized and negative stereotypes put aside while the two groups worked together for a broader goal.

Jews responded. In the early 1960s three-quarters of the money for the major civil rights organizations—the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), CORE, and King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)—came from Jewish donors. More than half the white Freedom Riders who went South were Jewish, as were two-thirds of the white students and organizers who flooded Mississippi to help register black voters in the summer of 1964. Jewish groups filed the first case against school segregation in the North and were the first to take advantage of court decisions barring racial covenants in housing deeds. Jewish lawyers dominated the civil rights struggle. Jack Greenberg was Martin Luther King's lawyer, and William Kunstler, Arthur Kinoy, and Morton Stavis represented the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and other organizations. Where there was a black-white alliance in the 1960s it was often a black-Jewish alliance.

The bonds blacks and Jews forged in the 1950s and 1960s were personal as well as political. Black novelist Alice Walker met her husband, a Jewish lawyer from New York, when he bailed her out of jail after a Freedom Ride.

And yet, though many Jews deny it, there was an air of paternalism that hovered over the early days of black-Jewish cooperation in the 1950s and early 1960s. Jews in the civil rights movement had the money and often the access to power. They frequently dominated interracial meetings, doling out advice as if they were the elder brothers in suffering. Jewish students might come South for the summer in 1964, but they would return to college in the fall, leaving black civil rights workers to carry on the battle.

Yet as the civil rights movement rolled up success after success—integration of lunch counters, passage of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act—these tensions were easy to overlook. So were the tensions that grew out of the legacy of black-Jewish encounters in northern ghettos where Jews were often the landlords and store owners in poor black neighborhoods.

* * *

The alliance between blacks and Jews split open in a hotel ballroom in Chicago over Labor Day weekend, 1967. Hundreds of civil rights and antiwar activists had gathered at the ornate Palmer House for the National Convention on New Politics. Martin Luther King addressed the opening session. There was talk that the convention might nominate King and antiwar activist Benjamin Spock to a third-party ticket to run against Lyndon Johnson in 1968. Within days, however, the convention collapsed in a torrent of factional disputes.

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BLACKS AND JEWS

Profits and Prophets: Overcoming Civil Rights in Boston

Hillel Levine and Lawrence Harmon

On March 25, 1968, Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel introduced Rev. Martin Luther King, this century's preeminent civil rights activist, to a convention of rabbis:

> Where in America today do we hear a voice like the voice of the prophets of Israel? Martin Luther King is a sign that God has not forsaken the United States of America. God has sent him to us.... I call upon every Jew to hearken to his voice, to share his vision, to follow in his way. The whole future of America will depend upon the impact and influence of Dr. King.

Dr. King responded with comparable exuberance to the scion of seven generations of Hassidic masters, "always standing with prophetic insight to guide us through these difficult days ... I remember marching from Selma to Montgomery, how he stood at my side and with us as we faced that crisis situation."

Two weeks later, Heschel walked at the side of the slain King's coffin as the funeral procession wound its way through the streets of Atlanta. The period of conviviality and optimism in black-Jewish relations, symbolized by the friendship of these two leaders, was soon to come to an end. Few people, however, could have predicted that the alliance would unravel as inexorably and completely as it did.

Conventional theories attribute much of the breakdown to forces intrinsic to the black and Jewish communities: mainstream Jewry's reluctance to accept corporate responsibility for the activities of Jewish slumlords; the demands for black community control, which undermined universalist principles on which Jews staked their achievements and which threatened Jewish interests and spurred Jewish racism; and the rise of black anti-Semitism and attacks on Israel, which went largely unchallenged in the black community.

But there is growing evidence that elusive forces external to the black and Jewish communities also played a significant role in undermining this historic alliance, and that opportunities were lost for positive contact between blacks and Jews at the neighborhood level. Instead of developing plans for how to create healthily integrated neighborhoods that might have provided a basis for stronger alliances between the two communities, black and Jewish leaders looked on helplessly as larger economic forces intensified the tendency toward conflict and mutual hostility.

It is worthwhile examining these dynamics in one large American city, Boston. Boston's changes are not uncharted. A fascinating paper trail, less well-known than Boston's Freedom Trail, winds through the city's financial district into neighborhoods now almost entirely black but once populated by many Jews of modest means. Whoever follows this trail must conclude that the conventional theories have left out economic and class factors that were a central part of the story. Whatever other tensions existed between Jews and blacks, it was the specific way that Jews and blacks were set against each other by outside economic forces that ultimately played a decisive role in shaping the nature of the relationship.

In September 1971, Senator Philip Hart of Michigan stormed into Boston at the head of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly. Hart was not simply performing a Lindsayesque stunt to create an exciting photo opportunity in an inner city neighborhood. It had been three years since the assassination of Martin Luther King—three years of government programs aimed at improving opportunities for poor blacks.

Hart suspected that the very programs adopted to correct the problem of black poverty actually intensified it. In his opening statement, Hart said the committee aimed to "translate ... the mysterious world of finance into its social implications." Specifically, Hart hoped to discover if competition, or lack thereof, among real estate agents and lending institutions contributed to the irreversible decline of one neighborhood that otherwise might have served as a national model of integration. Dozens of witnesses later, the Hart committee emerged with a picture of the "add-on costs" paid by poor and moderate income Jews and blacks in one city. But the wider implications were not lost. "If

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we fail to remove [discriminatory] lines," Hart warned, "whether they are tangible real walls or the consequence of decisions that have the effect of a wall, forces will be unleashed that could destroy us as a people."

Days of Rage

On April 4, 1968, Boston's black community of eighty thousand was poised between grief and rage as news spread of the assassination of Martin Luther King. On the afternoon following the assassination, the Massachusetts governor ordered ten thousand air and army guardsmen to their armories. Black activists in organizations such as the Urban League and Operation Exodus distributed pamphlets urging blacks to secure imperishable foods, water, guns, and "plenty of ammunition."

Two days after King's murder, one thousand angry blacks surged down Blue Hill Avenue, a major thoroughfare that reached from the predominantly black neighborhood of Roxbury to the north, and continued their march south into parts of Jewish Dorchester. Blacks demanded that shopkeepers, many of them Jews, close their stores to honor King's memory. Most complied. In the course of the march, six stores were burned, twenty-six looted, and dozens of people assaulted.

King's murder and the subsequent riots were to change profoundly the chemistry of black-Jewish relations in Boston. Jewish businessmen were the major financial supporters of Boston's leading black social policy center, Freedom House, an organization that had never succeeded in attracting funds from the Brahmin-controlled charities such as the United Fund. Bostonian Kivie Kaplan, a wealthy Jewish manufacturer and philanthropist, served as national president of the NAACP. But the new strains in black-Jewish relations undermined the position of Jewish liberals whose own paternalism often clouded their abilities to distinguish between legitimate black assertiveness and naked hate.

Whatever congeniality existed at the leadership level rarely extended to the grassroots. In Roxbury and the predominantly black South End, there was considerable black resentment of Jewish landlords. By the middle and late 1960s, property owners like Sydney Insoft, dubbed the "No-Heat Landlord" by the metro press, had become frequent targets of verbal attacks by black community activists. Blacks, however, were not alone in their desire to uncover economic abuse. It was a rabbi, Judea Miller, who in the mid-1960s uncovered ten dummy corporations that were constantly shuffling ownership of substandard housing in the black community in order to stay one step ahead of building inspectors and health department investigators. These companies, owned by a prominent Jewish family headed by Israel Mindick, enlisted as their corporate names the ten Hebrew words from the final verse of Psalm 19—"May the words of my mouth and the meditations of my heart be acceptable before You, O Lord, my Rock and my Redeemer." Thus, Yihiyu, Inc., Hashem, Inc., etc.

Although slumlords proved an embarrassment to Jewish communal leaders, most of whom lived in suburbs west of Boston, poor and elderly Jews of Dorchester focused little attention on this problem that agitated many blacks. They were more concerned with what they perceived to be a threat from black adolescents on their northern border. These Jews failed to see how the growing number of muggings, assaults, and handbag snatchings served the cause of distributive justice.

In the 1940s, the Jewish population of Roxbury and Dorchester exceeded 90,000. In the neighborhood of Mattapan, only a few blocks further south, upwardly mobile Jews could find attractive single-family homes. But with increasing frequency, the younger generation, including soldiers returning home from World War II who could not afford housing "close-in," set broader sights toward the verdant if often anti-Semitic suburbs. This "double jumping" set a new path of settlement in the 1950s for Jews who wanted "grass under their feet" and no parents and in-laws "overhead" in the wooden triple-deckers characteristic of Dorchester.

By the middle 1960s, many of the Jews who remained in the old neighborhood did so for economic reasons. A survey by the Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston identified thirty-five percent of the area's Jews as engaged in blue collar trades and only eleven percent—one-third the percentage found at that time in the suburbs—as "professionals." But economic reasons alone did not account for why many Jews remained. Eighteen synagogues and scores of Jewish butchers, bakeries, and bookstores served the neighborhood. The legendary G & G restaurant on Blue Hill Avenue not only offered familiar local concoctions such as french fries with kishke grease, but attracted prominent local and national office seekers eager to impress the Jews of Ward 14. By this time, nevertheless, some Jewish institutions had begun to pull up stakes.

By 1972, only 2,500 Jews, mostly elderly, would remain in Dorchester and Mattapan. Only one or two of the area's synagogues would still be operating and minyan goers would enter houses of prayer under the protection of armed guards hired by the local Jewish Community Council. Buildings which once housed Talmud-Torahs and Jewish community centers had been sold and in some cases given away to black church and community groups. The change took place very quickly, and under sufficiently suspicious circumstances; but most local Jews still do not know how or why it happened.

Social Responsibility

After King's murder, nowhere was there more anxiety over the destabilizing possibilities of a full-scale black revolt than among members of Boston's Vault, a group of twenty-five downtown business leaders representing banking, real estate, insurance, utilities, and manufacturing interests. For a decade, the business/good-government committee of the Vault had been meeting monthly in the boardroom of the Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company. There, it devised plans to back candidates who would favor tax concessions for business, airport expansion, and downtown development. In 1968, with the barely contained black ghetto just a short march away from the city's financial district, investors were unenthusiastic about the plans for a new Boston of hotels, convention centers, theatres, and elegant shops.

Boston's black community grew from 24,000 in 1940 to 70,000 in 1965. As redevelopment efforts escalated during the mayoral administration of John Collins in the early 1960s, blacks, who were callously displaced by federally funded urban renewal, sought new housing opportunities. But even as black needs for housing intensified, proponents of downtown development began coveting the centrally located black neighborhoods for potential expansion. The fraying black neighborhoods of the South End and Roxbury, now designated slums, pressed ominously on the downtown perimeter. They were viewed as both eyesores and impediments to a revitalized Boston.

When Kevin White, a populist mayor with no ties to the business community, was elected mayor in 1968, the institutions represented by the Vault deemed it prudent to enter a new phase of "social responsibility." One of the most prominent programs of this period was the announcement by twenty-two Boston savings banks of a plan to provide twenty-nine million dollars in federally insured, low-interest mortgages to low-income blacks. The program, dubbed B-BURG (Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group), aimed to make available 2,500 mortgages over a three-year period, requiring little or no money down.

The area in which blacks were allowed to buy homes with B-BURG funds was represented by a shaded region on a map that hung on the walls of real estate offices across Boston. The area, known as the B-BURG line, almost completely skirted the Italian and Irish working class sections of Dorchester and Mattapan. It corresponded, however, almost exactly to the configuration of the Jewish neighborhood. Without the knowledge of the residents, and with funds guaranteed by the federal government, 2,500 low-income black families were soon to be funneled into a small, cohesive Jewish neighborhood by the chairmen of twenty-two Boston savings banks.

The bankers' motivation for drawing the B-BURG line exclusively around a Jewish neighborhood is still cloaked in mystery. One theory is that the financiers attributed an unrealistic level of social compassion to Jews. Based on Jewish commitment to the civil rights movement, Brahmin bankers may have believed that Jews and blacks would create a model integrated neighborhood. Internal HUD memos of that time suggest that the bankers may also have feared the potentially more explosive mix of blacks and turf-conscious Irish ethnics. The widespread violence of the mid-1970s that occurred when black students were bused to predominantly Irish neighborhoods seems ample vindication of their fears. Alternatively, Jews were still perceived by the city's elite as rootless wanderers, lacking the courage to fight for their neighborhoods, but with sufficient communal resources to recreate their institutions in the suburbs. Mortgages were made available to blacks at advantageous rates, but only within a narrow zone of Roxbury, Dorchester, and Mattapan. Those who tried to find housing in the suburbs or other Boston neighborhoods were quickly set straight by the banks' community-based counseling agency, the Association for Better Housing. It is not totally surprising that black leaders were willing to ignore the existence of a discriminatory bank-imposed line when these banks were simultaneously providing the opportunity to advance black homeownership.

There is growing evidence that forces external to the black and Jewish communities played a significant role in undermining the black-Jewish alliance.

A greater mystery is how lay and professional leaders of the local Jewish federation and its constituent agencies failed to predict the conflicts that the line would create for inner-city Jews. When reports of escalating tension and street crime against Jews began to mount, the "too little, too late" response from the federation focused on increasing the area's number of social workers rather than challenging the legality of the B-BURG line.

During this period, the federation was also putting emphasis on the professionalization of its social service workers. In key cases, popular local workers with potential to implement traditional neighborhood stabilization tactics were being replaced with young, inexperienced M.S.W.s.

Other conditions existed that limited a legal response

to the discriminatory line. For several years, the federation had looked to the western suburbs for funds and leadership. Key lay leaders, who only recently had achieved social and professional acceptance, worked for prominent law firms that represented B-BURG banks and in some cases served on their boards of trustees. It may have appeared less than prudent to confront major financial institutions at a time when the Jewish community itself was pulling up stakes in the increasingly embattled neighborhood. Other leaders were more engaged by the plight of endangered Jews worldwide than local Jews at risk. Political solutions, too, seemed out of reach. Jewish businessmen who promoted downtown development were increasingly uncomfortable around Boston's new populist mayor.

To this day, many of the individuals active in Jewish communal affairs during the late 1960s deny knowledge of B-BURG and its effects on the community. Real estate agents and speculators, how-ever, lacked no awareness of the opportunity provided by the B-BURG line. Between 1968 and 1970, approxi-mately twenty real estate offices opened along Blue Hill Avenue and its environs. On their walls hung the B-BURG map. During the same period, almost an equal number of synagogues and Hebrew schools closed their doors. Dorchester and Mattapan, as city historians now note, became a classic breeding ground for block-busting.

In May 1987, readers of the *Boston Metropolitan Real Estate Journal* got a rare firsthand account of the methods utilized by realtors to destabilize the neighborhood. In an article entitled "Confessions of a Blockbuster," an anonymous author describes the methods used by agents to find homes for clients with B-BURG mortgages.

"We [the brokers] would try to outdo each other with the most outlandish threats that people would believe," he writes. "Sometimes it was only necessary to tell people that their twelve-year-old daughter would be raped, and they'd have a mulatto grandchild." The author further describes walking through Jewish neighborhoods with B-BURG clients in search of an attractive house. "I'd ring the doorbell and say, 'These people want to buy your house.' If the lady said 'no,' I'd say the reason they're so interested is that their cousins, aunts, mother, whatever, it's a family of twelve, are moving in diagonally across the street.... Most of the time that worked. If it didn't work, you'd say their kid just got out of jail for housebreaking, or rape, or something that would work."

In many cases, B-BURG administrators and bank assessors failed to provide sufficient mortgage counseling and information on needed repairs for B-BURG clients. Many, including newly arrived migrants from the South and some families with limited job prospects, suddenly found themselves heavily burdened by difficult to sustain mortgage payments and insurance. Real estate speculators were only too happy to snatch up foreclosures and resell at a handsome profit to new B-BURG clients.

The years 1968-1970 also proved disastrous for the Jews of Mattapan and Dorchester. The exponential increase in street violence created a wave of panic sales and focused suspicion on newcomers. During a one-week period in June 1970, three synagogues were targets of arsonists. In each case, the arsonists took special care to destroy Torah scrolls and prayer books. Police arrested several black youths who were later convicted of the crimes. Ironically, during a June 2 firebombing of Congregation Chai Odom in Dorchester, a group of frightened and angry Jews from the area was staging a public demonstration outside the offices of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies in Boston's financial district. The demonstrators demanded increased protection for the area's elderly and urged the Jewish federation to maintain a higher profile in the area.

During this period, a month rarely passed without the announcement of the closing or sale of a major Jewish institution or synagogue. Few of the closings, however, had the impact of the transfer of Roxbury's Mishkan Tefila to a black community arts group. Mishkan Tefila, a handsome building with imposing columns built in the American Renaissance style of the 1920s, was the area's major Conservative synagogue. In 1954, heeding the call of the suburbs, the congregation rebuilt its synagogue in the affluent town of Newton. The property was deeded to a small Lubavitch group whose Brooklyn-based Rebbe staunchly advocated holding the line in changing neighborhoods. By the mid-1960s, the synagogue building (assessed for more than one million dollars) was deteriorating, and it was not uncommon to find birds flying through the massive sanctuary on the hill.

For several years, a black arts consortium had demanded that Jews give the synagogue complex to the black community in recognition of black suffering. Federation leaders were sensitive to the need for benevolent action. They were mindful, however, of their fiduciary responsibility to the Jewish community and were also wary of making a gift that could be perceived as an acknowledgment of Jewish guilt. But after the riots following King's murder, the stalled negotiations led to a quick bailout plan for the besieged Lubavitch group and the transfer of Mishkan Tefila to the black arts group for the symbolic price of one dollar. The arts group, however, was not satisfied with the terms of the transfer and reportedly demanded an additional fifty thousand dollars for necessary repairs. Approxi-

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BLACKS AND JEWS

We Can Overcome: Reflections on Real and Imaginary Rifts Between Blacks and Jews

William Strickland

At the outset, one must observe that the much-ballyhooed rift between Blacks and Jews reflects only a partial reality since *some* Blacks and *some* Jews have never severed the bonds of friendship, love, and struggle that bind them together. This fact became clearer to me at a recent board meeting of the National Rainbow Coalition when, with thoughts of this article swirling in my head, I decided, out of curiosity, to count the racial-religious heads in attendance. Sitting around the table that morning were thirty-two women and men: eleven Blacks, seven Jews, three Latinos, two Arabs, one Filipina, and eight non-Jewish whites. Among the group were Jack O'Dell, Larry Landry, Dave Dellinger, Gwen Patton, and Arthur Kinoy—all of whom I have known for more than twenty years, since my fledgling days in the movement. Between then and now, of course, much has happened: Wars have been won and lost; dear, dear friends have passed; and an amoral and senile duplicity has seized the helm of state. Despite all that, two and one-half decades later, here they all were: Black and white, Jew and gentile, still working together, still committed to the task of forging a race-free and relevant politics for America's future. This enduring unity suggested to me that the current "analysis" of Black-Jewish rupture is misleading since it neglects, among other things, this intrepid network of strugglers who still labor in the vineyard, their eyes ever "on the prize."

Consequently, the facile generalizations about the deterioration of Black-Jewish relations must be reexamined for their pertinent truths. Conflict, intra- and intergroup, is not new. Some even deem it a dynamic inherent to group development. Others simply call it politics. Whatever one's perspective, it is undeniable that within our respective racial ranks abide revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries, progressives and conservatives, moderates and liberals, Republicans and Democrats, Zionists and nationalists, atheists and opportunists. The peace perspective now differs from Likud's; the New Jewish Agenda sees the world differently from the Jewish Defense League; and the NAACP is very uncomfortable with the Nation of Islam. No one expects the right to make common cause with the left simply because certain people on the left happen to come from the same racial or ethnic group as certain people on the right. As Mr. Spock would say, it is illogical.

The myth of the Grand Alliance, however, blurs such political differences, fostering ever so subtly what is, at bottom, a political accusation against Black America comparable to Original Sin.

Like Adam and Eve, Blacks and Jews are reputed to have once lived together in perfect bliss in a political Garden of Eden. Then along came the serpent (affirmative action, Farrakhan, insensitivity to Israel, Jesse ... fill in your own pet peeve) and paradise was lost. These same issues, compounded by Andy Young's forced resignation from the United Nations in 1979, constitute the grievances that Blacks feel make them the injured party. So unity became antagonism, synthesis became antithesis, and heaven wept.

History suggests that only part of this parable is true. What was called the civil rights movement, or the freedom movement, or, more simply, just "the movement," did have its Golden Age and its Grand Alliances, but they were not with the press or the pundits or the establishment-linked organizations, who now, with such relish, tell us that things have fallen apart.

THE MOVEMENT AND THE JEWS

First, a caveat. When I speak of the movement in these reflections I mean the segment of it that I knew and/or was involved in: the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), The Northern Student

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Movement (NSM), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party (MFDP). I was not familiar with events west of the Mississippi, except on a hearsay basis, and I had only tangential relations with the East-coast version of the Panthers. That having been said, I think, in retrospect, one can speak of Jewish involvement in the movement as existing on three levels: as supporters, as advisers, and as fellow participants. (Of course, I didn't think of them then as being Jewish *per se*; I am trying to sort matters out in this fashion only in light of the present controversy.)

For supporters of the movement, its earliest days were the most sublime. We were involved in a simple case of good against evil. The South was the villain, and the inspirational leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr., compelled the support of all justice-affirming Americans. So Jews, like many other Americans, gave their financial and moral support to this phase of the nonviolent, King-led movement. And this is the period that I think people refer to when they speak of the halcyon days of the movement.

Those early years produced a measure of sympathy between the onlooking nation and the struggling southern movement. But this receptivity was always fragile, always conditioned upon unity between these two camps and upon other people's interests, always subject to misrepresentation by members of the press and by critics with their own axes to grind. Still, it was a kind of unity. But it was not the First Great Unity. That was an internal development between the Montgomery Improvement Association and the forty thousand Negroes (fifties' usage) who joined in a boycott that lasted almost an entire year. The Montgomery bus boycott was a stupendous achievement, belying the canard that Negroes could not get together or that the South was impervious to the onslaught of a determined people. Montgomery laid the ground for nearly everything that followed and was, I think, Martin's greatest victory. It was assisted by contributions from around the country and from abroad, and by a generally favorable outsider press. But the victory was a function of the people's unity.

The passage from Montgomery in 1955 to Greensboro in 1960 brought young people into the movement. First, southern Black students, following the lead of those in Greensboro and Nashville, created a tidal wave of sit-ins protesting southern segregation. Then white youth got involved through the freedom rides. Some stayed on or came down later to work with SNCC or CORE, and these young student activists, Black and white, forged the Second Great Unity, the alliance between themselves and Black people of the rural South. Out of this unique collaboration came Selma, Albany, and Danville, as well as COFO (the Council of Federated Organizations) and the MFDP, to name but a few. And a spin-off from the alliance between the student activists and Black southern people was a network among students themselves, a web of relationships that linked people in SNCC, NSM, SDS, ERAP (SDS's Economic Research and Action Projects), CORE, the MFDP, and—surprise!—some members of the Black Muslims. People were in touch with their home campuses, their home communities, and each other. Some moved from one organization to the other because all, by and large, were part of an extended movement "family" that was committed to the politics of liberation. That is what made it a Golden Age.

Jewishness was of such little moment then that I am uncertain now which comrades of yesteryear were Jewish. In SNCC, Mendy Samstein and maybe Jack Minnis; in SDS, I remember Todd Gitlin and Mark Chesler; in NSM, Sam Leiken and Danny Schechter. (I am certain about Danny because I recall going to his house in the Bronx and hearing, for the first time, how guns were smuggled to Israel from the Grand Concourse.) But of the many, many others I simply don't know. We had another higher identity expressed in the old freedom song, "We Are Soldiers in the Army":

> We are soldiers in the army,
> We've got to fight
> You know we've got to fight,
> We've got to hold up
> The freedom's banner
> We've got to hold it up
> Until we die.

So the movement created its own political culture in opposition to America's alleged democracy. Jews contributed to and were a part of the sociopolitical construction, but their contribution was not perceived as distinctly Jewish. Rather, their particular heritage was blended with everyone else's to make up the eclectic, many-sided wonder that was the movement. That that special innocence could not be maintained in the face of the movement's escalating confrontations with America was a sad part of our maturity.

Then there were the advisers. All kinds and varieties of liberals and all kinds and varieties of leftists. The movement was generally open to but skeptical of the left. It wanted to make the world over in terms of its own vision and it didn't see what the Old Left had actually accomplished. Besides, members of the Old Left had been too caught up in arcane theories and seemingly irrelevant European models. We thought we had the answer to the American problem: we simply would stand up to it. Nevertheless, there were people around who had certain experiences with trade unions, with the Democratic party, and with the rough and

tumble of negotiations with "the power structure." So while people in the movement sometimes attacked their political perspective, they were quite ready to listen to their tactical advice. Kunstler and Kinoy were two of the movement's favorite lawyers, and Stanley Aronowitz was a confidant of NSM, SDS, and, to a lesser extent, SNCC. And then there was Bayard Rustin. Though he was Black, Bayard had the political sensibilities of a European Social Democrat. He had held these sensibilities for so long and, one presumed, identified with them so profoundly, that he was a conscious and unconscious advocate of these tenets as he thought they should be applied in America: peace, nonviolence, anticommunist socialism, and undying coalitions with labor and the Democratic party. Politically, Bayard essentially was a left-liberal Jew. I mention Bayard to illustrate that the Jewish impact upon the movement did not come only through specific personages, but also through a kind of free-floating intellectual environment that influenced the political thought of many movement participants. As the movement developed, people's admiration for Bayard waned. But in its initial period he was an important mentor to a great many people in SNCC, NSM, and SDS, and he symbolizes the real nature of the Black-Jewish rift which is, in actuality, a movement/antimovement rift.

Jesse may be a false messiah or a flash in the pan. The relevance of his message is the point.

Individual Jews were part of the student movement, but "official" Jewish organizations, almost by definition, were not. And to the extent that after the McCarthy purges the organized voice of the Jewish community was the voice of liberalism, it was in contact with the Black and white student left only tangentially—primarily through its emissaries. So we may speak somewhat simplistically of "official" and "nonofficial" Jews and "acceptable" and "unacceptable" expressions of the movement. This general division meant that there were different contact points with different Blacks and different Jews all along the political spectrum from left to right. But as both SNCC and SDS, to use two models of Black and white youth activism, came independently to question the values of liberalism and the honesty of American democracy, they broke off whatever tenuous ties existed between them and the apologists for Kennedy, Johnson, and the war in Vietnam. It therefore is incorrect to suggest that the student left segment of the movement was ever in any serious way in league with liberalism; their separation from it was long-standing.

Dissolution and Reemergence

When the unity that the movement represented splintered, the fault lines emerged not between Blacks and Jews but between Blacks and whites. The breaking point usually given is the 1966 Meredith "March against Fear," when Stokely Carmichael and Willie Ricks seemed to make "Black Power" a demonic incantation against white America. But the specific historical moment is not crucial. Youthful romanticism had yielded to an understandable and bitter realpolitik, and the movement family broke up. People now had to find new identities.

Some sought the old community in new communal arrangements; others in Zen, Islam, or the ashram; and still others in the emerging feminist and gay movements and in Africa or Israel. For the first time, some Jews who had not thought seriously about their heritage confronted the Holocaust and took pride in the State of Israel—especially after the triumph of the 1967 War. The morality play that had been enacted on American soil seemed now to have switched stages to the Middle East. Israel was the real David; its opponents, the real Goliath. In the confusion, hurt, resentment, and misunderstanding that accompanied the break in the movement, it made sense to turn to one's own heritage. In fact, everyone was doing it. Ethnicity had become the rage.

In this atmosphere, Israel became the central rallying point for many Jews, the prism through which they viewed themselves, Blacks, America, and the third world. The alliance that once seemed to hold the promise of making a new America had quietly expired. The movement had passed into history.

Without the movement to challenge it, the right then sprang to the fore. The right somehow gained intellectual respectability, while the residue of the left foundered on the margins of society. The Democratic party tried to position itself in a nonexistent center and then capitulated shamelessly to the mindless ideological fanaticism of the Reagan administration. Nature seemed to have forgotten its most cherished principles and embraced an intellectual and moral vacuum.

Then, improbably, sixteen years after Martin's assassination and nineteen years after Malcolm's, along came Jesse Louis Jackson galvanizing Black America and saying taboo things about Israel. And he was succeeding without the blessing and even against the wishes of Black America's "traditional allies," the Jews. So, here we are: at the rift.

Jesse, Blacks, Goyim, and Jews

The significance of the sixties and the student activists we have been describing is that many of these old-movement warriors are with the Rainbow Coalition and the Jackson campaign today. In fact, there are Jews

at almost every level of the Jackson campaign—from Gerald Austin, the campaign manager, to advisers Ann Lewis and Bob Borosage, to staff person from 1984 Caroline Kazdin, to key organizers all around the country: in California, West Virginia, Ohio, New Jersey, etc. So some Jews have kept the faith. But their continued involvement is only part of the story. From the beginning of the 1988 Jackson campaign to this writing (shortly before the last primaries in New Jersey, Montana, California, and New Mexico), Jesse Jackson has blown the ceiling off the percentage of whites prepared to vote not merely for a Black political candidate but for a Black candidate for president of the United States. Traditionally that white willingness has rarely exceeded ten percent. But in many states Jesse is routinely amassing between twenty and thirty-five percent of the white vote. He won Vermont, the whitest state in the nation, forty-four percent to forty-one percent over Dukakis. And in Oregon, the last to date as of this writing, with a four percent minority population, he received thirty-eight percent of the vote! These statistics show that there are more non-Jewish whites now allied with a Black-led movement than ever before in American history. It means that at the precise moment when the movement with the greatest potential for overcoming racism arises in America, substantial numbers of Jews have chosen not to participate.

And Jesse is not the question. He may be a false messiah or a flash in the pan. That is not the point. The relevance of his message is the point. In the last four years Jesse Jackson has been the only alternative critical voice educating the masses about the bankrupt illusions of Reaganism. And the relevance of his critique, its appropriateness, is undeniable. It is Jesse who has made drugs the central political issue in America; it is Jesse's attack on Reaganomics that has produced the plant-closing legislation that Reagan vetoed; and it is Jesse's attack on bloated military spending that was confirmed by the administration itself when Frank Carlucci's first official act as secretary of defense was to cut thirty-three billion dollars (ten percent) from the defense budget. Jews don't have to like Jesse to be part of the movement for a new America that he calls for. They have to agree only that a changed America is necessary. And it is necessary.

Today we live under an administration whose incompetence and immorality is unparalleled in our nation's history. Contemptuous of ideologically unpalatable reality, it governs by lying as a first and last resort (the Challenger, KAL 007, Iran/contra, Noriega, ad infinitum.) The evangelists are right: the moral collapse of America is everywhere apparent. Only their solution—more of the problem—is in error. Will there not be a movement that rises to this challenge and will Jews not be a part of such a movement? Only they can answer, but history does not stand still.

Nearly a century ago, Dr. W.E.B. DuBois said that the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line. In our own time we might paraphrase DuBois and suggest that the problem of the twenty-first century is: How does America propose to live in an increasingly self-conscious nonwhite majority world? Or, more relevantly, how is America going to live with itself when—if as experts predicts—European-descended whites, within a century or less, will no longer be the majority population inside the United States?

Jesse may not be the answer, but the Rainbow is certainly an omen. In 1976 Jimmy Carter beat Gerald Ford with less than half of the white vote. Ten years later Democratic senators in Louisiana, Alabama, North Carolina and other southern states won election to the Senate with a minority of white votes. A three-pronged movement marshalling Brown and Red (Hispanic, Asian-American, Native American, and Arab-American), white (Jew and non-Jew), and Black forces can triumph—must triumph.

The prospects for a future alliance of integrity between Blacks and Jews and Browns and Reds depend upon the prospects for resolution of the debate within Jewish America as to what Judaism's ancient humanistic tradition demands of Jews to relate to in today's and tomorrow's world. Sabina Virgo, a Jackson supporter in California, suggests that the choice is no more difficult than a return to memory. In a piece of campaign literature explaining her involvement in the campaign, she wrote:

> When I was young, I was taught that being Jewish means . . .
> You don't cross picket lines.
> You work for peace.
> You fight for social justice.
> You never forget the suffering of your people, a link to the suffering of others.
> You value learning and dialogue.

That, it seems to me, is a timeless message. And that is the answer to the Black-Jewish rift, for Jews and for all of us. □

BLACKS AND JEWS

Jackson and the Jewish Left

Paul Berman

Surely everyone can see it, even those of us who cannot march in Jesse Jackson's parade: You can't be a democrat and feel uninspired by Jackson's successes. Other politicians wave the flag. But, as someone has said, Jackson *is* the flag. The deepest doctrine of the Democratic party, dating back to Thomas Jefferson, has always been expressed in the nineteenth-century emblem, *equality of opportunity.* That slogan has never enjoyed a grander image than the sight of Reverend Jesse Jackson, in the brief moment after the Michigan caucuses, forging an interracial coalition of the working class, poised to move toward the lead. Democracy's heart beat a little faster for that instant.

The "movement" enthusiasm that Jackson has drummed up, the campaign workers that he has attracted, the excitement, the fireworks—these things have, for the first time in many years, brought a little idealism to the desiccated Democratic party. The Democrats, lacking the golden vaults available to Republicans, cannot survive as a national party without that idealism. There is a social-science way of expressing this fact—I refer readers to Harold Meyerson's recent *Dissent* essay about labor-intensive politics versus capital-intensive politics—but a fact it remains, and Jackson's charisma offers a solution. So there is a practical benefit to his campaign, too. Moreover, he has already half-rescued the party from the clutches of upper-class liberalism. This can be seen in the drug issue, where Jackson has brought an outlook that is geared to the lower class.

I don't even mention his program, which Michael Harrington himself has labeled "social democratic." Never mind if the program is, in the present context, a trifle long on promises. Never mind if the candidate still resists the language of his own advisers and speaks instead in the rhetoric of free enterprise, which he ought to know helped bring us to our present woes. Even so, social democracy, if only hinted at, expands the imagination. It is a rare and marvelous sight to see those social democratic advisers huddled at the rear of Jackson's podium, while the audience of blacks and whites, workers and farmers, cheers in front.

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I cannot condemn anyone for supporting Jackson. All year I've wanted to be a supporter myself. Four years ago, he was much less appealing. Jackson's slipperiness seemed all too obvious, his history of political opportunism was not inspiring, and his record on Jewish matters, even before the Hymietown-Farrakhan affair, was disturbing. Then came the Farrakhan affair, and Jackson's response was appalling. He spent the spring of 1984 surrounded by Farrakhan's shock troops, Fruit of Islam, explaining why Farrakhan was not to be denounced and why ethnic smears were permissible and complaining about Jewish conspiracies against him. Jackson was, in truth, campaigning against the Jews. No one had done that on a national scale since the 1930s. His 1984 campaign was a setback of precisely fifty years, and even in the 1930s anti-Semitism was, after all, reactionary.

But no one can deny that people do grow and that Jackson, on this issue, offered a spectacular paean to growth during the 1984 convention, and that since then, too, he has conducted himself in a different manner. The 1988 campaign contained, we might remind ourselves, some roads not taken. Mayor Koch, grotesque leader of the most corrupt administration in modern New York history, taunted Jackson unmercifully, and Jackson might well have discovered that anti-Semitic canards would have proved strangely popular when applied to Koch. The Palestinian uprising surely offered an opportunity to make anti-Zionism look respectable to many Americans. But Jackson kept to the high road. His recent statements on the Israel-Arab dispute have been, from my own perspective, by and large responsible and constructive.

If only we could pick and choose among Jackson's many speeches and interviews that touch on the Jewish question. What an excellent speech he gave on black-Jewish relations at Queens College back in March 1987. What warmth he showed for Jewish opposition to oppression, what understanding he expressed for Jewish history. What a reasonable interview he gave to the *Journal of Palestine Studies* in the winter of 1986. He explained that he opposed Israeli support for South Africa but noted that all the Western countries offer such support—the United States above all, more than

Israel. "So I'm not sure," he said, "that it is healthy just to isolate Israel in that sense." He also stressed Israel's right to exist.

But with Jesse Jackson there seem to be good days and bad days. Come the bad days, and the Jewish question in any of its forms baffles him altogether. At those times, he seems to forget that there are left-wing Jews and right-wing Jews, Israeli Jews and American Jews, Jews whose ideas and actions are not alike. He seems to picture a monolith—the Jews—and he seems to be full of animosity toward this Jewish monolith. Jackson evidently subscribes to the dubious theory that black advancement has run up against a Jewish wall (instead of merely a conservative wall), and that antagonism between blacks and Jews is structurally logical. At least he thinks so during those moments when he is not distinguishing between left-wing Jews and right-wing Jews. And at these times, Jackson's wonderful progress on the Jewish issue wobbles and shakes.

He went to *The New York Times* in April for his Democratic primary interview with the editors. What a calamity. The warm appreciation for Jewish progressivism that characterized his Queens College speech—gone. The careful distinction between healthy and unhealthy criticisms of Israel—gone. He talked about a "South African and Israeli joint project" to invade Angola. But there is no such joint project. He acknowledged discrimination against Jews by means of quotas in Europe, forgetting that older Jews experienced that discrimination in America, too. He relapsed even on the Farrakhan issue. Pressed to condemn Farrakhan by the editors of the *Times*, the best he could do was to explain that he repudiates "positions, not people." "To me, life is a constant process of forgiving people, redeeming people and moving on," Jackson said. This comment led to the following exchange:

Times: "But surely, sir, you must understand what Jews feel about a person who calls Judaism 'a gutter religion' and who says that Hitler was a 'great man.' I mean, you can understand the feelings that Jews must have toward that person as well as toward the words that he spoke."

Jackson: "Yeah. I also know that I saw Farrakhan on television several times explain that he was not describing Hitler as great, but as perceived to be that by people who followed him. He said, I think, 'wickedly great.' I don't agree with the analogy. I don't identify with the analogy.... "

Times: "But Farrakhan's anti-Semitism is indisputable. His speeches over and over and over again are anti-Semitic...."

Jackson: "Well I take a very clear position that I do not identify with racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, and make it a very public part of my teachings to thousands if not millions of people every day. So I guess my appeal is that given the charges that we have as a people, like the Jewish people, and as a community, we must really put our pluses and minuses in perspective and move on. And we have far more pluses, and we have far more need to be together than we do the luxury of being apart.... "

Jackson reflecting back on the 1984 affair is, in short, a perfect copy of Reagan reflecting back on Iran/contra. When his advisers get to counsel him, when he has the chance to write a speech in advance, to think through his words, he will make a good statement. Let us hope his advisers get to him more often. But, in another setting, in a high-pressure interview, old fallacies suddenly reappear. The implication that maybe Farrakhan isn't an anti-Semite, the hint that maybe Farrakhan has been misjudged—there it was. What was once believed, is still believed. The underlying animosity, I conclude, still underlies. We should admit to ourselves that after years of private and public coaching on this issue, the man is who he is.

In the interview I attended at the *Village Voice*, Jackson seemed to believe that his only error in 1984 was an ill-considered phrase, the stupid smear "Hymie"—which was, in reality, the least of his problems, in itself of no importance. The *Voice* editor asked him to reassure the left-wing Jews who support him. All Jackson had to do was recall the gist of his Queens College speech. But his voice tightened. He launched into an attack on Koch, rehearsing how he has been wronged by Jews, then only later found a few phrases from the Queens oration. It was a strange speech to make to New York's most anti-Koch newspaper. What Jackson can do with red-neck farmers wearing Confederate flag T-shirts—reach out to them, flatter them, call them the best farmers in the world, identify with them, speak to their needs, uplift them—is somehow beyond him when he's spontaneously presented with a handful of Jewish leftists.

Does any of this matter profoundly? Maybe the very substantial improvements over 1984 should suffice. For it is certain that Jackson has abandoned any out-and-out effort at trying to lead Americans in an anti-Semitic direction, and if he himself fails to inspire confidence on this issue, why should that be important? People who stand up cheering at Jackson speeches, whose faces stream with tears, who swell with democratic ambitions—these people are not thinking any thoughts at all about the Jews. At least this year they are not. The issue does not arise in front of the mass audience. The Jews of America do not face an imminent pogrom, and the Fruit of Islam is not menacing them, except in its dreams. In the history of bigotry and oppression, worse things have happened than having to read ambiguous

phrases in newspapers from time to time. One can argue that, in Jackson's case, the mere fact that he is black projects, in McLuhanesque fashion, a message of tolerance and freedom for all, a message of antibigotry, which is reinforced by his formal statements against anti-Semitism and which undercuts his own subtler back-page ambivalence. Such arguments may ring true (though it's a little insulting to Jackson to say so). Serious people who admire the rest of Jackson's campaign may be perfectly right in saying to themselves, as I suppose they do: It's too bad about the Jewish question, but no great harm is being done, so the matter can be dealt with later, and meanwhile wonderful political progress is being made.

But there are, of course, many of us who feel instinctively inhibited from making an expedient case of the Jewish issue. We find ourselves worrying, in fact, that Jackson's supporters may be a trifle deaf on this one issue. How many of us? I scribble the following calculation on my sleeve: Journalist Sol Stern has reported that, in any number of elections in the 1980s, Jews have voted for black candidates at a rate double that of other whites. In Jackson's case, the Jewish vote has consistently been half that of other whites. By working these figures out in relation to, say, the New York Democratic primary (where fifteen percent of whites voted for Jackson, but only seven percent of Jews, who are twenty-five percent of the total, etc. etc.), I offer the guess that eight percent of the New York Democratic electorate might have preferred to vote for Jackson but didn't because of the anti-Semitism issue. A lot of people! Of course these figures are worthless since the variables are infinite. But the phrase "a lot of people" has eminent statistical justification.

This "lot of people" now faces an awkward and rather lonely problem. Finding themselves to the left of Jackson on the Jewish issue (to use the language of the left and right), these people must now avoid getting pushed to the right of him on all other issues. Certainly they must refrain from launching nasty, Koch-like polemics against Jackson as was done in 1984. To do that would be to turn Jackson's idea of black-Jewish tensions into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The millions of people who correctly see in Jackson a tribune of justice, the many people who see Jackson's beaming countenance but do not see the shadows—these people are not about to react charitably to attacks. There are moments for the heavy hand and moments for the light touch, and today is surely a moment for the latter. The light touch means that in situations where progressive movements serve mostly to advance the personal ambitions of Jesse Jackson, people who feel strongly about anti-Semitism are going to have to absent themselves while at the same time expressing support for the progressive issues that Jackson is raising. A delicate maneuver, that is—maybe too delicate to accomplish successfully during an election season when the candidate is barnstorming to show that he and his issues are one and the same.

But with the primary season over, the light touch should become easier to apply. In future campaigns, in a thousand other races, in the effort to overthrow Koch in New York, for instance, we will find ourselves shoulder to shoulder again with Jackson's supporters. That is good. They belong with us and we with them. Some of those supporters will understand immediately why Jackson has been unable to expand his support among people worried about anti-Semitism, and no difficulties will arise. The Democratic Socialists of America, in its endorsement of Jackson, included a phrase specifically explaining that not all Democratic Socialists subscribed to the endorsement. That was an intelligent phrase: It prevented the anti-Jacksonians from feeling they had to split. Other pro-Jackson groups should be encouraged to make similar statements. But given the personal nature of Jackson's appeal, and given how complicated the Jewish issue is—how hard it is to explain this complexity to people who recall only "Hymietown" and Jackson's apology—many of Jackson's supporters will not immediately understand how someone could support progressive causes and other progressive candidates and not support Jackson too. Angry challenges may arise. How could they not? There will even be many people who share, perhaps in a more vehement way, the belief that apparently lies behind some of Jackson's ambiguity on the Jewish question, the belief that Jews form a conservative monolith opposed to social progress. To these people, we are going to have to make firm replies. We will have to explain that the view that Jews are an antireform monolith is itself a conservative obstacle to reform. The extra anger that some people bring to the Jewish question—which makes them unable to distinguish between a Zionist hawk and a Zionist dove, a Koch and his liberal or leftist Jewish opposition—and the belief that Jews (who formed in 1984 the only ethnic element of the white population to join with blacks and Hispanics in voting against Reagan) ought to be seen as dangerously opposed to liberal change—these attitudes arise fundamentally from prejudice and are themselves part of the problem.

We will have to make our points in a friendly and constructive way, and in a tone of voice suitable for presenting complicated arguments. Our purpose is not to break up progressive coalitions, but to fortify them. Yet we can't expect that arguments against anti-Semitism will of themselves stride to the microphone and make convincing speeches. It is we who are going to have to do that. Obviously we haven't done this sufficiently in the past. □

FICTION

The Grace of God

Robert C. Ehle

The following story is told by the daughter of the biblical King Saul. She was David's first wife, given to him by her father before Saul went mad and began his plots against David's life. She is telling her story as an old woman, during the Reign of Solomon, the son of David and Bathsheba.

* * *

Listen to the voice of the old woman,
Hear her song, you strong men of Zion:
You are a great nation,
A mighty folk feared and sung
in kings' halls and town squares.
Let the lion watch for the snare
and the wolf beware
the shepherd's sling.
Let them learn the rabbit's fear
and the doe's frail hope.
Listen to the plaint
of the barren old woman.

When I came back, he said to me, "Was Paltiel a good man?"

"A good man? Yes," I said. "But he was not a blessed man."

"But he was pious," my husband said, "which is all the Lord requires." He was old enough now for a beard, and very handsome.

A madness fell on my father, as it did on us all, when the shepherd boy sauntered out of Bethlehem, still stinking of sheep shit, but auburn-haired like a noble. When David appeared in the Valley of Elah, God fell for him like a schoolgirl; and I, the schoolgirl, found a false god. To kill a giant with one stone! He said he'd seen coyotes bigger than that back home.

I watched him play the harp before my father. He played the hill songs. Saul would begin to sing with him, because they were songs he'd known himself growing up. They were both hillbillies. They would sing songs together none of the rest of us had ever heard of. They were such bumpkin tunes; only a king or a shepherd could have sung them. They sang one song about secret lovers and perilous meetings, with a chorus that twanged over and over again, "Where is my duckling, my rabbit, my rock-dove? Her father has hid her in the wine cellar." They sang so seriously, but the rest of us did all we could do to keep sad faces. I was too young to pretend, and I finally began to giggle. When I saw others begin to smile, I laughed out loud and finally stopped the song.

"Oh, I'm so sorry, but really, I—Father, . . . "

But he didn't look at me. He looked at David. The boy had turned away, blushing. And this is how my father showed us we were in love.

* * *

Four new wives were brought to Solomon today. They are all from Endor, in the north, a poor village. Their marriage to the king will bring wealth and honor to their families, and very likely there is a baby brother or sister somewhere who will now have enough to eat. They will each spend one night alone with the king, and after that they will live like very comfortable nuns. I myself have gained back a certain measure of respect among some of the palace women. They come to me for counsel. Before he died, David requested that his son build me a house outside the new city. It is very small and made of clay, not stone, but it is a good place for an old woman. I have never had an audience with Solomon. We never spoke together when he was a boy.

They say my brother's love for David was like a woman's. Saul would have loved him like that if Saul had not been king. My brother saw what all Israel knew as soon as David brought down the giant—we had asked too soon for a king.

The two of them rode into battle together, David carrying my bother's standard and Jonathan shouting, "Hail, Philistines! Israel greets you with a gift of giant's

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bane!" They were young and strong and terrible. The two of them would scatter a legion only by shouting their names.

My brother and I took turns saving his life after my father went mad. I said to Jonathan once, "You know what the people are saying."

"They want David to be the next king."

He was older and seldom took anything I said seriously, but at this time he was quiet. Then he said, "I can see you love him. I love him, too, but you will be the blessed one, because you will bear his child. In him, the lines of David and Saul will be joined. It will be a great dynasty."

"You wouldn't give up the crown!"

"How would I reign over the Lord's Anointed?"

David and I began to walk together. In the fields outside Gilgal, he showed me how to tell when there were jackals close by.

"Are you ever afraid?" I asked him.

"The hand of the Lord has always been with me," he said. "I will only fear when he withdraws his hand."

My father began to take Jonathan with him to war, and to leave David behind. I went to David one day and told him to take me riding. "You've only ridden with my brother," I said. "Today the enemy will hear 'David and Michal.'"

We rode together on my father's mare and David said nothing as we rode out from the town, farther and farther into the wilderness. The land rose, and finally in the distance we could see Jericho, the great city.

"I've never seen it before," I said. "Is it true the walls fell merely at the sound of the trumpets?"

"They fell at the Lord's command."

I leaned back into his arms and he cradled me as gently as a mother lion. He began to rock, and he hummed "Hear Us, O Shepherd of Israel." It was late in the day, and the sun was low on the hills behind the city. We watched it go down, and, as it disappeared, we turned to go back to Gilgal. When we were back at the king's gate, it was dark. He turned my face to his and kissed me.

"You will be my wife," he said. "And I will be the next king of Israel."

* * *

When my father was sure David wanted me for a wife, he thought up a scheme to rid himself of his rival. To marry the king's daughter, David would have to slay one hundred Philistines. My father was too silly to be a king. He thought the boy would die in battle. The boy who had not died using a slingshot against a giant, whom women made up songs for at wells, whom men fell on swords for rather than fight. He could have brought down fifty alone just by walking over to Gath and shouting his name.

But you slew them like a true zealot. For a man who could play the harp so well, who had such a gift for words, you had a gift for garish display as well. Into the great-house you strode with a satchel of some kind of game; you looked like you'd come back from nothing more than a hunt. The Spirit of the Lord was so much upon you, you never thought about what the real idea had been. You marched up all sweaty—smiled and in front of the king dumped out what looked like a lot of bloody little mouse hides.

"*Two* hundred!" you shouted, and turned beaming to face all of us. My father bent down close to the skins and when he saw what they were, he blanched and covered his mouth and ran out of the hall. It was a gift for the Lord. You'd circumcised each of the fallen.

While I was still a young bride, my father stole me back from David's house. He felt he'd traded a daughter without a return, and because he was king, he was allowed to reconsider. Although I was still David's wife, I was now betrothed to Paltiel, the Pious. It was the first time I knew what it is like to be born a woman, to grow up and never be treated like anything but a child. To hope, at least, to be a wealthy child. But Paltiel was not wealthy. He was a poor farmer, an old friend of my father's, chosen as my new husband for his loyalty and absolute lack of influence. His wife of forty years had died not long before I'd come, and you could see by the expression on his face when he looked at me that she had not been a pretty woman—it had been a long time since she'd been young.

When I was first brought to his house, he touched his forehead to the floor and gasped out a whisper: "My Lady." He never stopped calling me that as long as we lived together. And the corners of his mouth didn't stop twitching, either. I insisted on bringing my handmaid and a cook. Even these women he bowed to and called "Lady," and although at first they looked down on him for it, calling him an old hill donkey behind his back, his country manners gradually won them over. I think he was my cook's uncle. He wasn't told I'd been taken from David, and I never talked to him. He was simple, but I think he knew there were politics involved. The king's business was the king's. He was an unfortunate man, a man who had prayed, I'm sure, for another wife to share his old age. He was given a royal shrew.

I wouldn't let him touch me. I slept at his feet, but he never once tried to come to me. Early in the mornings he would get up and say his prayers, as my husband

had done, but he never woke me. In the evenings before supper, he would recite what he knew of the laws and after supper he would interpret them.

I lived seven years with him. Of course, by the end we had begun to talk. One night, after supper, I asked, "Was your first wife as much of a shrew as I am?"

He laughed much more easily than he ever had. He said, "She was a rock badger, my wife. She was fierce and fat and she got the best prices at the market because she scared the merchants to trembling. I once had to hold my little niece in my arms for an hour, because Zillah had told her that the next time the little girl stole a piece of bread from the hotstone, she would gobble off her hand like it was a chicken wing!

"And she wasn't religious, either. Her mother was an Ammonite. She had no use for a god she couldn't see, and the ones she could see seemed silly to her! She would go with me once a year to Shiloh to sacrifice, only so she could trade the next day. Oh, such a woman! But we loved each other, My Lady. We grew old together happy."

He smiled and stopped, and as he looked at a guttering lamp and kept smiling, the silence came back to the house like a draft. Except for prayers, he had not said so much at one time to me while I'd lived with him. He wondered, I knew, whether he'd said too much. Or had sounded too happy.

"Mickele," he turned to me, bold and forgiving, "I have had a good life, little child." He would have touched my hand, I think, but finally turned his face back to the flame and patted the side of his chair. "And your life will be happy again, too, someday."

After my father died, his general, Abner, tried to make a deal with David. He came to Paltiel's house one day as Paltiel was working in his field and said I was to come with him. I was to be restored to my rightful husband. When Paltiel heard he had been living with another man's wife, he plucked his beard and said it couldn't be true. I mounted a donkey and he ran up to me, crying, "Sweet Lady, Lady Michal, my evening star! No, Mickele!" But as he reached out to my robe, a soldier struck him broadside with his sword.

As we rode away from the village, we heard shouts behind us and turned to see Paltiel running in his torn cloak. Blood ran down the side of his face, and he shouted "Don't do this to an old man!"

He followed us as far as Bahurim, shouting all the way. The people in Bahurim took him for an old mumbler and stopped him in their streets when we shouted back to them. The last I saw of him, he was sitting in the dust, with a few children and dogs staring at him. He rocked and rocked with his hands held in front of his face, as if to beg or ward off blows.

* * *

It was not easy after I was brought back. I had lived too long away from him, I think, and now he was the king of Israel. He had many wives, not like my father, Saul. I had been his wife for two years when he was a rebel soldier and had been Paltiel's wife for seven.

His heart was a cluttered room. He would sing in the morning and kill in the afternoon and make love to a woman in the evening. He talked with the priests or the generals late into the night. Humility and craft were mixed in him thoroughly to make him a great king. He made the Lord's name famous throughout the world; he gave us our great city, Jerusalem; he knew the greatness of Israel could be found most purely in himself. I didn't live easily with him.

When they brought the Ark of the Covenant into the city, he shamed me. At the front of the procession, he threw off his clothes and danced like a wild man. He shouted and whooped. He wiggled his royal buttocks before the women of the street and wagged his tongue and shouted things we were afraid to understand. Despite what they say, I was not the only one who turned her head in shame. It was something no one understood and only the rabble enjoyed.

At the palace I said, "I see the king has joined the circus today."

When he didn't reply, I said, "You shamed all Israel."

"I shamed only myself, and for the sake of the Lord. He chose to fall on me today in front of slave girls to confirm his choice of me as the king of Israel. If he has chosen me, and not your father's house, is that a concern of mine?"

"You are a trickster, David. You throw mud on my father's name, but you prophesy with the commoners as he did. If you prophesied truly, how can anyone tell? We didn't understand a word. I only know my father was a prophet, and should never have been anything else; you are a king, and a very cunning one."

"Think what you want to think," he told me, "but the throne of Israel is not for your father's house." After that day, he stopped taking me to his chamber.

* * *

Solomon is building a temple for the Lord. We've never seen such wealth in the city. Great logs from Lebanon, blocks of marble and granite as big as houses. There are men here, too, that we have never seen the likes of. Tall soldiers, with skin as black as a mynah's coat. They stand by hundreds of covered wagon loads. Some say it is gold, but that is hard to believe. So much gold!

This is the temple David had wanted to build.

We had, for the rest of his life, a royal marriage. When I'd come back to him, the king had two other wives, and he soon had five more. Almost all of the wives were gentiles, daughters of neighboring kings. Abigail and I were the only women he had married for love, but his love for me withered soon after my return.

His love for Abigail I didn't begrudge him. She was a good woman, we got on well together. His betrayal came later, and it was not one of love but of honor. A betrayal of my father, really. Did it start with the plaited beard, the poetry? He began wearing his mail at court and singing ditties to court sycophants. He became a gentleman-king. Look at his son, Solomon, the aesthete, and you see the direction in which he was heading. He took up the royal "we" of the neighboring kings:

He said, "We will see the minister of the harvests."

He said, "Is our horse waiting?"

He said, "Tell us what you thought of our last psalm."

"Your Highness," I said to him once, "How many of you are there now?"

He told me the king and the land are one.

"You sound like a Canaanite," I told him. "You are beginning to act, Your Multitude, more and more like those lesser than yourselves."

* * *

The defeat at Rabah was the first one Israel had suffered since David had been on the throne. He had ruled almost twenty years and had made people as far away as Ninevah talk about us with fear and wonder. He stopped going into battle himself after seventeen years, and no soldier begrudged it of him. He had fought longer than all but the oldest of them.

When he took a new wife after the defeat, I didn't even think about it. But others did. The first, of course, were the younger wives. Bathsheba, the new wife, did not appear in our chambers after the wedding. David had married a third time for love. But the young women spoke not just with envy, but with rage. They said this marriage was under a curse. The happiness in it would die as fast as it had been born. To have this woman, the king had put bloodguilt on his head.

After the wedding, he appeared nowhere without Bathsheba by his side. She was a beautiful woman, a woman it was easy to see a man would kill or die for. I don't know if she had a brain, but she had the eyes of a stallion, and David himself found it hard to look long at her. She had been the wife of a lieutenant in the king's army. The man had been killed at Rabah.

The king became more and more remote.

* * *

When it was clear what David had done I sent a court boy to the king's chamber with a request to speak with him that evening. "Remember the wife of your youth," I told the boy to say.

He was sitting at the hearth, and by the way he didn't move when I came into the room, I knew he'd been sitting like that a long time. Bathsheba stood at a far wall and when she turned her face to me her eyes were wet. Oh, Lady, you were more beautiful in grief than you were in happiness. We could have been sisters, you and I.

I asked her if I could have a few minutes with my husband, and she left the room.

"How have you been?" he asked me.

I didn't answer and finally he looked up at me.

"She's a beautiful woman," I said. "I think you have finally found your queen."

"I wouldn't have married her if it had been only her beauty. She has the heart of a ruler."

"And the eyes, yes."

"Oh, you've seen that, too? You know, Michal, she is the only woman I have not been able to look at? It makes me feel foolish. But she looks through me."

"It doesn't surprise me. That you can't look at her."

"She's made me a different man."

"Such a curse." He was used to my tongue, but looking at him now I knew that I had touched him. He turned once more to the fire, and I saw a tear on his face. "She is God's chosen, David. God uses man's folly for his own good purpose, isn't that right? She'll bear you a son."

"Michal . . . "

I sat down beside him, like a man. "Ah, David. It's not easy, this tarnish, is it? It's something to learn to live with, though. My father never did—he never learned to live with his sin. It drove him howling."

"There are lines on my heart I have never seen before."

I smiled, but what he'd said made me sad. It was something a man his age should not have waited so long to discover about himself. "You should write that down," I said. "You say better than you see."

He reached for my hand. When he'd touched it, I said, "I heard you ordered her husband to lie with her." He took his hand away.

"You have a devil's tongue," he said.

"Devils. What can I say? They run in the family. They frolic."

"Why did I marry you? Why did I think I could redeem what God had discarded?"

I looked at him, long and hard, with the eyes now not of a schoolgirl, but of some crazed, old necromancer, looking, looking. He was the handsomest man in Israel.

Brave as a feist and sly as a fox. Was that enough, then? My father had stood a head taller than any other man in the land. Was David just a little braver? A little more handsome?

"But it was an order not even my father would have thought to give."

"It's time for you to leave."

"I want to know, David. Why did God choose you?"

"Today I wish he hadn't. Today I wish I were an old shepherd in Bethlehem."

"You're lying, my friend. You exult in your sufferings as much as in your victories. You and your Jebusite wife are the stuff great tragedies are made of."

"What are you talking about?"

"Saul. You and my father. You ordered Uriah to lie with his wife, but your soldier was as zealous as you'd have been. He wouldn't do it. Not while his men were fighting. Which left a difficult problem. I mean, he may have been only a foot soldier, but he knew as well as anyone: it takes one and one to make three. His wife was getting plumper by the day, so what were you to do? What to do?

"Do you remember the hunt, David?"

"What hunt was that?"

"The price you paid my father for me. Two hundred Philistines. Those little foreskins—I thought they were mice at first."

He'd been quite sullen, but at this he laughed.

"You are such a strange girl, my Mickele."

"You aren't the first one to throw a problem into the ambiguity of the battlefield."

He was quiet for a moment.

"Yes, beloved. You had God in your pocket at the time. You didn't see much beyond your own sheen. Saul thought you would die fighting them."

"The Philistines."

"Yes," I said.

"You were a carrot hung over a cliff."

"Yes," I said. "And it could have been done. You know that better than anyone."

He looked at me without speaking.

"He only needed to have his most loyal men fighting close to you. In the front lines. For awhile."

"For awhile," he said.

"'When the fighting is worst, withdraw from him.' Is that what you said?"

"You shouldn't be saying these things to me, Michal. Not tonight."

I didn't know, of course, that Nathan had already rebuked him. Weeks ago. By this time everyone knew not only the sin, but the sentence; but I wasn't in the court anymore. I thought I was making the first, grand confrontation.

"Who else should be saying them to you? I don't understand it, David. Why were you chosen? What made you better equipped for kingship than my father? Your bravery? Or your blue eyes? Certainly not your heart, my shepherd boy, not your heart. You did in your sound mind what Saul did in his madness, and if I don't call down every curse on you for it, it's only because I don't have the gift of words."

As I traced a stone with my finger, I said, "But heaven should punish you for this, David. For this, if for nothing else."

He held his face in his hands now, a gesture I found a trifle melodramatic.

"But I am not," I said, "a great believer in heaven's justice. At least I don't claim to understand it well. I've not gotten along well with anyone, least of all your and my father's God. I don't trust him much. That's why I came here tonight. The Lord gets weak-kneed around you, David, and doesn't know when you need a talking to. Who else would have made you taste the gall if I hadn't come?"

He looked at me. A smile came on his face that I had not seen since I'd looked at my father; it was a smile you would see only on a king's face, and I understood again the Lord's weakness.

"I've tasted much gall already tonight, Michal. The baby died today."

* * *

Today I am walking the streets of Solomon's city, the brightest in the world. He is the second son of David and Bathsheba. A poet. A half-Jew. My handmaid stops me to buy some candles, and a rabbit for supper.

"Have you been to see the building of the temple?" she asks.

The old woman says:

The grace of God falls on the world
in eddies and swirls.
His goodness is like the snows
of the mountain ranges.
Tell the goat to climb down to the meadows.
Tell the hyrax to find cover.
An old woman, blessed with life
but not with youth,
here requests to die.
Bury her beneath the snow. □

A Report from the Movement

Profamily Hoopla

Nan Fink

On May 14, 1988, a bright and warm Saturday, forty thousand people gathered near the Washington Monument in Washington D.C. for the American Family Celebration. From its name this event easily could have been another right-wing rally for the preservation of the nuclear family.

One look at the crowd, however, made it clear that this was no right-wing event. At least half of the people present were union-affiliated—identifiable by their colorful union hats and T-shirts, and their loud cheers when their union officials were introduced. The broad ethnic mix and the many visible "Jackson for President" buttons were also indications of the progressive leanings of the crowd.

The event itself was in the best of the American festive tradition—relaxed and upbeat. People lounged in the sun, their kids were entertained by a children's program, they ate from picnic baskets or bought food from vendors, they strolled around the literature tables set up by union, political, and religious organizations, and they listened to music and speeches. "Are you having fun?" one of the speakers asked. Those who were listening yelled, "Yes!"

Yet, despite the celebratory air of the event, concern about American family life was the theme of the many speeches given by high union officials, liberal congresspeople, and heads of organizations such as the National Organization of Women and the National Council of Churches. The fact that the U.S. is the only industrialized nation in the world, except for South Africa, that doesn't have a national family policy was repeated throughout the afternoon. Speakers, citing the many serious problems faced by families today, called for a host of improvements in government support services—including family and medical leave, quality health care, increased child and elder care, equal pay for men and women, better education for children, economic security for all families, and more housing for poor families.

American Family Celebration, with its Americana air and its progressive criticism of U.S. family policy, was organized by the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW), an organization of activist women from many different unions. According to Joyce Miller, president of CLUW and vice president of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, members of CLUW have been concerned about family issues since 1971. It is only in the last few years, however, that CLUW has translated this concern into action. CLUW's programming is directed toward unions, and unions (with the exception of some local chapters) have not wanted to deal with family issues. In fact, the all-out union support given to American Family Celebration—an indication of a major change in union attitude toward family issues—came somewhat as a surprise even to the event's organizers. Such support would have been unthinkable only one or two years ago.

The shift in union consciousness about family issues that made this event possible in 1988 reflects the growing openness to profamily concerns among many groups on the left. This shift on the left is remarkable, because, since the 1960s and until recently, the left either ignored the family or saw it as an instrument of oppression of everyone but white heterosexual males.

The left's long-standing resistance to identifying family issues as important and its hostility toward people who care about the quality of family life can be

Nan Fink is the publisher of Tikkun.



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seen no more clearly than in two articles printed in *The Nation* in 1982. In "Recapturing the Family Issue" Michael Lerner, now editor of *Tikkun*, wrote that there needs to be a left profamily voice that addresses the specific problems of American family life today. People, he wrote, are attracted to the right because it is the only place where their concern about family life is being taken seriously. He proposed an ambitious three-part program—including a family Bill of Rights, a family support network, and an American Families' Day celebration.

From the reaction to this article, one would have thought that Lerner had advocated that everyone be locked into oppressive nuclear families. Barbara Ehrenreich, co-chair of Democratic Socialists of America, responded in *The Nation* by saying that profamily concern comes from "nasty impulses," such as racism, sexual repressiveness, and misogyny. It leads people to back off from the "important" issues of gender and sexual liberation. Describing left-wing profamilyism as "puritanical" and Lerner's proposals as "an affront to common sense," she suggested that we need a supportive infrastructure of community institutions—not family institutions.

In 1982, Lerner was apparently ahead of his time. However, it is now 1988, and most progressives consider the family to be a legitimate object of concern. Almost all of us, after all, are in families, whether we like it or not. Also, we have broadened the definition of family to include alternatives to the man/woman/one or more kids (in that hierarchical order) constellation. Those of us living with a child and/or with a gay lover, for example, now think of ourselves as living in families.

Not only have we redefined the family to include all sorts of variations, but, as the years have gone by and we have had to deal with family responsibilities and pressures, we have been made all too painfully aware by the grind of our daily lives that family life is very difficult. Problems we have with child care, health care, elder care, work, and making enough money to pay for everything—all these things create enormous pressure, and this pressure affects the quality of our family lives. As we look at other industrialized countries and see that they provide more support for their families, it makes sense to us to fight for that support in this country.

Given that there is a recent, growing openness to profamilyism amongst progressives, several questions about strategy emerge. First, how can we push for greater family support without giving up the broad definition of the family we have worked so hard to attain? There is a danger here: In order to get support for a national profamily policy, we might end up not insisting that all configurations of families be included.

A case in point is American Family Celebration. Although there were a few references in the speeches to "there are all kinds of families," the literature for the event side-stepped the question of what is a family. Before the event, gays and lesbians asked CLUW leadership more specifically to include homosexual couples as families. CLUW responded by encouraging gays to participate in the celebration but not to expect that all their issues would be dealt with at that time.

At the event itself, family life seemed to be equated with heterosexuality. There were many references in the speeches to single mothers, old couples, and poor families—but no talk about gay couples or gay parents. CLUW organizers appeared to be afraid of turning off union leadership by including gays. However, if the left is going to make headway in sparking a profamily movement, it is important not to marginalize gay families. A left profamily platform won't be supported by most leftists unless it includes all kinds of families.

Another question about profamily strategy that emerges is how to channel concern about the family into effective political action. The purpose of American Family Celebration was to build support for progressive legislation in areas connected with family welfare. Given the large number of people that turned out and the spirit with which those people responded to speeches about the need for a national family policy, it appeared that the event was an effective support-building mechanism. The problem was, however, that there was no follow-up.

People at the celebration were encouraged to sign petitions that included two sections, the first of which was a general statement that the federal government has "an essential role to play in strengthening the basic rights for American families." The second section, A Call to Action, urged U.S. Congress members to support specific pieces of profamily legislation that have been introduced in the House or Senate. The petition, although good for consciousness raising, was only a first step—and a wimpy one, at that. People at the event could have been organized to lobby individual congressional members about particular pieces of legislation (most crucial is the Family and Medical Leave Act, which has a good chance of passing).

American Family Celebration, as a first step in reclaiming the family issue, was successful in that it got across the need for a national family policy. Predictably, the event focused on specific problems of families—e.g. poor education, lack of health care, and poverty. Typical was the statement, "We need good child care for our children!"

As important as it is to press for the eradication of these, and other, family problems, it is equally important that the problems be put into a larger context. This was done only to the extent that speakers at the event blamed the Reagan administration for making things worse for families. Connecting links between the structure of capitalism and problems in family life were not mentioned at all. For example, there was no discussion about how the competitive American economy creates pressures for people at work—and how these pressures cause people to be less available for loving family relationships.

In order for the left to mobilize around family issues, the connecting links need to be made clear so that people understand that improving family life is not just a matter of developing a better system of child care or giving money to poor families (as good as these things would be). A progressive profamily platform needs to help people recognize how these problems are connected and how they are the result of the social system that exists in the U.S. Otherwise, it will be mobilizing around a family "wish-list" and miss the larger picture. Those people who care about family life in America—and who are not caught up in right-wing profamilyism—are more likely to respond to a deeper analysis of the family issue. □

BOOK REVIEW

Analyzing the Master

Phyllis Grosskurth

Freud: A Life for Our Time by Peter Gay. Norton, 1988, 810 pp.

In a 1983 *New Yorker* cartoon, Peter Reilly has a couple gazing reflectively into the fire while the man intones, "I will, however, say this for Freud—he got a lot of people thinking." There's no question that Freud was one of those people after whom we can never look at ourselves or the world with the same eyes. But he has not made it easy for us. Controversies continue to rage around such issues as his abandonment of the seduction theory. Inevitably, we have become as interested in Freud the man as we are in his theories. For the first time, Freud is being used to analyze Freud.

It is not surprising, then, that yet another biography of Freud has appeared, especially because researchers have raised troubling questions about his relationships and his inner motivations. People have begun to ask whether Freud made generalizations based on his own anxieties and evasions about himself. If this is indeed the case, Freudian theory needs a fresh and rigorous reexamination. It is thus essential that we learn as much about the man's life as we possibly can.

Now we have Peter Gay's *Freud: A Life for Our Time*. It will be taken seriously because Gay is an eminent scholar of the history of ideas. Gay has widely proclaimed his view, particularly in *Freud for Historians*, that psychoanalysis can be applied profitably to the interpretation of history. He might be expected to take the same view toward the first biography he has written, particularly because his subject is the man he most admires. Moreover, Gay is a graduate of the Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis and an honorary member of the American Psychoanalytic Association.

Certainly few writers know as much as Gay about the history of psychoanalysis and the specific, problematic issues about which there have been enormous speculation and controversy. In a series of rhetorical questions he raises in the preface, Gay signals his awareness of these:

> Was Freud's father married twice or three times? Did Freud have a love affair with his sister-in-law Minna Bernays, or is this sheer fantasy of a hostile contemporary, or of an ingenious detective biographer? Why did Freud think it advisable to psychoanalyze his daughter Anna when his papers on technique frown severely on the analyst's being close to his analysand? Did Freud plagiarize and then excuse his illicit borrowings by pleading a poor memory, or are such charges honest misunderstandings of his procedure or perhaps malicious slanders against a conscientious researcher? Was Freud addicted to cocaine and did he produce his psychoanalytic theories under its influence, or was his use of cocaine moderate and in the end innocuous?

He continues: "There are more questions still." These include Freud's alleged mysticism, his isolation, his loathing of Vienna, and his infatuation with his friend Fliess.

Gay makes it clear that he believes Freud has placed in the hands of "a scrupulous biographer" the means of uncovering the unconscious motives of his subject. His own aim is "to understand." He then makes a curious disclaimer: "In the text I do not argue with anyone." For the contentious issues, we must turn to the fine print in the long "Biographical Essay" at the back of the book.

Does Gay feel that by addressing himself directly to controversial material he will necessarily have to engage in argument? As "a scrupulous biographer" it is his responsibility to take a stand, to weigh evidence, to make judgments.

But Gay evades all the major questions raised in his preface. He sidles adroitly around them, telling us hardly anything we didn't know before, even though he has had access to some hitherto unpublished material. Ultimately this long, bland book is a disappointment.

One's disappointment is in proportion to one's expectations. Few historians know as much about European culture or are as deeply versed in the history of psychoanalysis as Gay. Moreover, Gay writes beautifully. For example, he describes the unconscious as resembling "a maximum security prison holding antisocial inmates languishing for years or recently arrived, inmates harshly treated and heavily guarded, but barely kept under control and forever attempting to escape." And he describes neurosis as "a condition in which the sufferer has regressed to early confrontations; he is, in short, trying to dispose of unfinished business."

But Gay fails to capture profundities of character and the complexity of human relationships. He gives clear expositions of Freud's theories but seems uninterested in people. This is a serious predicament for a biographer. Perhaps he believes that, if he does not probe too deeply into character, some disturbing questions will automatically settle themselves. The very fact that he ignores them may convince people that they really aren't worth discussing.

Look, for example, at some of the issues on which Gay should have had an opinion (naturally, one based on evidence). There has been a lot of speculation about the two former wives of Freud's father. One researcher has suggested that the second wife com-

Phyllis Grosskurth is the author of Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work *(Harvard University Press, 1987). Her study of Margaret Mead will be published later this year by Penguin Books.*

mitted suicide by jumping from a train. Gay shows no interest in her existence. Then there is the question of whether Freud's mother was pregnant when she married his father and whether his true birth occurred on March 6, not May 6, 1856. Gay comments that May 6 is "the conventional, *and I think* correct, date." [Emphasis added] But the only documentation of his birth seems to be the date of his circumcision recorded in the family Bible.

The greatest area of gossip concerns Freud's relationship with his sister-in-law, Minna Bernays. Gay does not even mention that she had been engaged to a close friend of his, Ignaz Schönberg, after whose death she came to live in the Freud household. Jung was the principal source of the story of their intimacy. One scholar (Peter Swales) has even contended that Freud made her pregnant and took her to Rome for an abortion. Gay's reaction is astounding. "Freud wrote some passionate letters to Minna Bernays while he was engaged to her sister, but this, rather than offering support to the Jung-Swales theory, seems to me to make it all the less probable." Why? And where are these letters? Gay, it seems, cannot believe in the affair because he himself finds Minna so "unattractive in her photographs." But it *is* conceivable that Gay and Freud would not be attracted to the same kind of woman!

There is no evocation of Freud's early family life or his relationships with his siblings. His sister Anna's bitter recollections Gay describes as "picturesque and impossible." He advises us to read them "with the greatest caution." Incidentally, throughout the "Biographical Essay," everything critical of Freud is to be regarded with "caution."

Oddly, Gay does not seem intrigued by the reasons for Freud's disenchantment with his marriage after his ardent courtship. Martha Freud is no more than an occasional name on the page. There is little sense of the family dynamics apart from his daughter Anna's tendency to quarrel violently with her sister Sophie, Freud's "Sunday child." And why did Freud need surrogate sons when he had three of his own? Were they truly uninterested in psychoanalysis or did Freud actively discourage them from pursuing it?

Gay begins to tread on treacherous but fascinating ground in his treatment of Freud's mother, Amalie Freud. In his sporadic allusions to her, she emerges as the most fully realized character in the biography. Gay—in my opinion, rightly—is skeptical of the conventional, sentimentalized conception of the relationship of Freud and his mother. Here she emerges as formidable, domineering, narcissistic, and sharp-tongued. In contrast, his father is a wimp. One wonders if the famous recollection (recounted to the boy) of the father passively allowing an anti-Semite to hurl his hat into the gutter was a screen memory for Freud's sense of humiliation at the way his father allowed himself to be dominated by his wife?

Freud, too, may have felt betrayed by his mother for producing what seemed an endless series of siblings. If Freud was a child deprived of adequate nurturing, if he harbored intensely hostile feelings towards his mother, what then happens to the Oedipus complex, the cornerstone of his psychoanalysis? And did his attitude towards his mother contribute to his bisexuality? Gay emphasizes the exiled mothers of Freud's case histories, but he fails to mention that the pivot of Freud's study of Leonardo da Vinci is the fact that the artist had *two* mothers. Was the fantasized memory only Leonardo's?

Freud had an adolescent infatuation for Frau Flüss, the mother of a friend, during a summer holiday he spent with her family in 1872. In a letter to his friend Silberstein (not quoted by Gay), Freud waxes lyrical about Frau Flüss's artistic accomplishments and her deep affection for her seven children.

> Other mothers [he writes]—and why hide the fact that ours are among them; we shall not stop loving them any the less for it—only look after the physical needs of their sons.... I have never seen her in a bad mood, or rather have never seen her vent her bad mood on an innocent person.

Gay refuses to recognize the shaky foundations of the Oedipus complex. It has been buttressed mainly by Freud's speculation that he must have seen his mother naked during a train journey when he was two and a half. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud records "a true anxiety dream" of his own which he remembers from his seventh or eighth year: "I saw my beloved mother, with a peculiarly peaceful, sleepy expression on her features, being carried into the room by two (or three) people with birds' beaks and laid upon the bed. I awoke in tears and screaming and interrupted my parents' sleep." Two associations come to Freud's mind. *Vogeln* [from the German word for bird] is a vulgar word for copulation. He also remembered that his mother's features bore the same expression as that of his grandfather while in a coma a few days before his death. I would argue that this could be interpreted as a retaliatory dream against the mother who had betrayed and neglected him. If Freud was starved for love as a child, is it possible he hated his domineering mother and adored his father but despised him for not standing up to his wife? If there was rivalry, might it have been for his father? Surely the time has arrived when we can re-examine the Oedipus complex as a possible inverted fantasy of Freud's own ambivalence about his sexual identity.

One indication of this is Freud's relationship with his wife, Martha. Did Freud unconsciously force his wife Martha to become a woman like his mother, a *Hausfrau* without intellectual interests? Martha's role was, as she said after his death, "as much as possible to remove the misère of everyday life from his path." Gay's conclusion is: "This meant a great deal to him, but it was not everything. His wife virtually made Fliess necessary." Presumably he means that Fliess, not to mention Minna, gave him intellectual stimulus. If he is also suggesting that Freud redirected his erotic feelings towards Fliess, he nervously shies away from any real analysis of it. Fliess, a young nasal surgeon from Berlin, was vital to Freud in the latter's years of "splendid isolation" during which Freud regularly sent drafts of his work in progress to his friend. Among the subjects they discussed was Fliess's theory of bisexuality. Early in their relationship, a disastrous operation occurred on the nose of one Emma Eckstein. While the two men had written sporadically since their first meeting in 1887, their friendship intensified in 1895 when Fliess travelled to Vienna at Freud's request to operate on Eckstein, a woman whose hysterical symptoms Freud linked (at Fliess's suggestion) to a blockage in the nose. After Fliess's departure, the

woman began to bleed profusely, and the situation became so critical that Freud called in another doctor who discovered that the genius from Berlin had mistakenly left half a meter of surgical gauze in the cavity created by the removal of the turbinate bone.

Freud was clearly shaken by the incident, although he assured Fliess that "of course, no one is blaming you, nor would I know why they should." Such assurances seem exaggerated. Freud was protecting Fliess while at the same time intensifying their friendship by imposing guilt on his friend. "Demon," he writes, "why don't you write, how are you? Don't you care at all anymore what I am doing ... are we friends only in misfortune?" His ambivalence toward Fliess and his self-reproach for entrusting a delicate operation to a man of little experience surfaces in the constant references to the Eckstein episode as the dream of "Irma's injection" that is referred to both in letters to Fliess and in the *Interpretation of Dreams*. Freud was obsessed with his "demon." He regained his freedom only by betraying his friend when revealing Fliess's theory of bisexuality to another researcher, an act totally ignored by Gay.

Finally, there is the vexing question of Anna Freud. Gay ignores the dangers of a father analyzing his own daughter, although he admits that Freud "failed to appreciate fully how much he must have contributed to his daughter's reluctance to marry." In his letters, Freud's frequent references to the fact that Anna seemed destined never to marry are almost over-determined. He was terrified of losing his creation, the person who had become everything to him, particularly the ideal young mother who would never produce sibling rivals. Gay approvingly remarks that Anna became "firmly installed as her wounded father's secretary, confidante, representative, colleague, and nurse. She became his most precious claim on life, his ally against death." This conception of Antigone as the nineteenth-century angel in the house is very romantic, but it was also, at least, a disturbing symbiotic relationship.

I suppose Gay would justify his subtitle, "Life for Our Time," by the material he includes about Freud's attitude toward women, his anti-Americanism, and his Jewishness. "Quite unintentionally," he writes, "Freud became a participant in the sweeping campaign for women's rights in his lifetime." How? Because he enjoyed the company of intelligent, good-looking women, and "in the profession he founded women could rise to the top." It depends what "the top" means. No women were members of the Secret Committee, no women rose to high administrative positions, and Gay doesn't give us any examples of a major theoretical contribution by a woman.

Freud's diatribes against Americans as savages who were good for nothing except to bring in money seem to verge on the pathological. According to Gay, "Freud was ventilating some inner need rather than listening to experience." It would be interesting to hear what he thinks that "inner need" was.

As for psychoanalysis being the "Jewish science," Gay tends to argue that Freud was simply a representative of the Enlightenment. However, this man who described himself as "a Godless Jew" was also a loyal member of the B'nai B'rith. Freud's ambivalence toward his heritage is part of the enigmatic nature of his genius which needs to be more fully explored.

Peter Gay speaks of "my Freud," betraying a certain degree of identification with his subject. Some of this is unavoidable in writing a biography, but there is always an accompanying danger of idealization. Despite its undeniable merits, Gay's biography does not escape this trap. After all, Freud is not his personal creation. □

Flirting with Joy and Danger

Bonnie G. Smith

The Americanization of Sex by Edwin M. Schur. Temple University Press, 1988, 229 pp.

Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America by John D'Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman. Harper & Row, 1988, 428 pp.

Do Americans currently write about sex more than any other issue? The discontents and vagaries of our national and personal sex lives arouse intense, relentless discussion ranging from the intensely personal and emotionally charged to the morally focused and disarmingly technical. So wide-ranging has the debate become that one suspects some kind of displacement. Analyzing sex substitutes for examining American life in general—unless, of course, sex is what American life really *is* all about.

In the colonial period, sexual activity had one goal: to reproduce the population in a subsistence economy. Communities punished nonreproductive sex only in order to channel it for population purposes. In addition, such direction did not foster an antisex ethos. Instead, as historians are discovering, pleasure made reproduction possible because people believed that only female orgasm allowed for conception. Thus, a flourishing sexual practice and a concern for erotic pleasures served an austere social necessity. Such clear intention contrasts sharply with the chaotic framing of sexual discussion today.

Sexual practice now churns up turbulent political alliances around such issues as abortion, pornography, birth control, and gay rights. "So-called gay folks," Jerry Falwell announced in 1977, would "just as soon kill you as look at you." Falwell, then helping Anita Bryant in her campaign against those she called "human garbage," became a key

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player in the Republican victory in 1980 because of this and similar stands. The repeal of the Gay Rights Ordinance in Miami for which Falwell and Bryant lobbied in such a primal way prepared the groundwork and set the tone for the politics of the eighties. Sexual matters fueled politics, provided its fire and feeling, and even marked out the field of battle.

Meanwhile, sex, like everything else in post-1945 America, found itself shaped by technology and profit-making. Networks of prostitution, the pornography business, sexology and sexological publishers, instruments of pleasure, to say nothing of the fashion, cosmetics, and cosmetic surgery industry, worked to serve pleasure while they led those pleasures in multiple directions. While some Americans formed political alliances, others applied economic terms and those of the free market to their discussions of sex. Individualism, freedom, and harmony in sexual matters came to be a critical measure of social progress and the quality of life. Capitalism and sex thus have interacted as functionally as subsistence and sex once did.

Edwin Schur in *The Americanization of Sex* sees the sex-capitalism axis as dangerous and dehumanizing. Torn from its connections with love and mutual concern, the contemporary sexual scene provides no place of grace. Objectification and violence characterize its operations, he maintains, and the inequities of class and gender make sex predatory, with women as a group selling themselves either in prostitution or in marriage to the economically privileged john or husband.

According to Schur, recent developments have only exacerbated the problem. Basing consumer sales almost entirely on sexual depictions of women has literally extracted the humanity from the sexual partner. In addition, sexual acts have become "abstract" to the extent that incitement depends on pornography, and execution relies on techniques provided by sexologists. Instead of fostering a practice of equals, capitalism consigns the have-nots to sexual expropriation by the haves. A bleak picture of our plight, *The Americanization of Sex* ends with a plea for rupturing the sex-capitalism connection by asking advertisers and industrialists to rely on other means for selling. Schur maintains that confronting the problems of inequality can lead to a rebirth of love and the subsequent elimination of sexual trauma.

On the other hand, Estelle Freedman and John D'Emilio in *Intimate Matters* find sex flourishing through its connection to urbanization and mass production. These modern developments beneficently severed sex from reproduction—industrialization by ending the subsistence world and urbanization by shattering the rural family. Though varying according to class, race, and gender, sexuality became a freer and more life-enhancing experience as it severed its old ties to reproduction. Moreover, just as there were heroes in the triumph of industry so there have been heroes in the creation of this new sexual economy. A black woman who claimed her body as her own, two young men who recognized their mutual love, women who cross-dressed—all these individual acts, occurring in a resistant social order but one ripe for change, furthered the cause of erotic freedom. Dense with such tales of struggle, *Intimate Matters* tells a story as American as apple pie.

In late nineteenth-century Memphis, black journalist Ida B. Wells braved repeated and vicious attacks in order to expose the system of sexual dominance that lay behind lynching. Seventy years later, leaders of the Gay Liberation Front faced harassment and arrest in their campaign for an "end to gender programming which starts when we are born" as a way of making a "free society." Sexual ideals shared the crucible that fired American political freedom and economic progress. Nuanced, moving, and heroic, this is history in the grand tradition.

Except, of course, it is about sex. I do not intend to engage the tired assertion that chronicling the rituals of national politics alone makes grand history. These books demonstrate that normal political history is a shadow-dance screening the control of the body—its access to and creation of resources, its reproductivity, and its pleasures. The grand movement of states concerns the most fundamental exercise of power over the reproduction of the population and the production of its sustenance. How long those issues have been papered over by scholars who thought they knew what politics was about when they looked exclusively at election results or the composition of a president's cabinet!

Instead, we should ask what the stakes are when we discuss sex in a scholarly fashion and what it means when the discussions are so contradictory. Agreeing that sex is a major component of the American social order, Freedman and D'Emilio pointedly differ with Schur in their assessment of its practice. *Intimate Matters* argues that any system that incites desire and allows it to prosper nourishes freedom. The internal logic of their story, however, creates room for doubt. Freedman and D'Emilio show a road to fulfillment that is never attained and that is fraught with danger, thus producing a constant state of both desire and anxiety. For every story of pleasurable fellatio, there is another of a prostitute's arrest—a barrier in the movement toward liberation.

Deploring the suffering produced by the historic alignment of sex with reproduction, D'Emilio and Freedman interpret these two terms as binary opposites whose fusion has amounted to a tyranny over sexuality. Yet the idea that one must repress sexual connections to the reproductive to be healthy leads to troubling conclusions about the human condition. It makes the sexual pleasure of a mother suckling a child or the pleasures of sexual acts leading to reproduction seem perverse. It also denies that we are all products of reproduction and bear its mark. It follows from Freudian insights that separation from our original love object—the mother—shapes our subsequent sexual desire. Sexuality develops inevitably within a reproductive framework in which reproduction constructs desire rather than merely the reverse. This does not make sexuality the mere instrument of procreation, nor does it privilege heterosexuality. Rather it calls for looking backward towards the origins of our erotic ties.

Eroticism is not just public and historical, but also private and psychic. The heroism in sexual struggles develops not just in the forces of repression writ large on the page of history, but in those deriving from our individual struggles writ small, that is, in our reproductive family histories. In the story of intimate matters, a celebration of sexual liberation built on the repression of our reproductive origins may in fact indicate new kinds of control by the forces of law, of civilization, and of the father.

One may offer this critique for discussion and still not endorse the bleak, albeit corrective position in *The Americanization of Sex*. Virtually no one tells a story of pleasure and happiness in Schur's book. Like many critics of current sexual mores, he makes his point by producing a narrative without heroes, even without people. In fact, his argument depends on showing that women are objectified and silent. The hypothesis of dehumanization is cemented in a rigorously dehumanized telling. The pleasures and passions found in *Intimate Matters* drop out of Schur's American scene in favor of statistics, the analyses of experts, and similar authoritative pronouncements. He denies even the assertions of elite women authors and those of their informants that increments of love and delight have entered their lives. Overriding these considerations is the importance of criticism, especially the criticism of capitalism, in the story of love and sex. All voices to the contrary—in this case the voices of women who are the victims, the objectified, the dehumanized—fall silent. The joy of writing a theoretically and rhetorically powerful book takes precedence over other people's pleasures.

The delight we Americans have in discussing sex so seriously, vigorously, and heroically should be balanced with an alertness to the dangers involved. Sex is not so ordinary after all, though neither is it the sanctimonious engagement the Moral Majority advocates. I prefer Freud's characterization of libidinal drives as like a riderless horse. Sex that is written, analyzed, and recounted in books may be just as dangerous and just as unpredictable. These two books both make for compelling reading, and *Intimate Matters* is particularly innovative and engaging. At the same time, the authors have silenced many people in the process of allowing others to speak. Trying on the one hand to discipline or on the other to encourage the riderless horse through writing constitutes a perilous endeavor that places all commentators on sex in a dilemma. While silence about sex has a particular politics of its own, writing about it involves a quest for power with its own social costs. After two centuries, the Marquis de Sade's mere written program for sexual liberty still troubles us. Gingerly making our way through this minefield, we continue to explore what an egalitarian politics of pleasure and a danger-free writing about sex could possibly look like. □

Why the Poor Stay Poor

Clayborne Carson

The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy by William Julius Wilson. The University of Chicago Press, 1987, 254 pp.

William Julius Wilson's book is the most thoughtful study of urban poor blacks to appear in many years. But it is cause for dismay as well as optimism. On the one hand, the book represents a significant departure from most writings on poverty published during the Reagan years. Wilson effectively challenges prevailing conservative arguments that discount the need for major new government initiatives. The overwhelmingly favorable reviews it has received encourage me to believe that public concern regarding the plight of the poor might be increasing. On the other hand, Wilson also demonstrates the extent to which the American Right still determines the battleground on which current discussions of poverty occur. A self-described "social democrat," Wilson nevertheless adopts some of the assumptions and vocabulary of his conservative opponents, thereby remaining within the narrow ideological boundaries that constrict contemporary debate on domestic social issues.

Recognizing that "the debate over the problems of the ghetto underclass has been dominated in recent years by conservative spokespersons," Wilson advises liberals to take seriously right-wing explanations of the causes of the worsening state of the urban black poor. Even his use of the term "underclass" marks a considerable departure from the notion once common among liberals that the poor were best understood as unemployed members of the working class rather than part of an enduring subculture characterized by the absence of the skills or attitudes required for success in the labor market. Wilson suggests that liberals cannot expect to have a serious impact on national policy until they admit the existence of this ghetto underclass, a heterogeneous catch-all which, according to him, includes those who "experience long-term unemployment or are not members of the labor force, individuals who are engaged in street crime and other forms of aberrant behavior, and families that experience long-term spells of poverty and/or welfare dependency."

In explaining why conditions in the inner city have worsened, he accepts the thesis, often put forward by conservatives, that the ghetto underclass is *not* the result of present-day racism. Refining the argument of his earlier book, *The Declining Significance of Race* (1980), Wilson distances himself from liberals who continue to dwell on the "worn-out" theme of racism and thereby "make conservative writers more interesting in comparison because they seem, on the surface at least, to have some fresh ideas." Wilson insists that racism cannot explain why the conditions of the black poor have "deteriorated during the very period in which the most sweeping antidiscrimination legislation and programs were enacted and implemented." As do many conservatives, Wilson refers wistfully to earlier times when ghetto residents did not hesitate to sleep outside on hot summer nights, when

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single parent families were "a small minority of all black families and tended to be incorporated within extended family networks," or when ghettos exhibited "a sense of community, positive neighborhood identification, and explicit norms and sanctions against aberrant behavior."

Indicating how Wilson incorporates such depictions of contemporary poverty should not, however, be taken to suggest that he has joined the ranks of the neoconservatives. Because he rejects the crucial argument in conservative writings—that federal social programs are unlikely to alleviate the problem of poverty—his book represents a significant departure from other recent works on the subject. While he acknowledges the existence of an underclass, he sees it primarily as a product of bad social policy rather than of the attitudes of the poor. While he discounts the importance of civil rights and antidiscrimination legislation as a means of addressing ghetto problems, he nevertheless acknowledges that forceful federal action is needed to address those problems. Wilson demolishes the arguments of Charles Murray, author of *Losing Ground*, who concluded that Great Society programs not only failed to reduce poverty but actually exacerbated the plight of the poor. Rejecting the notion that the underclass is characterized by an economically dysfunctional *culture of poverty*, he prefers instead to emphasize the concept of *social isolation*, which he believes better expresses the source of distinctive attitudes that persist among the urban black poor. For example, rather than attributing the rise in the number of single mothers and female-headed households to a self-destructive rejection of white middle-class values or to "permissive" liberal welfare policies, Wilson argues that economic trends have reduced job opportunities for black urban residents, which in turn reduces the number of employable and thus marriageable black males.

Yet, while impressed by Wilson's desire to provide a sound intellectual basis for a renewed assault on poverty, I remain troubled by what Wilson leaves out of his discussion of the causes of and strategies for combating the problem. Wilson tends to examine the black ghetto from the outside, as a problem to be solved through liberal social engineering, rather than as a complex community capable of being transformed from within as well as from without. Wilson's underclass includes inner city blacks who have little in common other than propinquity: single mothers and their children; people who are unemployed or on welfare for long periods; and criminals with or without ample sources of income. Given the current political climate, liberal reformers may indeed be justified in devoting little attention to the potential roles of welfare mothers or unemployed black males in efforts to improve their own conditions, but such lack of concern for the perspectives of the poor reveals one of the worst aspects of traditional liberalism—that is, its hierarchical, middle-class-dominated model of reform. Although the problems of the ghetto cannot be solved without major changes in the structure of the national economy, the political pressure needed to bring about such changes and the transformation of black attitudes and black institutions needed to exploit new opportunities will require political mobilization inside as well as outside the ghetto. The community organizing efforts of the National Welfare Rights Organization, led by George Wiley, demonstrated that poor blacks can play crucial roles in changing their lives. Without such participation, even the best intentioned social reform efforts have often been counterproductive.

It is understandable, given prevailing sentiments among whites, that Wilson ignores the mobilization of the poor as a necessary component of social change. Like liberals of the past, he disapproves of political strategies and intellectual arguments that might alienate whites who are needed for interracial coalitions. Consistent with this stance, Wilson deemphasizes race prejudice and discrimination as explanations of ghetto poverty. An honest look at the conditions of the urban black poor suggests, however, that race should not be so readily dismissed as a significant cause. Overt racism may have declined since the 1960s, but antiblack prejudice remains an important factor in restricting the opportunities of ghetto residents. Just as many white southerners once explained black subordination as a "natural" phenomenon resulting more from the inferiority of blacks than the hostility of whites, it is now comforting for northern whites to believe that they are not personally responsible for the condition of poor blacks. The popular tendency to blame present-day black poverty on impersonal social factors diverts attention from the close link between white racial attitudes and the structure of opportunities available to poor urban blacks.

Wilson is correct to contend that antidiscrimination legislation and affirmative action programs have disproportionately benefited middle-class blacks rather than the urban poor. But this results not from the intrinsic limitations of race-specific reforms but from the limited scope of the legislation and the programs. The racial oppression that afflicts poor blacks in northern cities has been only slightly affected by changes in white attitudes and governmental policies over the past three decades. College-educated blacks, to be sure, now have expanded job opportunities and are able to enjoy their new affluence with little fear that they will endure the indignity of being denied access to restaurants, hotels, and other public facilities. But while middle-class blacks have been able to buy homes in suburbs where liberal values predominate, poor blacks seeking low-cost rental housing find their housing choices constrained not only by lack of income, but also by intense hostility among working-class whites that does not seem to be abating. Affluent blacks are able to enroll their children in predominantly white schools; poor blacks send theirs to dilapidated public schools more thoroughly segregated than at the time of the *Brown* decision. In many northern urban areas, white antipathy toward poor blacks has manifested itself in fierce opposition to busing and to public housing projects in predominantly white neighborhoods. To see white flight from central cities as simply a response to economic pressures is to ignore the continued significance of race as a fundamental element in American life.

Wilson's discounting of racism as a cause of urban poverty stems as much from political expediency as from empirical evidence. Emphasizing race as a cause would require programs designed specifically to confront racial barriers as well as economic factors. But such racially targeted programs, Wilson believes, are unlikely to attract much white support. He writes:

> In the final analysis the question of reform is a political one. Accordingly, if the issues are couched in terms of promoting economic security for all Americans, if the essential political message underscores the need for economic and social reform that benefits all groups in society, not just poor minorities, a basis for generating a broad-based political coalition to achieve such reform would be created.

There is much to applaud in Wilson's suggestions for "universal" programs to address effectively the problems of the inner city. Macroeconomic policies designed to "promote both economic growth and a tight labor market" would certainly alleviate unemployment, which affects many whites as well as a large segment of the black population. His proposals for a more humane welfare system, which would include child support benefits for all families, regardless of income, may remove the stigma attached to the current program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Similarly, his suggestions regarding more adequate employment training programs and child care should certainly be part of any national policy designed to reduce unemployment.

Throughout the course of American history, blacks have often demonstrated a willingness to support such class-based as well as race-based political agendas, but, regrettably, they have rarely encountered much willingness on the part of working-class whites to join them in alliances based on class identity. That black political life continues to be rooted in racial rather than class identity does not reveal a reluctance among blacks to support policies fostering economic equity. Since the Great Depression, a basic fact of American political life has been that blacks are more likely than whites to vote for reform-minded politicians and to mobilize in support of progressive social and economic change. Even if Wilson's proposals were implemented, however, black ghetto dwellers have reason to question how much they would benefit from programs in which their race-related needs are addressed only as a "hidden agenda" concealed by "*programs in which the more advantaged groups of all races can positively relate*" [Emphasis in original].

Wilson joins with many conservatives in criticizing affirmative action programs that are designed to help blacks rather than persons of all races who are "truly disadvantaged." But his alternative approach, designed to equalize "life chances," presumes that programs that are not race-conscious would benefit blacks as much as whites. Although many Jews and members of other groups oppose racial quotas or racial preferences in hiring, current affirmative action policies have at least one virtue: they have survived under both Democratic and Republican administrations during an era of conservatism. College-educated and entrepreneurial blacks have indeed benefitted more from such programs than have poor blacks, but affirmative action is strongly backed by actual (mainly black) rather than potential (multiracial) constituencies. Middle-class black organizations, such as the NAACP, certainly recognize the limitations of current programs and have supported alternative antipoverty proposals. These organizations, however, can be expected vigorously to resist proposals to abandon existing affirmative action programs in favor of proposals that have no demonstrated basis of popular support.

Despite the fact that blacks are this nation's most dependable constituency in support of progressive economic as well as racial reform, few blacks are convinced that stable and powerful black-white coalitions in support of class-based programs are likely in the near future. Wilson and other liberals who recognize the limitations of race-specific reforms may wish it were otherwise, but the politics of race are firmly embedded in American cultural and political history. Wilson suggests that he, more than other liberals, is in tune with current political reality in the United States, and his book certainly reflects the decline in white support for race-conscious affirmative action programs. Nevertheless, if class rather than racial criteria were used to determine the beneficiaries of such programs, it is by no means certain that they would garner widespread popular or intellectual support. Nor is it certain that they would survive legal challenges without the underpinning of the vast body of constitutional theory and practice derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, which, after all, addresses the issue of racial rather than class discrimination.

Wilson's laudable effort to establish an intellectual foundation for class-based politics therefore confronts the reality that Americans have always given

THE MIRACLE HATER

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priority to racial rather than class identity when the two are in conflict. The white "backlash" of the 1960s marked the beginning of a curious—though understandable in historical perspective—political era in which white voters at the bottom of the economic order have repeatedly and increasingly indicated their preference for political leaders favoring redistribution of wealth to those at the top. Even after playing down racial appeals, Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign has had only limited success in garnering the support of such voters or even the support of middle-class liberals to whom Wilson addresses his appeal. Jackson's dilemma is the same as that facing any political leader, black or white, who wishes to mobilize political support for significant economic reform. Should one pursue the dream of building a strong black-white coalition, even while recognizing the fragility of previous interracial coalitions, or should one follow the more proven strategy of mobilizing black Americans by articulating their feelings of racial consciousness? Jackson's campaign may ultimately prepare the way for Wilson's class-based proposals by making race less significant in American political life, but his greatest appeal and his strongest opposition still comes from those who continue to see him in racial terms. Until white Americans become as willing as black Americans to support Wilson's political agenda, black Americans will continue to emphasize racial politics as the only available means to deal with their economic as well as their racial problems. □

The Making of Jewmaicans

Norman Weinstein

Minorities and Power in a Black Society: The Jewish Community of Jamaica by Carol S. Holzberg. The North-South Publishing Co., 1987, 257 pp.

"Watch Jamaica" was the order that Ronald Reagan, the first American president to visit the island on official business, proclaimed in 1982. His injunction was inspired by his belief that conservative Prime Minister Edward Seaga would lead Jamaica into a period of unparalleled prosperity, verifying the free market, laissez-faire ideology shaping Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative. Nothing of the sort has happened. Seaga's commitment to old style capitalism proved no more salutary to the island's economic welfare than former Prime Minister Michael Manley's democratic socialism. Seaga's potential resignation in the period ahead leaves the door open for another changing of the guard as the nation teeters on the brink of bankruptcy, an economic exhaustion precipitated equally by left and right ideologues.

But there are reasons more encompassing than right-wing economic boosterism to be a Jamaica watcher. This tiny island of little more than two million citizens and two thousand square miles has made contributions of particular intensity and quality to the arts, music, and poetry during the last two decades. Another reason for Jamaica watching is, tragically, more geopolitical. The White House has been watching since the seventies to see if Jamaica will go the way of Cuba.

Anthropologist Carol Holzberg is the most individual of Jamaica watchers. Her vision is exclusively focused upon that .025 percent of Jamaicans who identify themselves as Jewish, about 350 individuals, "Jewmaicans" if you will. Of the several fascinating reasons which inspired Holzberg to write this valuable though troubling ethnography, two facts appear most salient: Jewmaicans are a vanishing tribe, a topic beloved of anthropologists everywhere, and they constitute, this fraction of less than a tenth of one percent, nearly one-quarter of Jamaica's entrepreneurial elite.

The obvious question arising from this juxtaposition is why so economically successful a group is vanishing.

A generalized image of the typical Jewmaican of our time emerges from Holzberg's pages. He—the women are rarely spotlighted—is an extraordinary entrepreneur, hard-working, politically savvy, socially conscious of his duties to share his wealth with needy Jews in Jamaica and Israel. Also, he is usually—and Holzberg intellectually dodges this issue every which way—of white phenotype. Holzberg does mention briefly the presence of Black Jews in Jamaica, but they rapidly disappear from the author's scope. This omission becomes all the more damaging to Holzberg's case as she contends, repeatedly, that Jewish prosperity and political power in Jamaica cannot be attributed merely to skin color. It would be enlightening to know how many Black Jews are represented among the Jews who comprise a quarter of the national entrepreneurial elite.

This skewing of the average Jewmaican male image—projecting a type of supercapitalist as Jewish hero—can be understood in the economic context to which Holzberg is reacting. The violently bombastic, anticapitalist rhetoric of Manley's socialist regime did scapegoat successful men of industry, many of whom happened to be Jewish. Holzberg, in de-demonizing the Jewish businessman, clearly intends to introduce a corrective perspective, and her zeal seems to allow her to overlook the foibles exhibited by her subjects. It is curious that in a text amply laced with statistics, the exact earnings of Jewish businessmen are not offered. We are told they are "relatively affluent." The new *Encyclopedia of the Third World* (Third Edition) tells us, however, that 30 percent of Jamaica's national income is received by the top 5 percent of the

Norman Weinstein is a poet and literary and music critic. His most recent book of poetry, Albedo, *published by North Atlantic Books in Berkeley, explores the Jewish-Rasta connection.*


population. Two percent of the national income is received by the bottom 20 percent. One-third of the island is unemployed, according to 1985 records. The 1981 per capita income was $1,340. Clearly, the majority of the Black population is desperately poor.

Holzberg carefully points out how some Jamaican Jews have responded nobly, even heroically, to widespread depression. Members of the Jewish community have been leaders in supporting education and the arts for non-Jews and Jews alike. They have creatively marshalled resources to support a Jewish home for the elderly and indigent, all too often one and the same. They have served government, left and right-wing, with distinction.

But any sense of the deeper connection of Jews to the Jamaican community is largely omitted from Holzberg's study. In a rather swift anecdote in the opening chapter, Holzberg mentions how Black Jamaicans of the Afro-Caribbean millennial cult of Rastafarianism see themselves in a certain way as "Jewmaicans." They read the Bible rigorously (albeit fundamentalistically and allegorically), observe kosher dietary laws (more so than most Jamaican Jews), have a hunger for Zion (which they define as Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular), and await the coming of the Messiah. Holzberg notes the striking parallel between the Black Rasta and the largely white Jewmaicans, but nothing further is made of the comparison either by Holzberg, or, it seems, by white Jamaican Jews.

What seems glaringly apparent is that Jamaican Jews are culturally isolated. Holzberg points out the 400-year isolation of Jewmaicans from the Euro-American Jewish community and uses this isolation to explain their self-proclaimed "Progressive Conservatism": "While they are becoming less and less religiously observant, they are not becoming less and less Jewish." What I understand of Holzberg's assertion is that a distinctive Caribbean definition of Judaism is being lived out on the island, tailored to the circumstances of a tiny and powerful white minority. This Jamaican definition of Judaism relies heavily upon economic success, support for Israel, financial support for local Jewish institutions, and a generalized financial and intellectual support for arts and education, rather than synagogue attendance. (The island's only temple can barely draw two dozen worshippers on a Friday night.)

"The best analysis I know of our condition."
—Hugh Nissenson



Jerry Bauer

"Leonard Fein lives the Jewish experience with a zest and pride that shines brightly in every chapter of his book.... He has enriched the literature on Jewish thought."
—Abba Eban

"Trenchant, iconoclastic, at times scathing, at times rich with praise, **this book is must reading for anyone concerned with the current condition of American Jewry.**"
—Chaim Potok

LEONARD FEIN

WHERE ARE WE?

The Inner Life of America's Jews

Harper & Row

Astonishingly, neither the author nor apparently any of the subjects interviewed are concerned with the quality of spiritual survival. The Black Rasta so offended Holzberg by claiming he was a "true Jew" unlike those regularly attending "the Jewish church" cares passionately about the core elements of religious experience Holzberg's typical Jewmaicans neglect. The Black Rasta is as much a pure product of Diaspora consciousness—hungry in his soul for homeland and messianic return—as any Orthodox Jew. On the other hand, Holzberg's Jewmaicans seem hungry for economic comfort, security, and maintaining a cultivated bourgeois image of gentility and refinement. To what extent this image is the result of Holzberg's investigative biases is hard to determine, but Holzberg is clearly sympathetic to a liberal definition of Jewishness which has little or nothing to do with ritual observance, knowledge of Hebrew, or participation in returning to Israel. What she finds most commendable among Jamaican Jews is the balancing of capitalist self-interest with charitable activities—Judaism as ethical self-culture. She glosses over the fact that this definition of Jewishness makes it possible for Jewmaicans painlessly to assimilate among white non-Jews, a convenient accommodation to help assure financial success.

A reggae song by Gregory Isaacs describes Jamaica as "a Black man's hell in a white man's paradise." If one buys Holzberg's definition of the average Jamaican Jew as a socially conscious, cultured captain of industry, one might think that Jewmaicans are willing participants in "a white man's paradise." The figures for emigration to the U.S. tell a different story. The Jewmaican is a vanishing figure on the island landscape largely because he and his family emigrate in startling numbers. Holzberg offers the easy explanation that the antibusiness climate engendered by Prime Minister Manley's experimental socialist regime scared away many successful Jewish business people. When one considers that emigration reached an all-time high during the first year of conservative pro-business Prime Minister Seaga's tenure, this argument clearly fails.

While reasons for Jewish emigration are numerous, I'd like to propose a theory that Holzberg does not entertain.

Perhaps Jewmaicans are suffering not only from their isolation from the rich mainstream of Euro-American Jewish culture but equally from their isolation from Afro-Caribbean culture. And, further, the more despiritualized and deritualized Jamaican Judaism became over time, the more opportunities for spiritually connecting with Afro-Caribbean Black religious devotees were lost. This loss takes on deeper significance when one realizes the major role that religion plays in the daily lives of most Black Jamaicans. Religion, not economic success, is the cohesive force in Jamaican society. And the majority of Black religions, numerous syncretisms of Christianity and traditional African faith, are strongly celebrated in daily rituals. While many have strong social service components, they are practiced in dramatically ritualized forms akin to art forms. Jamaican politics, particularly during the riotous times of general elections, mock and mirror these forms, as do fashions and folklore—a rhythm of life practiced by most of the population, providing that characteristic buoyancy of primary color that travel agents sell as uniquely "Caribbean."

A hint of how alienated Holzberg's Jewmaicans *feel* from that dominant spiritual sensibility is suggested by this direct quote offered by one synagogue member:

> When the Jews first came, they were on their knees. But Jewish people have a penchant for hard work. They work even harder when their backs are against the wall. The same is true for the Syrians. The colored people don't know what hard work means.

Beyond the banal, commonplace racism of a powerful, white minority member, one senses that this Jamaican Jew is oblivious to the common archetypal themes of slavery and liberation central to both Judaic and Afro-Caribbean spirituality.

Jamaican Jews maintain their uniqueness through active and often compassionate membership in service organizations, patronage of Jewish businesses, and participation in Jewish social and athletic clubs. All of these allegiances exist outside of tribal history in a primal sense. These ties are severed instantly when a Jamaican Jew elects to leave the island.

Afro-Caribbean spiritualism, like many forms of Judaism, is very conscious of specific place and time. Rituals are mnemonics to bring to the worshipper's consciousness the old tales of slavery, exile, redemption, freedom. These rituals, Jewish or Rastafarian, are rarely "modern," commonsensical, or convenient to practice. A member of the board of directors of Jamaica's sole synagogue responds to Holzberg's inquiries about his willingness to eat pork and shellfish:

> In Jamaica, it is impossible to be overly strict with diet. Years ago [not in his day, as he was in his early forties], the community had a *shochet* (ritual slaughterer) and one could obtain kosher meat. But today, it is very difficult to find *any* kind of nutritious food on the shelves of the supermarket, what with shortages, import restrictions, and labor strikes.

The speaker's rationalization about being unable to maintain kosher dietary restrictions is neither better nor worse than that of millions of Jews globally. What is most astonishing is his (willful?) unawareness that thousands of the poorest citizens of his country, Black Rastafarians, maintain kosher dietary laws under conditions fantastically more difficult and complex than supermarket shortages.

Holzberg's book clearly should be of interest to anyone concerned with the relationship between Black non-Jews and white Jews, whether in Kingston, Jamaica or Brooklyn, New York. Holzberg has created an anthropological frame of reference for further study. Others have touched upon the historical, economic, and sociological issues at stake in that nexus between Black and Jew. Her book alludes to the spiritual issues at that meeting ground; would it had done more. □

FILM REVIEW

Anti-Semite and Jew?

Laurence Jarvik and Nancy Strickland

Au Revoir Les Enfants, a screenplay by Louis Malle, translated from the French by Anselm Hollo. Grove Press, 1988.

Au Revoir Les Enfants, written, produced, and directed by Louis Malle. A French-German co-production, Nouvelles Editions de Films SA, Paris. Orion Classics, 1987.

Laurence Jarvik is a special reader in the department of theater, film, and television at UCLA. Nancy Strickland works for a rare book dealer in New York.

Julien: (brusquely) We're not Jews?
Mme Quentin: That would take the cake!
Julien: What about Aunt Reinach? Isn't that a Jewish name?
Mme Quentin: The Reinachs are from Alsace.
Julien: Well, they could be from Alsace and Jewish.
Mme Quentin: That's enough, thank you. The Reinachs are *very* Catholic. If they could hear you! Mind you, I have nothing against Jews. On the contrary. Except for that Leon Blum, of course. He deserves hanging. Julien, sit up straight.
—From Scene 36, *Au Revoir Les Enfants*

Did Louis Malle have a right to make *Au Revoir Les Enfants?* Many critics seem to think not. The film is based on an incident that occurred in January 1944 at Malle's Catholic boarding school. The Gestapo arrived to take away Jewish children and the French Catholic priest who

had been hiding them.

Au Revoir Les Enfants has been the center of intellectual controversy. *The New Yorker, The New Republic, The Village Voice*, and *Vogue* (among others) have published blistering attacks on Malle; and American intellectuals have engaged in what George Orwell called "orthodoxy sniffing" when discussing Malle's personal statement. Malle has never claimed the film is a documentary, yet the debate nevertheless focuses in large measure on the truth of the film, as well as Malle's wealth, his politics, and the propriety of a French Catholic person filming what is perceived to be a Jewish subject.

Strangest of all are the attacks on the autobiographical elements. Pauline Kael of *The New Yorker* lambastes him for making up a story. In fact, she seems to want to revoke Malle's dramatic license:

> Malle has every right to fantasize and invent, but I'm puzzled by the kind of fantasizing he does here ... Malle has said that this is the most personal and important film of his career and I believe that he thinks that. I also believe that he's wrong ... If *Au Revoir* is very personal to him, this may be because as an adult he has felt stricken by the recognition that he wasn't stricken then, and it may involve his feelings of guilt over his family's safety and prosperity.

Kael not only attacks Malle for his honest confession of guilt, but she goes on to dispute his portrayal of the Jewish student Jean Bonnet. Kael complains: "There's something unseemly about the movie's obsession with his exotic beauty—as if the French-German Jews had come from the far side of the moon. And does he have to be so brilliant, and a gifted pianist, and courageous? Would the audience not mourn him if he were just an average schmucky kid with pimples?" Of course, it is precisely Bonnet's exceptional qualities that reflect Malle's own perceptions as a French Catholic schoolboy during World War II. It is what made Bonnet a memorable personality. To portray the boy as a pimply schmuck would have been dishonest (and probably equally offensive to Kael).

Malle told Richard Bernstein of *The New York Times*: "I remember in every detail some of the scenes, like Bonnet's face. When you get older, lots of things come back, they sort of float up out of memory, things that I had blocked out for years.... I was a very good student but he was always a little in front of me, we were both very shy and he stayed away from having any sort of a deep relationship because he didn't want to give away who he was, but I know that I felt he was going to become my best friend. In this case it didn't happen, and it was so brutal, so unacceptable, because he was taken away from me.... "

Jane Kramer, in the pages of *Vogue*, bashes Malle for being rich, though *Vogue* is a magazine not previously noted for its proletarian sympathies:

> [W]hat is easy and seductive about the movie [is that] the enemy is never really our sensitive, reflective selves. We share, with Malle, the privilege of a fine consciousness, and the enemy does not.... More than one French critic has pointed out (for whatever it's worth) that in *Au Revoir les Enfants* it is the underlings—the people who change the bedpans and mop the kitchens and in general do the dirty work of other people's lives—who end up doing the moral dirty work of the society, too ... [S]ome critics of *Au Revoir les Enfants* think that Malle should have started his *recherche* with [his wealthy family].... They think that, in the end, the film moves uneasily through some sentimental space between art and autobiography, and is true to neither.

This claim is simply inaccurate. Malle's film looks at his family, and all the French haute bourgeoisie, very critically indeed. He is unsparing in his stern depiction of the rich French children as spoiled, egotistical selfish brats—engaging in black marketeering, betrayal, and cruelty—and their parents as moral opportunists.


Although Stanley Hoffman accepts Malle's depiction of French Catholic boarding school life under German occupation, he rejects Malle's politics and can't resist a few swipes at Malle's privileged social position himself. "I was four years older than Malle during the Occupation," he notes, "and I belonged not to the privileged but to the vast, incoherent group of potential victims—my privilege was to have been spared." He berates Malle for his lack of intellectual sophistication. "The missing element in Malle's film is ideology," he writes in an otherwise favorable account in *The New York Review of Books*. "Malle appears not to have absorbed any clear political viewpoint during the war years."

It is difficult to determine what Hoffman means by this criticism. Clearly, Julien Quentin is no sloganeering Communist party organizer.

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But Malle did absorb a political viewpoint while at school—the Catholic faith. The entire film is filled with Catholic ritual and symbolism. The Germans are Catholics, the French are Catholics, and even Jean Bonnet (perhaps to impress Julien) attempts communion. In the end, Father Jean, a true Catholic, is depicted as a saint, and his namesake, Jean Bonnet, is a Christ figure betrayed by a glance from Quentin that serves as a Judas-kiss, a transgression that Jean forgives him, in Christian charity. Clearly, Malle is making a point about the transcendent power of religious faith and the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation. These are Catholic themes, and the film must be understood in this context.

Stanley Kauffmann has noted in *The New Republic* that Malle treats the German soldiers and the French informer Joseph with sympathetic restraint, "a restraint on Malle's part that is unusual and welcome, but that also resulted in—harsh word though it is—superficiality." Kauffmann is unfair to Malle. "Superficiality," like "ideology," is a buzzword inappropriate to a considered discussion of *Au Revoir les Enfants*. That Malle is sympathetic to the human plight of Joseph and the German soldiers does not mean that he exonerates their behavior. This fact is clearly illustrated in Julien's revulsion at Joseph after Joseph has betrayed Bonnet. What Kauffmann calls superficiality is, in fact, the moral judgment of a religious Catholic.

In interviews, Malle stresses that *Au Revoir les Enfants* grew out of his own need to seek creative solutions to moral dilemmas that have haunted him since childhood. He told Annette Insdorf of *Premiere Magazine*: "After all these years away [from France], things from my childhood started coming back against my will. Eventually, I realized I had to go back to my own country, to make a picture in my own language about my own past. I wrote the first draft in about ten days because I'd been thinking about it for years and making notes."

"I was scared to deal with it." he admitted, "unsure that it wasn't sacrilegious. And I didn't think there was enough to make a film out of it. It's only when I reached the point of really revisiting it the way I *wish* it had happened—with a more complex relationship between the two boys—that I could make the film." The friendship did not exist, he candidly remarks: "... I didn't even know he was Jewish, although I think the older kids did." Malle did include some personal memories along with fictional incidents: "I wrote the last classroom scene exactly as it happened, with Jean Bonnet shaking the hands of the other students before leaving—but I added Julien's look. Unconsciously, I was trying to express something very obvious—my guilt, at least sense of responsibility."

It is precisely this Catholic admission of guilt, carrying with it the request for absolution, that is so unnerving to the critics of this film. They cannot accept the ambiguity of a protagonist who is no hero, yet begs forgiveness and understanding. What also disturbs Kael, Hoffman, Kramer, *et al.*, is that the film reveals clearly how French Catholics viewed Jews during World War II. This revelation is hard for assimilationist Jews to accept. Jewish Jean Bonnet is *different* from his classmates. Bonnet looks different, he acts differently, he eats different food, he does better in school and plays piano better. In other words, he looks Jewish, he acts Jewish, he follows Jewish dietary laws, and he has a Jewish musical ability. All these facts are met with disapproval from the secular New York intellectuals, who reject the notion of Jewishness.

To the New York critics, such a description of Jews is abhorrent, and perhaps anti-Semitic. But why do they object to a description that could apply to a member of any observant Orthodox community? Is it because they are—as assimilated secular intellectuals—ashamed of their Jewishness and wish to deny that there are any uniquely Jewish qualities, practices, and beliefs?

In a telephone interview, Malle said one of the questions that interested him in making the film was, "What is it to be a Jew?" Julien's question in the restaurant about the Reinach family is indeed about Malle's own relatives. He did not bother to change the names—the Reinachs fled Alsace before the Germans in 1871. They are his mother's relations. The name Reinach, like most German names, is considered Jewish in France. His living relatives are all practicing Catholics.

The other important question for Malle in the film is, "What is it to be a Catholic?" It is no accident that the priest who hides Jewish children has the same Christian name as Jean Bonnet. Father Jean represents the "inspired Christian tradition" of charity. When he preaches to the congregation in the film, he is reading from the actual sermons given by Father Jacques, the priest at Malle's grammar school who was deported to Mathausen. When Father Jean quotes St. Paul, he speaks for Malle's Catholic faith, delivering the moral of the film. "'Brethren, do not think you are all-knowing. Do not return harm for harm. If your enemy is hungry, give him food. If he is thirsty, give him drink.' We shall pray for those who are suffering, those who are hungry, those who are being persecuted. We shall pray for the victims, and for their tormentors as well."

The name Malle gives to Jean Bonnet—Kippelstein—means in German "turning over a stone." In this film Malle unearths the gravestones of the dead to reveal the tragedy of the Second World War for Jews, French Catholics, and Germans alike. It is a Catholic perspective, not a Jewish one, and it must be understood in Catholic terms.

In *Au Revoir les Enfants*, no one escapes—not the Jews, not the priests, not the French schoolboys, not the collaborators. There is no optimism in Malle's universe. As he told Elvis Mitchell of *Rolling Stone*: "You can say the unifying theme in my films is the loss of innocence. That's why I chose the title; to me it also means 'goodbye, childhood.' That time, when I was a sheltered schoolboy and the Gestapo came and took Jean Bonnet away from the classroom, was the end of my childhood, and I've been thinking of that all my life." Would that Louis Malle's attackers had given this subject a fraction as much consideration. □

All They Are Saying

Milton Mankoff

One of the few joys of heavy exposure to right-wing perspectives is recognizing that conservative ideologues feel as powerless as their liberal or radical counterparts. Eight years in the saddle apparently have not alleviated this feeling, and as the Reagan presidency winds down there have been myriad recriminations hurled by those having to lower their political expectations.

Disaffected conservatives typically have blamed the president directly or indirectly for failure, missed opportunities, and betrayal. Richard Viguerie, the far right's fund-raising impresario, called Reagan a "senile idiot" after the recent arms accord. Those less inclined to vitriolic display, like Fred Barnes, writing in February's *The American Spectator* (TAS), focused on his lackadaisical tendencies in making White House staff appointments, allowing pragmatists and opportunists to burrow in and influence policy.

Barnes, like Donald Regan, also believes that Nancy Reagan bears some responsibility for her husband's conduct. Unlike Regan, who notes the First Lady's use of astrology to determine the timing of her husband's actions, Barnes cites Michael Deaver's insider account, *Behind the Scenes*, to portray Nancy Reagan's attempts to influence the president on policy matters. Mrs. Reagan, who has been single-minded in her devotion to advancing her spouse's place in history, undoubtedly shares the right's view that leftist professors determine it. Thus, she urged Ron to soften his position on the Soviets and promoted the Geneva summit. She also lobbied her husband to help the dispossessed and to cut a deal with the Sandinistas, and she argued strenuously against going to Bitburg. In these latter instances she didn't prevail but made it more difficult for ideological purists to carry the day.

Instead of crying over spilled milk, some conservative Administration-bashers have begun to redirect attention to the future. Fred Barnes, seemingly on lend-lease from *The New Republic* to *TAS*, now provides an intriguing glimpse at post-Reagan era counsel to the right in his "Why Can't Conservatives Govern?" (May).

Barnes believes that despite his shortcomings, Ronald Reagan "took the country as far in a conservative direction as it is willing to go" in this century. Rather than pursuing futile campaigns for constitutional amendments requiring a balanced budget and eliminating any federal role in education, as some conservatives have advocated, he believes the right must rethink its entire orientation toward government.

Barnes argues that conservatives must end their romance with the "minimalist" state. Americans *like* big government. They are attached to federal subsidies for PBS and National Public Radio and a host of other social programs that repulse conservatives and that even neoliberals find wasteful. Instead of priding themselves on opposing spending as a matter of *principle*, the right should offer its own vehicles for channeling tax dollars. He specifically proposes doubling NASA's budget over the next decade to compete with the Soviet space effort and to reap scientific and military benefits. Another suggestion involves having the federal government provide subminimum employment for the poor unable to find private jobs, coupled with day care for their offspring.

Along with embracing spending for the "right" cause, Barnes believes conservatives need to think programmatically. They must not assume governmental "acts of omission are preferable to acts of commission." He is particularly enamored of Education Secretary William Bennett's impassioned call for pedagogical emphasis on the wisdom of Western Civilization. Barnes also waxes enthusiastic about Thatcherite proposals for the sale of public housing to the poor at bargain prices and, interestingly, expanding Head Start, because he views it as unquestionably successful.

Finally, the author contends that conservatives must overcome their aversion to working *in* government, particularly within social service bureaucracies. Wanting to work only for the CIA, Treasury, State, Defense, or Justice won't do. It will leave formulation and implementation of social policy to liberals, who relish bureaucratic machinations.

Barnes's viewpoint is likely to get respectful attention if George Bush becomes president. Bush is Nixon in human form. His support for the far right's domestic agenda is largely rhetorical. He was apparently one of those who urged the president to be more conciliatory toward Gorbachev. Even if Bush loses in November, a more pragmatic conservative opposition may be ascendant for awhile. Black Monday and hard times for Texas oil have depleted the financial and ideological support for militant Reaganomics. The televangelists' troubles have humbled the moralistic "cultural conservatives" as well. The meager support for Jack Kemp and Pat Robertson among Republican primary voters reflects the current shift in the party's center of gravity.

Win or lose, the task of the liberal left will be both easier and more challenging: easier because it won't have to fight for every social program that is taken for granted in virtually all affluent societies; more difficult because it will have to articulate more effective policies to deal with our long-neglected social problems. □

Milton Mankoff is associate professor of sociology at Queens College, City University of New York.

Current Debate: Should Terrorists be Assassinated?

Louis René Beres

Khalil al-Wazir, a trusted lieutenant of Yasser Arafat, was assassinated by a skilled commando team at his home outside Tunis on April 16, 1988. Known widely by his *nom de guerre* Abu Jihad, the senior figure in the military arm of the PLO had dispatched the first Fatah squad in 1965 to sabotage Israel's main water project and had been in charge of terrorist operations inside Israel since 1973. Officially, Israel denies any role in the assassination, although the finesse of the operation has all the markings of Jerusalem's intelligence services.

What has been the global response? Predictably, it has been one of almost universal condemnation. Yet, from the standpoint of international law in a world system without government—a system where self-help is sometimes the only possible path to justice—assassination is not always murder. Indeed, in the absence of prospects for extradition and proper trial, extrajudicial execution can even be law-enforcing.

Significantly, the existing world legal order lacks an international criminal court with jurisdiction over individuals. Only the courts of individual countries can try terrorists. It follows that where individual states harbor such criminals and refuse to honor extradition requests, the only remedy available to victimized societies lies in unilateral action.

Was al-Wazir a terrorist? From the perspective of the many mourners who accompanied the casket to the cemetery in Damascus, he was plainly a martyr. In Israel, however, he was remembered as the architect of the 1975 takeover of the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv that caused eighteen deaths, and the 1978 coastal raid which left a trail of forty-five corpses from Haifa to Tel Aviv. It is very likely that al-Wazir played a major role in last March's hijacking of a bus in southern Israel that killed three Israeli civilians.

From the point of view of international law, the legitimacy of Palestinian claims for self-determination does not vindicate the use of PLO violence against Israeli civilians. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the two 1977 Protocols to those Conventions, codified long-standing principles of international law requiring that every use of force be judged twice: once with regard to the justness of the cause and once with regard to the justness of the means. Thus, even if the Palestinian uprising in the territories satisfies the legal requirements of "just cause," the means used to further the objectives of self-determination must also be just. The legitimacy of a certain claim never legitimates the use of violence against the innocent. The ends do not justify the means.

On December 9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as "criminal." Yet even for acts of terrorism that were already criminalized by prior treaties and conventions (e.g., hijacking and hostage-taking attacks on internationally protected persons), international cooperation and punishment of offenders remains essentially nonexistent. Although the long-standing "extradite or prosecute" formula applies, power politics always prevail. Tunisia would hardly have honored an extradition request for al-Wazir from Israel or anywhere else, nor would it have undertaken to prosecute Arafat's deputy in Tunisian courts.

Any civilized system of international law must regard assassination as a crime in *almost* all circumstances. There are circumstances, however, where an action that is normally criminal becomes, as a form of retaliation, an act of law-enforcement. In legal terms, we are speaking of the measure of self-help known as *reprisal*, an act by an injured state in retaliation for prior harm to that state.

By the standards of contemporary international law, terrorists are known as *hostes humani generis*, common enemies of humankind. Like pirates who were "to be hanged by the first persons into whose hands they fall," according to the distinguished eighteenth-century scholar Emmerich de Vattel, terrorists are international outlaws who fall within the scope of "universal jurisdiction." The fact that al-Wazir's crimes had been directed specifically at Israel removes any doubts about that country's jurisdiction in the matter.

In his 1758 classic, *The Law of Nations*, which still displays law-making authority under the terms of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Vattel stated: "Men who are by profession poisoners, assassins or incendiaries may be exterminated wherever they are caught; for they direct their disastrous attacks against all Nations, by destroying the foundations of their common safety." Later, when the Nuremberg Tribunal was established in 1945, the Court ruled that in certain exceptional circumstances, literal adherence to due process (the Tribunal was referring to the question of retroactivity and crimes against humanity) could represent the greatest *injustice*. Concluding that retroactivity need not be unjust, the Tribunal affirmed: "So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go unpunished"—*nullum crimen sine poena* ("no crime without

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punishment").

Assassination, like retroactivity, is normally an illegal remedy under international law. Yet, support for a limited right to assassination can be found in Aristotle's *Politics*, Plutarch's *Lives* and Cicero's *De Officiis*. Should the civilized community of nations now reject this right altogether, it will have to recognize that it would be at the expense of effective counterterrorism. Lacking any of the central institutions of global authority to interpret and enforce the rules against terrorism, the existing law of nations must continue to rely on even the most objectionable forms of self-help. To do otherwise would simply reduce the already limited arsenal of weapons that can be brought against terrorists. □

Sanford Levinson Responds

Professor Beres argues as follows:
(1) Khalil al-Wazir was a terrorist, a status punishable under established international law.
(2) In the absence of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over his offense, any state can (indeed *should*) take responsibility for enforcement of international law.
(3) Israel did precisely this in (presumably) ordering al-Wazir's assassination on April 16, 1988.
(4) One should therefore refrain from condemning Israel, unless one wants to "reduce the already-limited arsenal of weapons that can be brought against terrorists."

One could say a number of things in response: separate articles could be written on each point. I begin by noting that there is much debate about what constitutes being a terrorist. One need not disagree that al-Wazir was a terrorist; the problem is in distinguishing him from presumably more attractive people, such as the former members of *Lehi* or the *Irgun* who now receive ovations from the so-called leadership of the American Jewish community because *their* terrorism was for a better cause.

Beres' brief contains three examples. Two of them occurred in 1975 and 1978; the third is the recent hijacking of a bus in the Negev, where al-Wazir's role is described as "very likely." Being a lawyer, I think it relevant that Israel made not the slightest effort to prove in its own courts of law that al-Wazir was culpable for *any* of these specific acts of terrorism. As for the first two examples, Israel has had more than a decade to "try" al-Wazir *in absentia* and to notify him (and the world) that he would be treated by Israel as an international outlaw. The last of the three events raises the most problems: Does Beres generally countenance execution where it is only "very likely," rather than "certain beyond reasonable doubt," that a suspect committed an offense?

Israel has just finished a months-long trial concerning John Demjanjuk, alleged to be the "Ivan the Terrible" of Treblinka. Whatever one's feeling about that trial and the death sentence imposed upon Demjanjuk, there is a world of difference between the due process of law granted to Demjanjuk and the summary execution visited upon al-Wazir. Given Beres' purported commitment to law, why does he not suggest that the Israeli commandos should have *kidnapped* al-Wazir and brought him to Israel in order to be tried? Surely a team skilled enough to carry out the operation in the first place could have managed to spirit al-Wazir out of the country instead of executing him. One problem, perhaps, is that it is not at all certain that al-Wazir *could* have been sentenced to death had he been brought to, and tried by, Israel: I believe that the death sentence is reserved for those incriminated in the Holocaust.

There is, however, something almost surreal about viewing Beres as making one lawyerly argument to be countered with another. Can he, or any reader of this exchange, genuinely believe that the assassination of al-Wazir had the slightest thing to do with an Israeli desire to vindicate international law? Surely not. Israel assassinated al-Wazir because of a political judgment that his death at that time would be effective in suppressing the uprising in the occupied territories. To believe that anything else underlies the assassination is to live in a fantasy land.

How, then, should one assess the assassination? I have indicated why I believe that the legal framework offered by Beres does not help (or at least does not help Israel). Perhaps we should concentrate on ethical or moral argument and debate the legitimacy of assassination as a political tactic. Still, unless one makes an (untenable) argument for the moral duty to assassinate all terrorists, one must pay careful attention to particular contexts and presumed consequences.

The assassination was a political act, and one should assess it politically. Is there any reason to believe that it contributed to bringing about a desirable solution to the Palestinian uprising? I think not. It is just one more action by a bankrupt Israeli government determined to avoid any move toward meaningful change from the status quo of domination of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians by Jews (and, alas, "Jews" is surely a more accurate word than "Israelis," since the latter term includes an almost twenty percent Arab minority whose interests seem to be scarcely recognized by those in control of the state). Moreover, I cannot help but believe that the assassination represents an attempt, one hopes only subconscious, to encourage the PLO or local Palestinians to engage in counterterrorism so that Israeli Jews can try to regain the moral high ground by presenting themselves as victims of unrelenting Palestinian terrorism. The obscene response by the Israeli civilian leadership to the killing of fifteen-year-old Tirza Porat at Beita underscores the political usefulness to the Israeli right wing of Jewish deaths that can be ascribed to Arab terrorism.

It is inconceivable that any acceptable resolution to the current situation could come about without negotiations with the PLO. It is equally inconceivable to assume that assassinations of high PLO leaders will serve to encourage formal

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PLO recognition of Israel's right to exist as well as a renunciation of terrorism, which remain preconditions for American willingness to deal with the PLO. Perhaps more important, it is inconceivable for assassinations to serve as a plausible means of encouraging necessary PLO compromise in regard to the legitimate security interests of Israel.

One need not believe that Khalil al-Wazir was the victim of abstract "injustice" in order to believe that his killing was a malevolent act ordered by brutal people committed to a vision of Israel that dishonors both Judaism and Zionism. Beres' argument, couched as one of "law," demonstrates the intellectual corruption that support of the current Israeli government's policies brings in its wake. □

Current Debate: Ben-Gurion's Role in the Holocaust

Just as the charge that American Jews failed to act appropriately to save European Jews during the Holocaust has generated considerable controversy in the United States, the similar charge leveled at Jews living in the Yishuv (the Jewish community under the British Mandate in Palestine) has provoked fierce debate in Israel. Israeli historian Idith Zertal, writing in Tikkun *(Vol. 2, No. 2) argued that "the Zionist leadership failed the test, and did not rise to the demands of the bitterest time in Jewish history. The behavior of the Yishuv's leadership when confronted with the Holocaust, and its reaction to the devastation, were marked by failure in almost every possible respect, apart from malice. The Yishuv leaders' behavior was typified by shortsightedness, failure to comprehend developments in occupied Europe, and enslavement to ideologies and predetermined concepts that committed them irrevocably to obsolete and inappropriate patterns of thought and reaction . . . " And about Ben-Gurion, Zertal wrote: "He in fact relegated rescue to a role of secondary importance, both on the Yishuv's practical concrete agenda, and in its consciousness and ethos." What follows is a debate based on Zertal's article.*

Shabtai Teveth

Two glaring faults plague much of the recent writing on the response of the Yishuv (the pre-State Jewish community in Palestine) and its Zionist leadership to the Holocaust: first, the tendency to look at the Holocaust through today's eyes—from a sort of post-Entebbe worldview—and second, the tendency to create an imaginary conflict between the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and the rescue of Jews from Hitler's Europe. These faults have led some writers to the accusation that rescue was inherently at odds with the establishment of a state.

At the center of this attack stands David Ben-Gurion, then the chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive (JAE). He is accused either directly by name or indirectly through such collective references as "the leadership of the Yishuv" and "the Jewish Agency."

A mixed chorus has been voicing these preposterous accusations for many years. It was first led by a notable revisionist, Shmuel Tamir, the defense attorney in the Kastner criminal libel suit of 1954, who accused the JAE of collaboration with the Nazis in the destruction of Hungary's Jews. The charge was readily picked up and spread by ultra-Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem and by Soviet propagandists in Moscow. Most recently, it has been revived by the leftist British playwright Jim Allen, who makes a similar charge in his *Perdition*. The play premiered last summer at the Edinburgh Festival, after Jewish protests blocked its opening at the Royal Court Theatre Upstairs in London.

Joining this group, in a fashion all their own, are Mati Meged and Benjamin Harshav (Hrushovski). The former, an Israeli man of letters and a notable Palmakhnik (member of the Haganah's striking force), has recently been exposed as the secret "eye-witness" who for years had been feeding other writers, some of world renown, with groundless gossip. The worst such charge held that Ben-Gurion, in the War of Independence, organized young immigrant survivors into special formations upon their arrival in Palestine, and heartlessly placed them in the Latroun Battle without proper training, thus dispatching them to their deaths. Harshav, a distinguished Israeli professor of literature, followed suit, and under his *nom de plume*, Daniel, published in 1987 his poem "Peter The Great," in which "David Ben-Gurion paved the road to the Burma Road [to relieve Jerusalem of its siege] . . . with the bones of boys from the Holocaust."

So widespread has this senseless criticism been that even Professor Anita Shapira, Berl Katznelson's biographer and a leading scholar at the Institute for Zionist Research at Tel Aviv University, has fallen victim to the same scholarly flaws. Concerning the Yishuv's paratroopers dropped in 1944 in Nazi-occupied Europe, she mistakes the duality of their mission—their military duty as British soldiers to help RAF pilots escape German prison, and their

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Jewish mission of rescue—for a gnawing conflict of conscience. In her *Berl* she mistakenly depicts the paratroopers as torn between their Jewish and Zionist roles, a duplicity that never even occurred to them. In the process, she too unfairly portrays Ben-Gurion as more interested in Zionists than in Jews during the Holocaust years.

Idith Zertal's highly inspired but poorly substantiated "The Poisoned Heart" (*Tikkun* Vol. 2, No.2) shares the aforementioned faults, but in a different way; she tries to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. This equivocation may be attributed more to confusion and lack of mastery of the historical evidence than to political bias. Her article therefore merits special examination, one that I hope will afford this writer the opportunity to shed some light on Ben-Gurion's response to the Holocaust.

What is most noticeable about Zertal's article is that it speaks in two contrasting voices. The less prominent voice is hushed, hardly above a whisper; it can be detected only sporadically, and it speaks in defense of the Yishuv and its Zionist leaders. The Yishuv was small, we are told, only 450,000 strong, "with no political sovereignty, limited economic resources, and a clandestine military force in its infancy." Obviously, "these realities" prevented the Yishuv from "doing anything real and rendering the Holocaust into something other than what it essentially was." Following Antek Zuckerman's memorable remarks, which she quotes, Zertal offers her conclusion that "he [Antek] knew Jews could not stop the Nazi Machine." She would have been wise to end her article at this point. For if rescue was beyond the Jews' and the Yishuv's reach, what more needs to be said about Ben-Gurion's and the leadership's response?

Instead, she continues in the second, more prominent voice—brassy and piercing throughout the article—to indict the Yishuv's leadership for failing to come up with "a correct response to an unprecedented situation such as the Holocaust."

Zertal maintains that the reason for this failing was mainly psychological. She concentrates on the leadership's "enslavement to ideologies and predetermined concepts that committed them irrevocably to obsolete and inappropriate patterns of thought and reaction"; on their "refusal to believe the unbelievable"; and, most important, on the "ideological inhibition" that afflicted them. For this last point she seeks support from the historian Dan Diner, who asserts that:

> total annihilation seriously undermined the special imperative of *having* a Jewish state, as Zionism explained this imperative in terms of saving Jews from the worst excesses of anti-Semitism. The reports of total destruction, of the 'final solution,' challenged the validity of Zionism's answer to anti-Semitism. Such reports had 'no right to exist.' To continue pursuing the mission of creating a Jewish state in Palestine, the Zionist leaders had to refrain from perceiving Nazism in its full horror—despite their traditionally pessimistic position concerning the fate of Jews in exile.

The whole premise of this passage—it is unclear how much of it is Zertal's and how much is Diner's—is entirely psychological. No attempt is made by either author—both historians, not psychologists—to support it with even a shred of evidence. Had serious psychological work been done on this "Zionist inhibition" and its effect on Ben-Gurion and his associates during the Holocaust years, Zertal surely would have referred to it.

Nevertheless, Zertal goes on to make the further psychological claim that what determined the Yishuv leaders' position was their long-standing Zionist ideology of the negation of the exile (*Shelilat ha-Golah*). She even insists that Ben-Gurion was unable to tell the difference between Hitler's death factories and the familiar "degenerate" condition of exile. Her only evidence in support of this charge is quotes from Ben-Gurion's November 1942 speech at the special session of the Elected Assembly. The assembly gathered in Jerusalem, it must be recalled, to stir world opinion in light of reports of the Nazi atrocities, as well as to launch three days of national mourning, prayer, and protest. According to Zertal, he said (the omissions and misrepresentations are in brackets): "Let us tell our dear brothers and sisters, the tortured martyrs of the Nazi ghettos: Your disaster is our disaster, your blood is ours.



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[We shall do our utmost to avenge your vengeance], and we shall allow ourselves no rest until we redeem you [both] from the *Nazi inferno* and from the *degenerate state of exile* [wrong translation: it should read "from the degrading exile"], and bring you up, [all of you, *to us*] to our land, which is being built and redeemed."

The main purpose of Ben-Gurion's speech—as its title, "A Plea To Human Conscience," implies—was to demand a Jewish army to fight Hitler, a right for which Ben-Gurion tirelessly fought, despite being persistently denied by the British government. His demand must be understood in light of the history of Jewish persecutions and the Jewish plea for international justice, and no stretch of the imagination could read into it anything psychological. Yet, on the strength of this imprecise quotation Zertal charges that Ben-Gurion "was even capable of creating in his psyche and his design a symmetric parallel between ... the assembly-line annihilation ... and the 'degenerate' condition of exile."

Ben-Gurion aspired to redeem the Jewish people by restoring them to a life of national independence in Eretz Yisrael. He did not have to renounce his Zionist faith in order to save Europe's Jews from Hitler, any more than Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had to renege on democratic capitalism, Tory monarchism, and Leninist communism, respectively, in order to fight Hitler. Furthermore, Ben-Gurion's mention of the degrading exile was in accord with the available information about the Holocaust. In November 1942, it was still believed that widespread famine, torture, brutality, sadism, and mass shootings were the Nazi means of destroying Jewish life. Nazi death camps, though already known to British intelligence, were yet to be discovered by the rest of the world or were disbelieved. The intricate system of transports from all over occupied Europe to the death camps in the East was still unknown outside the S.S. units that were charged with the task. It would be some time before Jews, even at the gates of the death camps, would believe that the unbelievable—a centralized, systematic, assembly-line genocide—was really taking place. Indeed, the opening of Ben-Gurion's speech clearly indicated only a fragmentary knowledge of the Nazi destruction machine, and the extent of this knowledge had nothing to do with his psyche: "We do not know exactly what goes on in the Nazi field of slaughter; how many Jews have already been massacred, murdered, burnt, buried alive, and how many are still under threat of the destroying sword. The Nazi gallows is surrounded by a wall of machine guns and expert hangmen letting no one come or go. Only from time to time reaches us the cry of spilled Jewish blood, the blood of children and women, trampled upon and torn to pieces."

Ben-Gurion did not yet know of the existence of death camps and gas chambers, which is why he made no mention of them. It is clear, therefore, that the "Nazi inferno" was Ben-Gurion's reference to Nazi horrors in Eastern Europe, where the Jews were herded into ghettos, while the "degenerating exile" referred to the wretched life in France, Holland, and Belgium, from where there were no reports of mass killings. Zertal, however, sticks undaunted to her thesis: The "symmetric parallel" between the assembly-line annihilation and the "degenerate condition" of exile was created in Ben-Gurion's "psyche" and "design" simply because "the 'degenerate' condition of exile ... had been familiar and routine [to the Zionists] since time immemorial."

Unfortunately, Zertal does not fare much better with history than she does with psychology. Why had Ben-Gurion "never appointed himself, even when the horrifying facts about the annihilation became fully clear, as the leader of the Yishuv's rescue efforts?" Zertal asks, only to answer that "by behaving in this fashion, he in fact relegated rescue to a role of secondary importance, both on the Yishuv's practical concrete agenda, and in its consciousness and ethos."

Both the question and the answer are a product of the first fault—seeing the past through today's eyes. For what does Zertal mean by the "Yishuv's rescue efforts"? The efforts of the JAE? If so, the Ben-Gurion to whom she addresses her question is not the Ben-Gurion of 1942 and the years thereafter. True, he was chairman of the JAE, but more in theory than in practice, since from 1940 to 1944 he was in a constant state of resignation because his proposed policies were rejected by his peers in the party as well as in the JAE. In fact, he had to argue, if not battle, for every inch of his political path against adversaries—the formidable Weizmann, the astute Katznelson, and the intractable Tabenkin, among others. He was not yet the Ben-Gurion of 1948 and the post-State years—the unique, the one-and-only quasi-omnipotent prime minister and minister of defense.

But even in the best of times, Ben-Gurion, the JAE chairman, stood at the head of an unchangeable coalition. It was elected at the 1939 World Zionist Congress, which, because of the war, was unable to reconvene for nearly seven years. True to Zionist custom, the JAE departments were divided among the parties that made up the JAE coalition, and each was a jealous guardian of its domain. The Inner Zionist Council—to which the JAE was accountable throughout the war years—was not empowered to alter either the coalition's partisan makeup or its personal composition. This was and remained the prerogative of the World Zionist Congress and the General Zionist Council, both defunct for the duration of the war. Ben-Gurion, therefore, could no more sack the much-slandered Yitzhak Gruenbaum, leader of the General Zionists Group A, head of the JAE's labor department, and chairman of the Yishuv Rescue Committee, than he could appoint himself mayor of New York. As a matter of fact, in the coalition system that governed the Yishuv, and later Israel, even Ben-Gurion as prime minister and minister of defense could not appoint and dismiss at will.

If, however, Zertal means that Ben-Gurion should have appointed himself head of the Rescue committee, her misconception runs still deeper. She writes that at the end of January 1943, the JAE "succeeded in establishing the *Va'ad Ha'hatzala*, the Rescue Committee, as an umbrella framework for the coordination of rescue operations, and installed Yitzhak Gruenbaum as its chairman.... [He] had little public and political clout in the Palestinian yishuv, and worse still, did not enjoy the esteem and backing of Ben-Gurion himself."

The Rescue Committee never was, and never was intended to become, an "umbrella frame-

work for coordination of rescue operations." Such powers were granted to it retroactively only by Zertal and other critics. The Rescue Committee's history began with the four-member "Committee for Polish Affairs," better known as "The Committee of Four," first set up in 1939, with a view toward assisting Poland's Jewry and maintaining a constant liaison with it. In November 1942 the JAE expanded its focus to the whole of occupied Europe, adding at the same time a fifth member to its board, Dr. Bernard Joseph, a lawyer and member of the JAE's political department, to facilitate the committee's contacts with the British administration in Palestine, with foreign governments, and with international bodies. To meet its wider responsibilities, the committee changed its name to "The Action Committee."

This committee was meant to guarantee better coordination among the JAE's departments, whose heads, or their deputies, made up its board. In other words, it was not representative of the whole Yishuv since all the parties outside the Zionist coalition could not take part in it. Most notable in their absence were the Revisionists, who established in 1935 their own New Zionist Organization, and the ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionist Agudat Israel. To meet public demand for national unity in all matters concerning European Jews and their rescue, the JAE entered negotiations with all parties. Finally, in mid-January 1943 a new twelve-member board was elected to a still unnamed body. Of these board members, five were members of JAE departments (who formerly made up the Action Committee), three were members of the Yishuv's National Council (of whom one represented the opposition's General Zionists Group B), and two each were representatives of Agudat Israel and the Revisionists. There were, however, in Palestine at the time, no less than forty *landsmanschaften* (associations of immigrants of European origin) who were clamoring, a few with success, for representation on the committee's board. Thus, the plenary session of the committee consisted of no less than twenty-five members, and on a good day even thirty.

It took a long time to settle on a name for the new committee. Finally, the debate ended in a compromise, and the committee took a neutral name: "The Committee For Occupied Europe's Jews." In time it became known as "The United Rescue Committee at the JAE," and, for short, "The Rescue Committee." The attempt to define the committee's functions, tasks, and objectives never met with success, however. The members of the Inner Zionist Council could not make up their minds as to what to expect from the Rescue Committee, and consequently it was left to fend for itself. Needless to say, Zertal's "umbrella framework for the coordination of rescue operations" had no such brief, and virtually no resources. In fact, even the gathering and collecting of information—the original role of the Rescue Committee's predecessors—proved to be beyond its reach. "Little wonder," writes Dr. Dina Porat, "that from the outset the Committee's members felt themselves superfluous, there not being, in fact, even one area they could call their own." Zertal, who draws on Porat's *An Entangled Leadership*, would have done well to consult the chapter from which the above quotation is taken before addressing her question to Ben-Gurion. Why should he have appointed himself the head of a committee that could do nothing but talk, especially when even the compact and businesslike JAE could not do a great deal more?

To sum up, the Rescue Committee was a public body meant, at best, to increase public awareness of the ongoing destruction of Europe's Jews, harnessing public support for the Zionist leadership, or, more specifically, for the JAE. It had nothing to do with "rescue operations." Such operations were all in Haganah or Haganah-related hands, subordinate to the JAE. In fact, the Committee's major, and perhaps only, contribution to "the Yishuv's rescue efforts," to quote Zertal, was in the sphere of raising money for the Yishuv's "Appeal for Mobilization," with which it joined to campaign for a "United Appeal for Mobilization and Rescue." To accuse Ben-Gurion of not relinquishing the chairmanship of the JAE—the Yishuv's nearest approach to a government—for the leadership of the Rescue Committee is puzzling, to say the least.

Ben-Gurion, therefore, should be judged on the strength of his record as chairman of the JAE. To bear responsibility was in Ben-Gurion's nature. In fact, bearing responsibility was the hallmark of his leadership, and not once did he shrink from it. He considered it his responsibility to give overall direction to the JAE, not to take charge of any particular department, committee, or effort (the exception to the rule was his taking the defense portfolio in 1947). Nevertheless, there is no question that he played a major role in the struggle for larger immigration, a Jewish brigade, colonization, and the strengthening of the Haganah and rescue—all of whose day-to-day direction was entrusted to the JAE departments.

In support of her contention that Ben-Gurion "relegated rescue to a role of secondary importance," Zertal quotes from my *The Road to May* (an abridged, 220 page edition of my 1,800 page biography of Ben-Gurion): "Two facts may be established firmly. Ben-Gurion did not give rescue top priority in Zionist policy, and did not view the rescue enterprise as a central matter which he was duty-bound to head. Neither did he feel it necessary to explain his behavior—at that time or at other times."

But Ben-Gurion was hardly ever in the habit of explaining any of his "behavior," and that is why I, as his biographer, felt called upon to do it for him, in detail and at length. By omitting my explanation, Zertal leads her readers to the wrong conclusion

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that Ben-Gurion was so bedazzled with Zionism and the vision of a Jewish state that he left the fate of European Jews in Hitler's hands.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Ben-Gurion predicted the destruction of Europe's Jewry by Hitler before any other leader did so. A volume could not do justice to the vast evidence supporting this claim. Indeed, Zertal does mention Ben-Gurion's two bloodchilling prophecies from January 1934 and May 1938. But these quotations do not prevent her from also asserting—in a cavalier manner—that Ben-Gurion's behavior, like that of other Yishuv leaders, "was typified by shortsightedness," or from pronouncing her preconceived judgment: "Ben-Gurion's personal commitment, however, was not primarily to rescuing Jews, but to the building of the Jewish state itself." Thus she intimates that Ben-Gurion relegated rescue to secondary importance either out of choice or because of "ideological inhibition."

As early as April 1936 Ben-Gurion made his position clear on rescuing European Jewry. He told Sir Arthur Wauchope, the British high commissioner in Palestine, that "were there the possibility of transferring Polish Jewry to America or Argentina we would have done so, regardless of our Zionist ideology. But the whole world is closed to us. Had we not room in Palestine, our people would have no choice but suicide."

The Evian Conference of 1938 and the Bermuda Conference of April 1943—the free world's two farcical attempts, at the initiative of the United States, to find a refuge for the Jews—proved Ben-Gurion right. Not one country opened its gates to Hitler's victims. The Yishuv in Palestine, small as it was, and despite the limitations placed on it by the British and the vile opposition mounted by the Arabs, received and absorbed more Jews from Nazi Europe than the rest of the Jewish world combined. Had there not been Zionist Palestine, at least another 250,000 Jews would have died in the gas chambers.

Rescue, both in the strictest and broadest sense of the word, had been the compass and the engine behind all of Ben-Gurion's political work since August 1933, when he bought and read Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. In fact, he was ready to compromise his Zionist principles in order to rescue Europe's Jews. In 1934, for example, he met with lieutenants of Haj Amin Al-Husseini, the notorious Mufti and leader of the Arab National movement, to offer the Mufti his federal scheme: In return for Arab consent to an emigration of four million Jews from Europe, Ben-Gurion promised Jewish assistance in bringing about a federation of Syria, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and a Jewish state in Palestine. He thus was ready to trade so high a Zionist value as full sovereignty and independence in return for Jewish rescue. Furthermore, in 1937 he was willing to accept Peel's partition of Palestine and worked hard to convince his party and the World Zionist Congress that a Jewish state, even a tiny one, could open wide its gates to receive millions of Jews from Europe. Again he was ready to trade a sacred Zionist value—the wholeness and integrity of Eretz Yisrael—for Jewish rescue.

This approach cost Ben-Gurion dearly: his party, Mapai, split over the partition issue. Thus, in March 1944, Ben-Gurion referred to this issue with the following words: "Had a Jewish state been established seven years ago we could have brought over millions of Jews ... and they would be here today. Now we will never bring them here ... for they are no more.... Tabenkin ... will believe me when I say that I would not have given up hoping for the whole of Palestine if I had not believed that bringing two million Jews to Palestine was worth all the fine talk about one, whole Palestine."

Clearly, Ben-Gurion's relegation of rescue to secondary importance was due to the then-prevailing constraints and circumstances, which completely ruled out massive rescue by the Yishuv or by any other Jewish community. Ben-Gurion always followed a rule that he first coined in public when he called on the Yishuv to cripple the White Paper of May 1939. He then said: "We shall not engage in moralizing to the Mandatory government; it is deaf.... Nor shall we engage in futile efforts."

This rule of utility, so to speak, led him to concentrate on the achievable. The little strength that the Yishuv had was best not spent on "futile efforts." Sad as it was, Ben-Gurion had realized at the war's outbreak that efforts at massive rescue were bound to prove futile. He simply had no choice. Like his Zionist colleagues and Jews throughout the world, he was up against an impregnable double wall: Hitler was destroying the Jews systematically, and the Allies would not lift a finger to save them. Yet without Allied help there was no help at all. Today's post-Entebbe world view fails to take into account the fact that American Jewry kept a low profile for fear that the war would be considered a Jewish war or that the Yishuv lacked Israel's air force. Today's critics cannot understand that the British administration in Palestine could thwart the JAE's attempts to stir British opinion simply by failing to issue the necessary travel papers to Moshe Sharett, head of the political department, as it did in the Joel Brand case.

* * *

There is now a consensus among most serious students of the Holocaust about the futility of the mass rescue schemes. Zertal herself admits to it, albeit in her familiar *sotto voce*. But when sounding her more authentic voice, she does not remember these facts. Moreover, the picture of impotence that she paints is incomplete. Missing is the fierce opposition of His Majesty's government in Whitehall and of the British administration in Palestine to any rescue attempt made by the Yishuv. Britain opposed plans for a Jewish army or a paratroopers' regiment, the opening of Palestine's gates to refugees and survivors, the saving of 29,000 children from the Balkans, and the air bombardment of Auschwitz and the railroads leading to it, to name just a few things.

Sadly, all that was feasible was the "small rescue," as it came to be known: the sending of money and food parcels, and, whenever possible, the saving of individuals or small groups, eventually totaling thousands, perhaps more, but not a great deal more. The Yishuv and the JAE, under Ben-Gurion's leadership, were engaged in this kind of rescue more than any other Jewish community and Jewish leadership. Incredible as it may seem, the Yishuv raised more money for rescue than American Jewry, ten times its size.

It is true that however involved Ben-Gurion was in "small rescue"—and he was involved in all rescue schemes—his primary interest was the creation of a Jewish state. But in the Holocaust years, it was not so much the Zionist

dream that drove him as the belief that a Jewish state in Palestine offered the best and only chance for mass rescue. In 1938 and 1939 he devised a scheme to seize Haifa by force, proclaim it a Jewish state, and open its port gates to millions of Europe's Jews. During the war years he was beset by fears that Hitler's example in Europe would be followed by other leaders in the Americas and in the Moslem world. In his view, the world proved itself completely impervious to Jewish misery, and therefore only a Jewish state would be capable of extending succor to Jews in distress. In short, the Jewish state was, in his view, the only guarantor of the Jews' collective safety and their only means of assurance against a repetition of the Holocaust. To deny his major preoccupation with Jewish safety, to intimate that Jewish rescue was secondary to his Zionist dream, is willfully to twist history beyond recognition.

The main thrust of Zertal's article, to use her own words, is symbolic. In other words, recognizing that mass rescue was impossible, she still thinks that Ben-Gurion should have committed some symbolic act—the nature of which is never made clear—that would have reassured Europe's Jews, before they met their death, of the Yishuv's love and concern. She would have done better to demand a romantic act, since so many of her points that grossly offend the historian would delight the romantic eye.

Indeed, Ben-Gurion, the JAE, and the Yishuv did understand the importance of symbolic acts. Yishuv agents in Istanbul, spearheading all rescue operations, recognized that what they were doing was largely symbolic. Summing up their outstanding work, Shaul Avigur of the Haganah said: "It is of symbolic value for the survivors. One of the men made even more modest claims: "The one thing we did in Istanbul was to become an address."

The symbolic acts in question had three major purposes: first, to help to rescue as many Jews as possible; second, to reassure Europe's Jews of the Yishuv's concern and sympathy, as well as to try to stir in them the hope that all was not lost; and third, to ease their own generation's and the next generation's consciences. Such reasoning helped the "United Appeal for Mobilization and Rescue," to which the JAE was by far the largest donor, improve its fundraising efforts. In one meeting of the appeal, Eliyahu Golomb warned that the many thousands of Jews who would survive Hitler would also ask whether everything had been done for their rescue. "Fundraising is not intended only to save them, but to save the nation's honor in the future as well," he said. At another meeting, with the same purpose, Zalman Aran predicted that if the campaign failed to fetch 5 percent of the outstanding capital of the banks and of the Histadrut's companies, and 40 percent of the JAE's budget, it would be "our generation's disgrace."

The decision to drop thirty-two paratroopers in occupied Europe was also largely symbolic. Clearly, the JAE and the Haganah wanted to drop a whole regiment of paratroopers in Europe—paratroopers who would incite rebellions in the ghettos, start Jewish resistance, and save as many Jews as possible—but, under the prevailing circumstances, only the British could train paratroopers and fly them to their destinations behind the lines. The British rejected the larger plan outright.

The constant demand for more money came, indeed, from outside the JAE. Zertal makes much of this fact, and, in her love for the romantic, she even intimates that the thirty-two paratroopers created their own mission to occupied Europe. The paratroopers, however, never felt they were in conflict with the JAE. On the contrary, they looked to Ben-Gurion and his associates for leadership. Yeshaiahu Dan, speaking for the paratroopers, made this point absolutely clear on nationwide television in May 1987.

Zertal does not explain why the paratroopers' mission is inadequate as the symbol she is seeking. Nor does she specify what sort of "symbolic" act she has in mind. Would she have preferred missions that were more suicidal? Was the paratroopers' mission not suicidal enough because only seven of the thirty-two paratroopers were killed? To ask for larger suicide missions merely for the symbolic effect that such missions might have on future generations is to embrace the worst sort of romanticism. No responsible government would knowingly sacrifice its soldiers in such a symbolic act. Human life was, and remains, the highest Jewish value; it is to be sacrificed only to save other lives.

There remains one final issue in this debate that cannot be overlooked. Members of the public, as Zertal depicts them, or the field men, if you wish, believed that more money meant more rescue; and therefore they put money before rescue schemes. Ben-Gurion and the JAE, on the other hand, put schemes before money. This controversy was not simply academic, for meeting Aran's demand—and he was not the only one to put it forward—would have meant bringing the Yishuv's economy to a halt. Indeed, some people expressed displeasure with the Yishuv's response of strikes, protests, and ordinary fundraising. Such measures were all too conventional for their tastes, and pressure for more dramatic steps gained momentum. In the face of the ongoing Holocaust in Europe, Jewish organizations elsewhere should have dedicated all their time and money to rescue, they claimed. In 1944 the JAE should have diverted its entire budget—2,100,000 pounds—and all of the budgets of the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Foundation Fund—1,766,000 and 1,250,000 pounds respectively—to rescue, they insisted. Instead, a total of only 315,000 pounds (the equivalent of $12,600,500) was actually spent on rescue.* But no one came up with concrete, sensible, and feasible schemes for rescue or for other alternatives to protests.

Had this romantic view prevailed, the Yishuv would have stopped acquiring land and establishing new settlements, and it would have been constantly on strike, preoccupied with mourning and protests. Zertal, it seems, would be very proud; but we would all be left with the bitter memory of the Holocaust and nothing else. Had Ben-Gurion and his associates at the JAE not gone on to strengthen the Yishuv's economy and armed forces, had they not continued to fight the White Paper and the British government, and had they not considered their principal objective the creation of a Jewish state as a haven for Hitler's survivors, there would

*According to Dr. Porat, a careful calculation shows that between February 1943 and June 1945 the Yishuv spent 1,325,000 Palestinian pounds ($53,000,000) on rescue, of which 647,000 pounds (48.9 percent) were raised by the Yishuv itself, 512,000 pounds (38.6 percent) by the American Joint Committee, and 170,000 pounds (12.8 percent) by the other Jewish communities of the free world.

have been the Holocaust—only the Holocaust—and no State of Israel.

Zionism is undergoing a crisis of faith from within, and it is being assaulted and debunked from without. It has become fashionable to depict Zionism as the root of all evil, as if prior to the erection of the Jewish state Jews had known uninterrupted bliss. In the process, the accusing finger is directed towards Ben-Gurion, the chief architect of the Jewish State. He stands accused only because he truly symbolizes combatant Zionism—the symbolic link between national destruction and rebirth. □

Idith Zertal Responds

The historical debate concerning the Holocaust and the behavior of Jews outside the range of the Nazi murder machine towards the Jewish victims in Europe does not and cannot resemble any other historical debate. It is necessarily burdened with pain, tension, and moral judgment. This fact may explain the aggressive tone that characterizes Shabtai Teveth's response to my article, "The Poisoned Heart: The Jews of Palestine and the Holocaust," (*Tikkun*, Vol. 2, No. 2). But it does not justify it. Leaving aside the details in dispute between us, I must take issue with Teveth on another count. He identifies emotionally and intellectually with the Yishuv of Eretz Yisrael, and in particular with Ben-Gurion—the hero both of his biography and of many Zionists. In this debate, however, it is the Jews of Europe, the victims of the Nazis' systematic campaign of annihilation, who merit our full sympathy and compassion.

Teveth is so eager to defend his hero and the behavior of the Zionist leadership that he leaves no room in his historiographic worldview for positions and interpretations other than his own. In Teveth's worldview the roles are clear: a good Jew, how much more so an Israeli Jew, can either defend the Yishuv during the Holocaust, or can retroactively "aggrandize ... Hitler's death-camp victory by defaming the Yishuv leaders, as his willing or unwilling accomplices," thereby becoming a partner in his deeds. This sort of inflammatory argument really does not deserve a reply, but, out of respect for Teveth, I will attempt to answer some of his charges.

Teveth rejects any attempt to interpret Ben-Gurion's positions, words, and deeds that is not based upon documentary evidence—in most cases what Ben-Gurion himself had to say on the matter. This historiographic approach was popular in the nineteenth century, motivated by the rather naive belief that there exists a single historical truth that can be uncovered by accumulating bits of archival information. Teveth believes that a passage from some speech delivered by Ben-Gurion at a meeting or conference, and what Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary on one date or another—some passages of which he quotes while ignoring others, as we shall see below—represent the only relevant historical facts. Teveth forgets the classic and already somewhat timeworn words of the great historian E. H. Carr: "No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought—what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even what he himself thought he thought."

As for Teveth's accusation of hindsight, it is bewildering to have to repeat truths that have long since become established in historical writing: that there is no static and absolute truth waiting in the cellars of archives to be disclosed by the omnipotent servant of Clio; that history is by very definition a perpetual dialogue between the present and the past, the unceasing resuscitation of the past by future generations, each generation with its own point of view and its own *Zeitgeist*.

Teveth accuses me of "hindsight." What is the historian's task if not to arrange the past, to interpret, and understand it from the perspective of time? It would seem that like Moliere's M. Jourdain, who was unaware that he was speaking prose, Teveth does not understand that he is engaging in hindsight. Is Teveth not using hindsight when he asserts that it was not possible to do more to help the Jews of Europe? Or when he claims that if the principal objective of the Yishuv leadership during the Holocaust had not been the creation of a Jewish state as a haven for Hitler's survivors, then we would have been left with only the Holocaust and no state of Israel? This assertion must stem from hindsight because it is based on knowledge that became available only after the Holocaust and only after the historical process that led to the establishment of the state.

When Teveth argues that at the outbreak of the war Ben-Gurion already realized that efforts at massive rescue were doomed to prove futile, and consequently, being a great pragmatist who focused only upon problems and projects that were possible and practical, he refrained from getting involved in the rescue enterprise, he is using hindsight. How could Ben-Gurion have known, even before the Final Solution was underway, that there was no chance for rescue? Is it not Teveth who knows these things today and endows Ben-Gurion with this knowledge?

Teveth employs hindsight selectively, just as he quotes selectively and interprets selectively. When he tries to defend his hero, he makes ample use of hindsight, but when he attacks those whose opinions he does not like, he accuses them of seeing the past through the eyes of the present.

Moreover, any explanation based on psychological insights is alien to Teveth's spirit and riles him to no end. To our great fortune, however, not all historians share this view. For more than a generation the best historians have been unwilling to do without psychological explanation—that true infrastructure of human history. The painful fact that this vast and rich territory is not always documented in the archives does not mean that it does not exist and that we are permitted to ignore it. Perhaps Shabtai Teveth will

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agree to ponder the statement of the great historian Marc Bloch, who said that "every historical explanation is essentially and ultimately psychological."

Now for a few facts. This is not the first time that Teveth has quoted Ben-Gurion's 1936 remarks to the High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, in order to prove that there was no conflict of interest between Zionism and the attempts to rescue Diaspora Jewry. Nor is this the first time that he has ignored other passages that do not square so well with his position. On December 7, 1938, for example, Ben-Gurion addressed the central committee of his party: "Our demand that we bring children from Germany to this country does not stem purely from pity for these children. If I knew that it would be possible to save all the [Jewish] children of Germany by shipping them to England, but only half of them by bringing them to Eretz Yisrael, I would choose the second option—because we are dealing not only with these children, but also with the historic account of the Jewish people." Ben-Gurion began his remarks at the same session with a painfully frank and sober announcement: "I recall my sins in these terrible days of the incipient disaster looming over European Jewry [this was, it will be remembered, a few weeks after *Kristallnacht* in Germany] and perhaps on the eve of the end of the Mandate—I am worried about the elections in the Tel Aviv branch [of the party]."

This statement is almost unbearable, but we should remember that its full and terrifying import became clear only after the fact, after the Holocaust. When Ben-Gurion expressed that worry, he could not foresee or even imagine the Holocaust. Even the Nazis had not yet crystallized or fully formulated their Final Solution. The prophetic talents that Teveth ascribes to Ben-Gurion, when he asserts (both in his reply to me and in his book) that Ben-Gurion, after reading *Mein Kampf* in 1933, was the first to predict—before any other Jewish, Zionist, or gentile leader—the destruction of European Jewry by Hitler, make Ben-Gurion's above-quoted words all the more serious and his guilt almost unpardonable. This is certainly not Teveth's intention, nor is it mine. Similarly, the fact that Teveth spares the readers of *Tikkun* what Ben-Gurion said in December 1938 indicates how weak his thesis is. These two quotations—the one from 1936 offered by Teveth and the one from 1938 that I have cited—must be understood in the appropriate context: Both were uttered before the Holocaust, before Jewish children were systematically annihilated, before anyone even imagined that this could possibly happen in the heart of Europe.

Taking statements out of context can prove black and white at the same time. Quotations deal with only the overt and immediate historical image. Focusing on this immediate reaction is the role of the chronicler. Thereafter, the paths of chronicler and historian diverge, since the historian's task is to be critical: to disclose the truth behind the words or the untruth concealed within them; to descend into the inner core of historical events and decisions and to understand its agents. But Teveth cites only what fits in with his preordained conceptions. He writes about the Ben-Gurion of the late thirties in Promethean terms. But only two or three years later, during the Holocaust, he claims that Ben-Gurion is merely one leader among many. Which Teveth shall we choose? Which Ben-Gurion?

Giant or not, all agree that, beginning in the second half of the thirties, Ben-Gurion was the Yishuv's most prominent and powerful leader. Teveth's argument that Ben-Gurion repeatedly submitted his resignation throughout this period simply does not stand up to the test of history. Ben-Gurion's resignation threats are familiar to historians and were well known by Ben-Gurion's own colleagues and contemporaries. They were one of the accepted weapons of his political battles. In any case, they are certainly not evidence of his weakness. Thus, Teveth's discussion of the *Va'ad ha-Hatzalah* ("Rescue Committee") is confusing. On the one hand, Ben-Gurion is only one leader among many, not even able to appoint and dismiss people at will, compelled to struggle over every inch of his political path. On the other hand, why must he fight for the chairmanship of the *Va'ad ha-Hatzalah*, a body devoid of meaning and rent by conflicting party interests? Here we truly have an example of trying to have it both ways.

There is, of course, another truth. Had Ben-Gurion assumed the direction of the *Va'ad ha-Hatzalah* (to do this he would not have had to relinquish the chairmanship of the Jewish Agency Executive [the JAE], as Teveth claims) and harnessed all of his energy, influence, and reputation to the matter of rescue, we can assume that the *Va'ad ha-Hatzalah* would not have been so impotent a body as it was. But he did not lead it, because he, as Teveth himself states in the Hebrew version of his biography, "did not place rescue at the top of the list of priorities of Zionist policy and did not see the rescue enterprise as a central topic which it was his duty to head."

In order to prove, finally, that there was no conflict between those who worked directly at rescue—particularly the parachutists dispatched to occupied Europe—and the leadership of the Yishuv, Teveth quotes what parachutist Yeshaiahu Dan said on Israel television's "This is Your Life." Relying on testimony presented on a television gala program for Independence Day, more than forty years after the event, even by so fine a person as Dan is an astonishing innovation. Many other sources are available; for instance, another of the parachutists, Dov Harari, in a letter written in late 1942, complained that their mission was being delayed: "Everything begins and ends with the crisis in the party [Mapai]."

Finally, Mr. Teveth has coined the idea of the post-Entebbe worldview, claiming that I say it was possible to save the Jews of Europe. This is simply a misrepresentation. In my article I stated again and again that the Yishuv's power was limited and that almost all avenues of assistance and rescue were blocked off. My principal arguments involved the leadership's state of mind—the willingness to rally to the call of moral imperative, with no calculations of utility. But what is more interesting is that Teveth is the only one who uses this post-Entebbe worldview argument. What does he mean by it? Is he not simply projecting his own views on others? Is he not essentially juxtaposing the Entebbe situation with that of the Holocaust and drawing a parallel between them, thereby making the Holocaust tragically banal? Interesting and troubling material for further thought. □

LETTERS

(Continued from p. 7)

public statement of a new direction in Soviet policy. It has been an illusion of American and Israeli foreign policy that a settlement would be possible that simply ignored the Russian presence. Now that Gorbachev is pursuing a new direction for the Soviets, it makes sense to pressure him to use his power and prestige to be one of the guarantors of a peaceful settlement. But, as we have insisted, Israel must have treaty rights to enforce the demilitarization—after the experiences of the past, Israel should not have to rely exclusively on any international force to guarantee its reasonable security interests.

Mr. Eno wonders why we do not give credit to Israel for its willingness to negotiate a solution. The fact is that Israel refuses to sit down with the representatives of the PLO or to create another mechanism through which Palestinians could freely choose their leadership. Israel says it will negotiate with Jordan, but the Palestinians are the indispensable party, and Israel does not and will not negotiate with them. In fact, many Israeli leaders refuse even to recognize their existence! Even the relatively enlightened Likud member of Knesset, Dan Meridor, when correcting galleys of the interview that appeared in our May/June issue, insisted on changing all references to the Palestinians to "Palestinian Arabs." The results of the poll Mr. Eno cites are distressing, but they testify to the fantasies of those who have nothing, likely to be modified when they are offered something. Many Zionists dreamt of a Zionist state from the Nile to the Euphrates; most gave that up when they were offered a tiny state by the U.N. What remains worrisome is that the Likud recently reaffirmed its dream of a Jewish state on *both* sides of the Jordan. And these expansionists actually have power!

NATURE, SCIENCE & THE BOMB

(Continued from p. 21)

Habermas argues, is marked by the fact that the program of scientific enlightenment, which is in fact valid only in the context of our relations with external nature, seems to have taken over even in the context of our relations with each other, in the *social* realm.

In this sense, the problem is not so much that we have mastered nature as that it has mastered us: that categories and concepts applicable only to nature have begun to seem relevant to questions of social organization. What Habermas calls the "subsystems of purposive-rational action"—the industries of Big Science and Big Technology—have swallowed up the social realm, organizing it in accord with technological imperatives instead of with the freely expressed wishes of autonomous subjects. The utopia projected is the technocratic one of a smoothly functioning machine, not the democratic one of a free community of equal subjects. "Efficiency"—a category appropriate to work, not interaction—appears as the decisive category for social thought. "Stability," "success," "containment of conflict," and not consensus or open debate, appear as the distinguishing marks of a "rational" society.

To see science and technology as by themselves offering answers to social questions is to get the real order of priority reversed. For science and technology are themselves social projects. This is why Habermas calls them "subsystems." The problem, he argues, is not with science and technology as such, but with the fact that their connection to the social realm has been forgotten. If this is so, the solution to contemporary problems lies not in attempting to *abolish* the contemporary project of science and technology, but in *reasserting social control* over it: recognizing that it *is* a social project, that it takes place *within* the sphere of human interaction, and hence must be subject to that sphere as well.

This conclusion clearly is relevant to the problem of nuclear weapons and environmental crisis with which we began. For it means that "the problem of science and technology," which Schell and others hold responsible for both these dangers, is *not* itself a scientific or technological problem, nor even a problem of our contemporary attitude towards nature. It is a problem of our contemporary attitude towards *society*. By treating society, or politics, as something that must be subject to the exigencies of science and technology, instead of the other way around, we are falling once again for the myth of society as "second nature" criticized by Western Marxism. The real problem has nothing to do with science or with nature: It has to do with whether the social order (including its technology) is to be viewed *like* nature—as an independent environment we are simply given and cannot change—or whether it is seen as something *not* independent of us, but something we produce and therefore *can* change democratically. The crisis that faces us today according to this account is *not* one produced by a dominated and subdued nature that is now taking its revenge, but by an imperfectly subdued society—a society that is too much like nature, too much out of our control, and hence threatening to destroy us all.

III

One often hears today that humans are alienated from their environment. I think this claim is correct, but it says more about our relations to society than to nature. The "environment" we most proximately inhabit, and from which we are alienated, is not the earth or the ecosphere, but the *social* environment: the world of people and institutions, governments and markets, mores and fashions, which seems as real

(and often more impenetrable and frightening) than the world of nature. We are alienated in that we fail to see that the social environment is *not* natural, hence *not* unalterable and independent of us, but rather is *our own doing*, an environment we have produced and can (if we choose to) change.

Today this environment includes the terrible danger of nuclear holocaust. Here too the issue is whether we see this danger as an unalterable natural fact, or as something for which we must take responsibility and that can be abolished. In one sense, this is the message of *The Fate of the Earth*: to call us to social action. The solution to the problem of nuclear weapons is a political one, Schell writes: "[W]e are speaking of revolutionizing the politics of the earth.... The task is nothing less than to reinvent politics: to reinvent the world." And yet Schell's book is marked by a troubling ambiguity. For Schell seems to equivocate about precisely the question Habermas makes central: On which side of the boundary between science and politics (between nature and society) does the threat of nuclear weapons lie? The solution to the threat clearly may be political: Schell argues persuasively for the dismantling of the system of sovereign nation-states. But its source seems to lie somewhere else. "The fundamental origin of the peril of human extinction by nuclear arms," Schell writes, "lies not in any social or political circumstances of our time but in the attainment by mankind as a whole ... of a certain level of knowledge of the physical universe." It is not a social system that is at fault, but rather something to do with science itself, knowledge itself.

But there is something strange about this way of framing the issue. Schell seems to suggest that a *scientific* development—the discovery of the energy within the nucleus—can by itself produce, or require, fundamental and far-reaching *social* changes. In particular, he says that discovery will put an end to the current international political system of individual sovereign nation-states—either simply by literally blowing it up or, if we're lucky, by people's recognizing the need to change the international system. But such an argument returns in a perverse way to scientism—to the idea that scientific discoveries can generate social imperatives *by themselves*. Is it really the discovery of nuclear fusion that has made inevitable the destruction of the current international social order? Isn't it rather the existence of that social order that has made inevitable the destructive *use* of nuclear fusion against humans? Is it science that has produced a threat to society, or is it rather an imperfectly organized society that has turned science into a threat?

Schell deeply distrusts science. He associates it with death, with lifeless generalizations instead of the appreciation of qualitative uniqueness, with a cavalier attitude towards the lack of additional earths to experiment upon, and with the attempt to dominate nature. Science, for Schell, is a dangerous and almost diabolical force whose insatiable and Faustian curiosity and whose desire to unlock secrets that would be better left hidden, has led us to our current crisis. Indeed, Schell's central image is not so much of Faust as it is of Adam and Eve being expelled from the garden: With the development of nuclear capabilities, he writes, "our species has eaten more deeply of the fruit of the tree of knowledge.... In doing so, we have caused a basic change in the circumstances in which life was given to us, which is to say that we have altered the human condition."

Any "alteration of the human condition" appears in this (explicitly religious) context as a *sin*; and insofar as knowledge grants us the power to alter our own condition it too appears as sinful. Environmentalists often argue this way, too, speaking of the hubris in humanity's attempts to "alter" nature through technology. Instead of seeing that the solution to our crisis consists in humans' overcoming their alienation from their environment by explicitly recognizing it as theirs and asserting the right to change it, this view sees any attempt by humans to alter "the human condition" as a sinful violation of "what they have been given." Human action, human will, human autonomy—even human knowledge—all become suspect. Humans' already shaky faith in their ability to transform their world is further undermined.

Schell describes the earth—in a familiar trope nowadays—as a single living organism, whose unfathomable complexity and fragility is beyond science's grasp. Humans, although they are *part* of this organism, and hence yoked to it for their very survival, are constantly attempting to alter it, not recognizing the risk they run of unintentionally destroying it and themselves. Science and technology are a dangerous (and doomed) attempt by misguided humans to rip themselves out of nature, violating its laws, its fragile equilibrium, the beauty of its complex order. Schell goes so far as to see nuclear knowledge as the importation of alien, "cosmic" forces into a "terrestrial" environment where they can be only destructive. If only humans would remain within nature, submit to it, and follow its dictates, everything would be fine.

This kind of talk, so familiar today, is deeply mistaken. The love of nature and the faith in nature's healing capacities seem to mask a deeper and darker *fear* of nature. Nature appears here as an Old Testament divinity—generous, perhaps, with its riches, but jealous and indeed a bit arbitrary as well: a divinity that must always be propitiated and flattered, and one we must not try to imitate, or even too deeply

to understand.

Yet no such divinity exists. Nature has no interest in preventing us from imitating or knowing it, nor in taking revenge on us if we do. Nature is no more characterized by fragility or equilibrium than it is by catastrophic change. Nuclear war and ecological collapse, if and when they come, will be no more "contrary to nature" than are earthquakes or hurricanes—or the extinction of the dinosaurs, or the burning out of the sun we know to be our exosphere's ultimate fate. The problem isn't that these things are contrary to *nature*; it's that they're contrary to *us*. *We* don't want them; nature doesn't care.

We *cannot* violate nature, because we are natural beings. It is curious that the very thinkers who insist on the unity of nature, and rail against human hubris in thinking ourselves separate from nature, still somehow find it possible to criticize contemporary technology as "unnatural," or as an illegitimate intervention in natural processes. They fail to see that our every act is an intervention: we "change" nature (as do all animals) every time we move, or eat, or breathe. No human project takes place outside of nature—not the hut at Walden Pond nor the golden arches of McDonald's, not ecologically minded "stewardship" nor scientific "tampering"—hence none can be a violation of it.

To say that contemporary technology is perfectly "natural" is not to defend it, but rather to point out that "natural" is not synonymous with "good." We certainly need a way to distinguish desirable from undesirable technologies, but "nature" by itself does not provide us with one. The environmentalism too often uncritically accepted on the left thinks it can draw this distinction by somehow reading it off from nature: undesirable technologies are those that "violate nature." (It's always interesting to ask someone arguing this way why the forces at work in a nuclear plant are "unnatural" while those at work in a windmill are not.) But this is just a version of what philosophers call the naturalistic fallacy: you can't derive prescriptions for action from descriptions of nature. Such a fallacy turns out, curiously and tellingly, to be identical to the ideologically rooted fallacy that Habermas and Western Marxism in general have identified as underlying the technologism and scientism environmentalists typically see themselves as rejecting. For here too the attempt is to decide *social* questions—which ought to be decided in free debate among humans—by appealing to scientific facts (to be determined, presumably, by ecologically trained "experts") about *nature*.

In defending the notion that nuclear weapons are bad because they violate some natural law, or more broadly that science and technology are bad because they aim in their very purpose at some such violation, Schell and the others miss what Habermas saw: that what is centrally wrong with a world in which science has swallowed up politics is not that nature has been dominated, but that human autonomy has been lost—the autonomy that allows humans to see that their environment is *not* something given for all time, but something they can *change* to fulfill their real needs. It follows from this point that to achieve human happiness society must not relinquish, but for the first time must truly *assert* control over, its own conditions—and that its failure to do so up until now has led us to our current impasse. The environmentalist awe in the face of nature undercuts this sense of autonomy, appearing to imply that we must once again relinquish control before the massive fact of nuclear weapons or ecological fragility. It is crucial for humans to learn not to feel impotent before *any* external reality, to learn that the world is *our* world, *our* creation, and should be subject to *our* desires.

Kant defined enlightenment as the escape from tutelage to another—a book, an authority, a teacher—into the maturity that comes from trust in one's autonomous reason. In a world that seems rapidly to be spinning out of our control, the recapture of the sense of our own autonomy seems the most important, and the most usefully subversive, of all social goals. Whatever helps to reinforce that sense deserves our support, and whatever lessens it deserves our criticism. The autonomy we ought to try to cultivate requires us to refuse to accept *anything* as given, as inviolable, as not to be questioned, as out of our hands, as too fragile to attempt to alter. It means cultivating a faith in ourselves, in the capacity of our reason to understand the world, and to change it if our understanding shows it needs to be changed. We need to recognize that the nuclear threat does not arise because we are hubristic. It is not the result of knowledge, or original sin, or the unfortunate fact that the strong force exists inside the nucleus. Nor is it an accident. It arises because of a particular set of *social* arrangements that make nationalism, imperialism, and war inevitable—a set of social arrangements that, like all others, we can and must change if we decide they are wrong. □

THE UNILATERAL OPTION

(Continued from p. 24)

Healing the Schism in our Soul

The implicit hope of this proposal is that gaining something may have a therapeutic effect upon the Arab Palestinian spirit. At present there is a hysterical, fantasy-like quality to the dreams of Arab Palestinians, which encourages them to risk all. By gaining a stake in

reality, by acquiring land with specific boundaries, they too will have to start evaluating long-term gains against short-term losses. Eventually they might even come to appreciate the people of Israel and their indomitable will to realize their dream despite interminable obstacles. But this proposal does not depend upon their doing so.

In persuading the Israelis to implement this proposal, we will achieve a number of important goals that are central to our progress as a nation. We will restore our sense of dignity in our national purpose by adhering to morally defensible means for guaranteeing our survival. We will eliminate the deep schism in our national soul and heal the moral wounds that infect our spirit. We will be able to look our children, whom we are committing to a lifetime of soldiering, straight in the eye, charging them with a mission that is morally valid. We will enable our fellow Jews worldwide to feel wholeheartedly unified with us. We will allow our allies in the community of nations to side unapologetically with our cause. We will once again be a young nation courageously feeling its way across minefields of moral dilemma and political complexity. We will stop having to be embarrassed about being a chosen people. And even if we have to go to war against the new territory at some point in the future, it will not be because we failed to do everything humanly possible to prevent war from breaking out. We will have taken our stand as a people dedicated to its survival with its soul intact. The issue is not getting peace for territory, but giving up a piece for integrity. □

THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS

(Continued from p. 28)

from the territories, at which point we would demand new elections. Such an agreement could be written into the coalition agreement, but new party leader Avner Sha'aki has ruled out even this possibility.

The two non-Zionist Orthodox parties—Agudath Israel and SHAS—which are least flexible on issues like "Who-is-a-Jew?" and Friday night movies, do not have strong foreign policy commitments and would support a Peres government's approach to peacemaking. Of course, they are open to making a deal with either Likud or Labor. To gain their support, Labor would have to agree to support some of their other demands. The fact that Rabbi Eliezer Shach has come out in the SHAS party newspaper *Erev Shabbat* in favor of talks with the PLO should be seen as the latest in a series of signals that both SHAS and Aguda do not rule out a coalition with the center-left. (Shach is the supreme halakhic authority for the rabbis of SHAS and the non-Hassidic half of Aguda.) This stance may also be designed to increase these parties' market value by sending a message to Likud that their support cannot be taken for granted, but it marks an improvement over 1984, in any case, when they ruled out participation in a Labor-dominated coalition.

Both Likud and Labor consider the foreign policy issue of such transcendent importance that they would trade generously on other issues to gain Orthodox support for a "narrow" coalition. But unlike Likud, which has had little difficulty meeting religious party demands (although it has been unable to deliver all its votes to amend the Law of Return), Labor will have to square concessions with its own platform and with its satellite partners, most of whom are quite militant in their opposition to Orthodox demands.

American Jews should be aware of this possibility. If a compromise over the Who-is-a-Jew issue enables Labor to form a government capable of advancing the peace process, the dovish and pluralist wings of American Jewry will be in conflict. One also wonders whether the Labor satellite parties, which tend to be more militant than Labor both on the peace issue and on civil rights issues, will accept the difficult logic in the strategy articulated by Ezer Weizman, who has said he would "wear *tzitzit*" (ritual fringes) for the next four years if it would get Israel into a peace conference.

A further complication is the struggle for the Arab vote. Ten percent of the electorate is Arab—twelve seats in the current Knesset were elected by Arab voters. Of these seats, six went to the two parties of the hard left—the Rakah communists and the Progressives—while the other six went to parties of the center-left, mostly Labor. Labor has the same problem including the hard left parties in a coalition that Likud has with Kach: The idea of sitting with communists in government is so far beyond the pale that it would drive soft Likud voters and right-wing Labor voters into the arms of Likud. (The truth is that in the 1984 talks, the communists demanded improvements in Arab villages and an Israeli Arab bill of rights—things Labor should be able to champion, and certainly live with.)

In the wake of the riots and the Israeli Arab response, as well as Rabin's (and therefore Labor's) complicity in the army's harsh policies, Labor will be lucky to get two Knesset seats from the Arab sector, compared to four last time. In this regard, the resignation of Labor's sole Arab Knesset member may actually help. If MK Darousha forms a new party, he may win a seat or two and then join a Labor coalition. The Progressive party is in disarray, and some of the Arabs who voted Labor in the last election might not want to take their protest vote all the way left to the communists, where, as we have seen, it can help block the right but cannot play an active role in empowering the center-left. In mathematical—not ideological—terms, this means that a vote for the

communists is worth half of what it would be worth if it went to a party of the soft left or center. At best, the six communist Knesset seats would abstain in votes of confidence against a Labor government, thus lowering the number Labor needs to maintain a simple majority from sixty-one to fifty-eight. (By abstaining, the Knesset total is reduced from 120 to 114.) The net result, therefore, of these six seats of the left is to help a Labor coalition lower the minimum number of seats required for a non-Likud coalition from sixty-one to fifty-eight.

Oh, No. Not Again!

Above all looms the significant possibility of another postelection parliamentary deadlock—defined as the inability of either bloc to put together more than sixty Knesset seats, that is, less than a simply majority. In this regard, we may expect Likud and Labor to position themselves sufficiently far apart to enable them to present alternative visions to voters, but not so far apart as to eliminate the possibility of another unity coalition. Moreover, the Likud faction that opposes Sharon's bid for leadership and favors exploring new ideas for advancing the peace process may prefer a renewed coalition with Labor to a coalition with the extreme right, since such a coalition might prevent the radicalization of Likud and decrease the chances of Sharon's rising to power.

Despite the polarization of the campaign over the peace issue, both Peres and Shamir will probably present a muted version of their respective positions. Shamir will speak about his opposition to trading any territory for peace but not about annexation of the territories into Israel. Peres will talk about autonomy and the peace process but not about major territorial concessions.

If the next coalition includes both large parties, but gives one a relatively greater plurality, the other party would play a reduced role. Peres hinted that he may be aiming at precisely this goal when he told the *Jerusalem Post* in a recent interview that he had not ruled out inviting Likud to join a Labor-dominated government in a junior role. Being in government, but without the possibility of vetoing Peres' initiatives, might clip Likud's oppositionist wings; in the opposition, Likud would be pushed to the far right. Peres might actually prefer to include Likud in this way: So long as it cannot really neutralize him, it could provide him with a perfect alibi against the inevitable charges of his Arab negotiating partners that he isn't moving fast or far enough.

What appears rather more realistic at this point is that Likud will invite Labor into a coalition in a junior role, with Labor getting the defense ministry. The problem here is that from Shamir's point of view, Peres has seriously undercut his authority in the U.S., and he (Shamir) would look much better to Washington and to American Jews if he were contrasted with the harder right instead of with Labor. Nevertheless, Shamir might not want to be held hostage by the crazies on the hard right, preferring the international legitimacy that Labor participation would bring. As bad as things are for Israel now in the international arena, they would be even worse if Likud were putting down the uprisings on its own.

Labor must reject such an invitation, should it come. But if Labor does not participate in the next government, it will be the last hurrah for both Peres and Rabin, who have led the Labor party since 1974 and will have failed to win four consecutive Knesset elections. As a result, Peres and Rabin will try to drag the party (minus the dovish satellites) back into government.

Dovish party leaders such as Abba Eban say that Peres will have to win the election—that is, be able to form a coalition that does not depend on Likud—in order to escape the last hurrah scenario, but Eban's has not been the last word in the party for quite some time. Since Shamir and his faction have the same problem within Likud, they can be expected to try to take Likud into a coalition even if it means serving in a junior capacity, trying to defend their decision with the claim that they had "to prevent the Labor defeatists from giving it all away to the Arabs."

If polls indicate that the idea of a unity coalition remains popular with many people, Peres and Shamir might hint at their flexibility on the issue. In 1984 Shamir openly called for a unity coalition when Likud dipped badly in the polls; analysts agree that it helped Likud narrow the gap with Labor. That lesson will not be lost on the vote-starved leaders of the two major parties in 1988. On the other hand, polls now indicate that a majority of voters favors a narrow (Labor or Likud dominated) coalition after the elections, although voters are evenly split on its preferred political character.

Youth, Ethnicity, and Class: What's a Party To Do?

Labor has rehabilitated itself as a responsible party of government and Peres' image is better, but the party must seriously address a number of other soft-Likud concerns if it is to break through. Labor must overcome people's perceptions of it as elitist, old, and Ashkenazi. Likud continues to lead among younger voters and those from "oriental" (Edot Ha'mizrakh) backgrounds, especially North Africans. Ratz, Mapam, and Shinui get almost all of their support from middle-class Ashkenazi voters.

As long as existing voting patterns persist, Labor is tied to the old age homes (literally: Labor activists always make sure to ferry voters from old age homes to

the voting booths on election day), Likud to the high schools. Every four years, Labor loses several thousand voters through "natural attrition," while Likud gains new strength from those who have turned eighteen since the previous election.

Younger Israelis tend to see the conflict with the Palestinians in increasingly stark and brutal terms and identify with the messages that Likud and the right-wing parties transmit. This fact is compounded by Labor's association with Israel's "glory days," in which the Sephardi middle class largely did not participate. The sense that Labor's future is behind it is exacerbated by the paucity of younger Labor politicians in elected office.

A Labor list with a group of younger (forty-five and under) candidates—including a few development town mayors, such as Ashkelon's Eli Dayan, Sderot's Amir Peretz, or Jewish Agency Settlement department head Nissim Zvili—would help dramatically. Including other younger leaders, such as Peres's confidants Yossi Beilin and Avrum Burg, could only improve the party's image. (As it happens, all of the above people hold *very* dovish views on the Palestinians and peace.)

The Labor party also needs fresh faces from the Arab community, trade unions and the factory floor, the kibbutz and moshav, and women's groups—the traditional constellation of constituencies without which a progressive majority cannot coalesce. If Jewish blue-collar workers would start voting Labor in Knesset elections again—as they do overwhelmingly in Histadrut and trade union elections—the entire political picture would shift to the left.

• To effect such change Labor must "retire" enough sitting Knesset members to make room for attractive newcomers; accommodate the economic and social demands of a social democratic and populist working class with a dovish and increasingly private-sector oriented middle class; convince Arab voters to vote for the one party where they will have the greatest impact (even if they object to aspects of Labor's policies and/or performance) without alienating the pragmatic but hawkish Sephardi middle class; and make the case for its vision of the future, and not merely for its role in shaping the past.

These changes may not take place this time: they are a tall order. But they must take place eventually. It may take another election and a new generation of party leaders rising to the fore, but one wonders how much time Israel has. The alternatives are calamitous. □

THE COMMON GOOD

(Continued from p. 32)

even more important: encouraging a process of public discussion and long-range consensus formation. Indeed, the politics of the common good is above all the politics of discussion.

The candidate should also raise the issues of family, neighborhood, and work and be open to what religion may have to say on these matters—not in order to invite some prefabricated answer from the Christian right, but because these issues are critical to a recovery of what in *Habits of the Heart* we call "moral ecology." Changes in these areas are essential in the effort to deal with advanced poverty.

Most people in America still have very positive feelings about the family. Yet much about the life we lead, particularly our occupational life, pulls the family apart. Democrats could advocate a family policy similar to that of Social Democrats in Western Europe, which would provide family allowances and leave-time for parents, and would require businesses to schedule their work hours with family needs in mind—benefits that, again, would apply to everyone, not just the "deprived." These policies would make life much easier for American women, but it is not just a question of women's rights, but again of the common good.

Rising medical expenses, especially for those over eighty-five, are rapidly leading to a crisis where there will be an intense struggle between advocates of life-extending care for the aged and proponents of all other forms of social spending. Here, as Daniel Callahan has proposed, we need a national discussion about the meaning of old age, the dignity and value of the aged, and the limits that must be set that will be fair to old and young alike. The effort simply to deny that old age is significantly different from other periods of life avoids discussion of the particular virtues and responsibilities of old age and is an example of advanced poverty.

Most contemporary discussions of social policy are premised on the value of economic growth, and much of what we have said in this article makes the same assumption. Yet growth comes in many forms, some more efficient and socially beneficial than others. Western Europeans, for example, enjoy virtually the same living standard as Americans while consuming only one-half as much energy per person. Furthermore, some forms of growth are life-threatening. If the whole world had as many automobiles per capita as the United States, we would expire in a cloud of carbon monoxide. Yet what does third world economic growth mean if it does not mean automobiles for every private family? And if we oppose the general use of the automobile elsewhere in the world how can we justify our own addiction to it? Surely it would be a certain ticket to defeat to ask Americans to give up their private automobiles today. Nevertheless, we must at least begin to discuss environmental responsibility in transportation and other fields.

Here too the question of the common good is involved. The threat of growth to the natural ecology inevitably leads to the even deeper question of the threat of growth to our moral ecology, of how to think about increasing wealth and technological advancement in ways that will not destroy our capacity to act together as morally responsible persons.

A president who leads us into a serious discussion of the common good, both at home and abroad, will make a contribution that would far outlast his own administration. The climate a president creates is as important as what he does. Reagan corrupted the American people by lying to them and simultaneously encouraging them to be self-indulgent and self-righteous. He pretended to be a teaching president but he taught us badly. He encouraged illusion and discouraged responsible discussion.

We need a teaching president who will encourage us to be self-restrained, devoted to the creation of a good society, and willing to engage in vigorous debate about the common good, which is, as Dennis McCann has put it, not something any of us has a certain definition of in advance, but the good we seek in common through a politics of discussion. The one thing it is not is simply the aggregation of private interests, with no agreement as to what the outcome means in terms of the general good.

We Americans have undoubtedly been corrupted by the affluence of the postwar era and, most recently, by the fantasy world of Ronald Reagan. But we have maintained enough common sense and genuine civic virtue to be able to respond to serious, intelligent leadership.

Leaders who talk about sacrifice and a new age of limits in a grim and tight-lipped way will be rejected. Americans will still prefer fantasy. But if serious thought and hard work are presented as the necessary prelude to a society and a world that are safer, more peaceful, and, in a deeper sense than we now fully understand, more prosperous, then Americans can rise to the challenge with joy and enthusiasm. It wouldn't hurt to have a leader whose vision, joy, and enthusiasm could infect us all. □

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(Continued from p. 44)

The black caucus gained control and passed a resolution denouncing the "imperialistic Zionist war"—Israel's victory in the Six Day War three months earlier.

There had been rumblings for several years about tension between blacks and Jews. As calls for Black Power replaced King's plea for integration, black organizations became more hostile to whites, especially Jews. The proximity of Jews made them easy targets for antiwhite hostility. Many blacks also seemed genuinely puzzled that Jews, of all people, did not understand the black turn towards nationalism and a civil rights movement that was black-led and black-controlled. After all, weren't these desires mirror images of what Jews had done with Israel?

Jews located opposition to Israel in black anti-Semitism. For many blacks, however, hostility to Israel was part of a broader identification with third-world struggles across the globe. Oppressed themselves, many blacks felt more affinity for those newly oppressed, like the Palestinians.

But the resolution at the National Convention on New Politics capped a series of incidents that descended into gutter anti-Semitism. Shortly after the Six Day War, SNCC published a newsletter picturing Israeli General Moshe Dayan with dollar signs for eyes. The Black Panther magazine chortled:

> We're gonna burn their towns and that ain't all
> We're gonna piss upon the Wailing Wall
> And then we'll get Kosygin and DeGaulle
> That will be ecstasy, killing every Jew we see.

Within eighteen months, the split that opened in Chicago had become an abyss. In the fall of 1968, New York's schools were shut down for weeks in a dispute that pitted the largely Jewish teachers' union against a black community school board in the poor Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of Brooklyn. The community board wanted the right to control the education of its students, including the right to hire and fire teachers. The union objected and struck New York's schools until several teachers fired by the community board—all of them Jewish—were reinstated.

As the strike dragged on, someone put anti-Semitic leaflets in the mailboxes of several teachers. Albert Shanker, the head of the teachers' union, reprinted the leaflets by the thousands—a move opposed by many of the Jewish teachers in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, who believed that blacks in the neighborhood were angry at whites, not at Jews.

New York snapped. Television screens and newspapers were filled with bitter charges of Jewish racism and black anti-Semitism. Diane Ravitch, a historian of New York's schools, calls the teachers' strike a "seismic" event for New York. It was an event from which the city, and black-Jewish relations, never recovered.

* * *

As the black-Jewish alliance that supported the civil rights movement began to crumble, a quieter but just as fundamental split was occurring between poor and working-class blacks and Jews. The battleground here was neighborhoods. In the South, blacks had not known

many Jews, and the Jews they had known seemed benign in comparison with other whites. But in the North, contact between blacks and Jews was intimate, especially in the ghetto. A popular saying in the 1960s noted that of five people a black meets in the course of a day—the shopkeeper, the landlord, the social worker, the teacher, and the cop—the first four were Jews while the fifth was Irish.

These Jews acted like whites. Some storekeepers overcharged; some did not. Some teachers worked hard with students; others brushed them aside. There was nothing "Jewish" about their behavior. And while they may have been the whites that wielded day-to-day control over black lives, they were not the reason that unemployment was high, housing was dilapidated, schools were poor. They were part of the problem, not all of it. But for a black whose view was shaped by his or her neighborhood, Jews wielded enormous power, and many blacks resented that power.

This constant and unequal contact between blacks and Jews was exacerbated by the wave of neighborhood changes that transformed cities in the 1960s. In city after city—from Boston to Chicago to Los Angeles—Jewish neighborhoods in the late 1960s turned inexorably into black neighborhoods. Blacks sought to break out of ghettos and move into better housing. Part of the reason they chose Jewish neighborhoods was that, unlike the residents of ethnic neighborhoods such as South Boston or Mayor Richard Daley's Bridgeport in Chicago, Jews did not respond violently when blacks moved in. More often than not, the Jews just moved out.

The blacks who moved into these neighborhoods were poorer and received fewer city services. Crime rose. For a period during the 1960s, it seemed that every Jew had an elderly relative, friend, or coworker who felt trapped in a once-Jewish, now-black neighborhood. The impact on these Jews, and on the Jewish community as a whole, was devastating.

* * *

By the time Allan Bakke applied to medical school in 1973, black-Jewish relations were already near the breaking point. Bakke was not Jewish, but his challenge to the concept of affirmative action galvanized the support of prominent Jewish neoconservatives and the three major Jewish organizations (the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League.) Not all Jews vocally opposed affirmative action, and a good number of Jews as well as some Jewish organizations supported it; but the attack by these intellectuals and organized Jewish groups against affirmative action eliminated any hope of restoring the black-Jewish alliance. Black criticism of Israel struck Jews at their most vulnerable point. It was like a blow to the solar plexus. Similarly, Jewish criticism of affirmative action cut to the heart of the emerging black agenda. It meant attacking not only a key black issue, but also the most articulate and influential members of the black community. Most blacks who had risen to positions of power in government, business, or universities credited affirmative action programs for at least partially starting them on their path to success; and attacking affirmative action meant alienating them.

Some Jews saw in affirmative action the specter of quotas that had once kept them out of medical and law schools. But for blacks, affirmative action was a floor, not a ceiling, a way to get in the door of corporations and universities that were resistant to hiring and promoting blacks. And blacks were not blind to the fact that Jews were doing increasingly well in these corporations and universities. Jewish interests and black interests no longer seemed to coincide.

* * *

Franklin Delano Roosevelt had created the New Deal coalition in 1932 with blacks and Jews as charter members. By 1984, that coalition had crumbled under twenty years of black-Jewish tension. Jews had long distrusted Jesse Jackson because of his embrace of Yasser Arafat and his insensitive comments about the Holocaust and about Jewish influence in the press and politics. When Jackson used the words "hymie" and "hymietown" in private conversation and paraded his association with Minister Louis Farrakhan, it confirmed suspicions many Jews had all along.

Jackson and his supporters felt unfairly pursued by the charges of anti-Semitism. It was all the press wanted to talk about. They never wanted to talk about Israel's trade with South Africa or about the way in which Mayor Edward Koch fanned tensions and hatred in New York.

Donna Brazile, a young black staffer for Jackson from New Orleans, had been too young to march with Martin Luther King. Growing up, she had considered the Jews the "good" white people. Her family doctor was Jewish; so was its lawyer. But when the controversy over Farrakhan erupted, Brazile spoke to her mother down in New Orleans and was shocked by what she heard. Farrakhan, her mother said, was right. Those Jews were no good. Her doctor had always given her the wrong medicine. When Brazile went home to where she grew up in Kenner, Louisiana, she talked to black teenagers in her neighborhood. They considered Jews the enemy. Jews wanted to "get" Farrakhan. They wanted to "get" Jesse Jackson. They would not be satisfied until

Jackson was destroyed.

* * *

In the interviews I have conducted over the past two years, Jews and Jewish leaders pine again and again for a more "moderate" black leader to replace Jackson, someone like Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley or Philadelphia Congressman William Gray. But whether Jews like it or not, Jackson is likely to be the most important prominent black politician in the country through 1988 and beyond. He is likely, at the very least, to emerge as a leader of the Democratic party's progressive wing. He will also probably run again for president.

Commentators have long talked about Jackson's "Jewish problem"—the fact that his views and past comments make Jewish voters hostile to him. It is a striking failure that a man who has built his success in 1988 on his ability to connect with the pain and concern of others—blacks, gays, laid-off workers, poor farmers—remains unable to understand the pain and concerns of Jews.

So where does that leave Jews, especially liberal and progressive Jews who still care about an alliance with blacks. (It seems unlikely in the current atmosphere that neoconservative Jews will have any interest in linking up again with black concerns.). Alliances are worth something only when each side feels valued. To be frank, even though Jews sometimes wax nostalgic about the old civil rights days of black and white together, we ought to understand why blacks, by and large, do not. They resented the paternalism of the early alliance, with Jews too often acting as the elder brothers in suffering. Considering that history, Jews must be wary of the impulse to write off Jackson, to bypass him in favor of other more "acceptable" leaders. To do that, in the opinion of many blacks, would smack once again of Jews telling blacks who their leaders should be.

Liberal and progressive Jews must continue to talk to Jackson and to other black leaders in order to find areas where they can work together. Liberal Jews can endorse much of Jackson's and the blacks' progressive agenda: support for affirmative action, for the opening up of the top levels of universities and corporations to blacks, and for a renewed attack on poverty and a more genuine attempt to eliminate the American underclass. But Jews, in the spirit of a true coalition, must demand that attention be paid to their concerns as well. They must demand that black leaders denounce anti-Semitism, whether it comes from Farrakhan or anyone else, and that blacks defer to Jews on questions of Israel—that they acknowledge that Israel is a special issue for American Jews much as affirmative action and South Africa are special issues for American blacks. Only by showing respect for each other's concerns can blacks and Jews hope to reassemble an alliance that works for both groups. □

PROFITS AND PROPHETS

(Continued from p. 48)

mately half that sum was given by individual Jewish philanthropists.

The news of Mishkan Tefila's transfer created a wave of bitterness among the Jews of Dorchester and Mattapan. The area's Jews came to regard the federation not only as complacent regarding their fate but actually in league with radical forces in the black community. The local chapter of the Jewish Defense League increased its patrols of at-risk synagogues and escalated its activities in the political arena. A press release from the Jewish Survival Legion, a JDL offshoot, decried the transfer as the "downfall of Boston Jewry in Mattapan and Dorchester." Its supporters vowed to stop further sales and, if necessary, to "fight in hand-to-hand combat so that our Jewish blood shall be avenged." The credibility that the JDL could gather as defenders of elderly Jews was made possible, in part, by the failure of the federation to develop a strategy to deal with the consequences of the B-BURG-inspired transformation of older Jewish neighborhoods.

Federation leaders responded more directly to the threats of these Jewish vigilantes than they had to the actual conditions that prompted these quixotic and doomed efforts to maintain the area's ethnic balance. One of the major efforts was the provision of seed money for the Mattapan Organization, a group that purported to bring together black newcomers with their Jewish neighbors to address issues of blockbusting, parks, schools, and city services.

Too Little, Too Late

Janice Bernstein and her husband, Sumner, were two of the earliest proponents of the Mattapan Organization. Committed to the area but concerned about falling property values, Bernstein and her Jewish neighbors formed a real estate committee to gather facts on B-BURG policies. In addition, they undertook a two-pronged practical approach: first, to restore their neighbors' faith in the community, thereby limiting panic sales; second, to offer traditional welcome wagon services for arriving blacks, thereby reinforcing the message of preservation of middle-class neighborhood characteristics.

The stabilization efforts of the Mattapan Organization paled in the face of the commission-hungry real estate agents, including Jews and blacks, who vied for B-BURG clients. Even as patterns of chronic nonpayment started to appear among the first wave of indigent B-BURG

buyers, the FHA-insured mortgage money continued to flow into the targeted area. The Boston Redevelopment Authority, despite stern protests about the discriminatory line from its relocation chief, continued to rely on B-BURG funds as its major relocation tool.

Changes in the public schools were also happening quickly. More than six years before a federal judge would seize control of the local schools and implement busing to achieve racial balance, progressive forces in the community were experimenting with open enrollment programs as a means to challenge segregation. For decades, the Solomon Lewenberg Junior High School in Mattapan had been an important symbol for the area's lower-middle-class Jews. There, earnest students of modest means could follow the likes of Theodore White to Boston Latin School, Harvard College, and beyond. The Lewenberg and its reputation for academic excellence also became a symbol for many black parents whose children had suffered in the inferior public schools in the predominantly black neighborhoods. Initially, black students were welcomed at the Lewenberg, a model of integration. When the children of the newly arriving B-BURG clients entered the school en masse, confusion and conflict led to a decline in discipline and a perceived decline in educational standards. Anxious Jewish families withdrew their children. The Lewenberg, which in 1965 was twenty-five percent black, was more than ninety-five percent black by 1971.

In 1970, Mattapan's Jews watched a daily ritual that convinced many of them that there was no longer any hope for their neighborhood. For months, a gang of black students had been descending on Jewish shopkeepers after school, overturning fruit stalls and pilfering from stores. The situation had escalated to the point that most afternoons, shortly before school let out, shoppers would scurry off Blue Hill Avenue as shopkeepers closed their stores and dropped their iron grates. Boston Police officers would usher hundreds of students past the shuttered stores and escort them several blocks north to the borders of the black community. For black observers, the situation called forth images of a forced march. For Jews, it appeared that they had lost not only their neighborhood school but their access to familiar shopping and social areas. Blacks and Jews were united in their helplessness.

Janice Bernstein, who one year earlier was baking cakes to welcome black neighbors, underwent profound changes after several black students assaulted her son near the Lewenberg and after witnessing assaults on her elderly neighbors. Bernstein, who refused to stop frequenting Blue Hill Avenue, chose a Louisville slugger for protection on her shopping forays. In a period of several months, the "welcome wagon lady" had earned a new nickname, the "bat lady."

Mixed Irish and Jewish areas on the southern end of Mattapan, which technically were not within the B-BURG line, also began to show signs of serious destabilization by 1969. Realtors consistently refused to show the areas' ranch-style homes to black clients, prompting an angry but ultimately ineffective memo from Mayor White to the B-BURG chairmen.

The area's largest synagogue, Temple Beth Hillel, was led by Rabbi Gerald Zelermyer, a top graduate of the Jewish Theological Seminary. Zelermyer believed and sermonized that Jews still had a future within Boston's city limits and worked with black and white clergy on neighborhood stabilization efforts.

During the last week of June 1969, Zelermyer returned to his Mattapan home after an interfaith breakfast discussion about the means to further peaceful integration. A short time later, he answered his doorbell to find two black adolescents on his doorstep. They shoved a note at him which called for him "to lead the Jewish racists out of Mattapan." The rabbi recalls a flash of light and a searing pain around his eyes. According to the physician who later treated Zelermyer, the youths had thrown acid directly in the rabbi's face.

The next morning, Zelermyer, whose injuries were not permanent, met with key board members to reiterate his decision not to abandon the area. The board members explained to him that, without his knowledge, the synagogue had already entered into a purchase and sale agreement with the city of Boston months before. Board members vowed that they would not allow Temple Beth Hillel, like Mishkan Tefila, to be made a symbolic gift to the black community. The news of Beth Hillel's sale prompted similar moves by temple boards both inside and outside the B-BURG line. With each new announcement of the intended closure of a Jewish institution, for-sale signs sprouted like poisoned mushrooms throughout the community.

Throughout 1969 and early into 1970, a committee of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies sat in deliberation on the crisis in Mattapan and Dorchester. Strident voices were directed at the federation leaders by angry residents who believed that liberals in the suburbs were incapable of understanding urban problems. Further, Mattapan's Jews voiced growing contempt for the bonhomie perceived to be emanating from civil rights coalitions of prominent black and Jewish leaders at a time when elderly Jewish residents were afraid to walk their streets. In addition, Jewish communal organizations were under increasing suspicion from blacks who were purging their national organizations of liberal Jewish officials and supporters. They perceived federation efforts to stabilize the neighborhood as a disguised

attempt to block black homeownership and community control.

In the summer of 1970, federation officials decided it was time to act and converted a suite of dentist offices on Blue Hill Avenue into a multipurpose community center. By then, fewer than 7,500 Jews were living in the area.

Relying almost exclusively on the services of social workers rather than community organizers, the intent and function of the center soon took shape. With the exception of funds for the posting of security guards in front of the few remaining synagogues, no efforts were made to shore up remaining institutions or to confront, at the political level, the ravages caused by blockbusters and bank officers. Instead, the center served as a relocation clearinghouse for the remaining Jews in the area. Federation officials, with the aid of Jewish landlords, developed a list of vacant houses in other, safer areas of the city. Social workers would accompany elderly Mattapan Jews to view the new apartments in unfamiliar neighborhoods. Concurrently, with the aid of HUD, the Jewish community began to erect Jewish housing for the elderly miles away in the Brighton district of the city.

During the critical years 1965–1969, the federation could neither find its way to allocate any significant funds nor use any of its political influence to stabilize Mattapan and Dorchester. Not only was a historic opportunity for a well-planned integration effort missed, but the groundwork was set for intense mistrust of mainstream Jewish leadership by lower and middle-class Jews, which still exists today. It was only later, when faced with the calamitous toll of muggings, arson, and several murders, that the Combined Jewish Philanthropies spared no expense in the relocation effort. A Jewish community had by then been largely dispersed. By 1972 fewer than 2,500 Jews would remain in Dorchester and Mattapan.

Painful Lessons

This saga of the area's residents failed, in large measure, to capture the attention of Boston's newspapers and political leaders. In the nation's capital, however, the situation in Mattapan was coming to be seen as the dark side of the Great Society. It was only in the Senate antitrust hearings, however, that the depth of the problem finally came to view.

Black and Jewish witnesses alike assailed B-BURG from their individual points of view. For blacks, the program had merely extended the geographic boundaries of the black ghetto and prevented blacks from buying homes in sought-after suburban locations. "Every local, state and federal housing agency knew about the discriminatory line set up by the B-BURG coalition, but no affirmative action was taken and the black community was afraid to jeopardize the only opportunity it had to purchase homes under the FHA program," testified Sadelle Sacks, former executive director of Fair Housing, Inc.

Janice Bernstein, the "bat lady," also testified about her years of dealing with blockbusters and street hoodlums. "We would never have moved out of this community if it could have been successfully integrated but we were pressured," she testified. "[The neighborhood] held some wonderful memories for us but it became a nightmare."

Also testifying was Joseph Bacheller, former chairman of the Suffolk Franklin Bank, one of B-BURG's major contributors. Bacheller, for the most part, seemed incredulous that a Senate subcommittee was challenging the B-BURG line. "We cannot really see that there is any need to argue the necessity of our having a line somewhere," he stated. Ultimately, the warnings about discriminatory lines went unheeded by bankers who were wholly unimpressed with Senator Hart's admonition about "what could destroy us as a people." B-BURG's authors smugly justified the decision to funnel blacks into Jewish Mattapan and Dorchester, even when confronted by blacks and Jews who lost their homes and communities through foreclosures or blockbusting.

With the exception of the revocation of the licenses of several real estate agents, there was little accountability following the Hart hearings. In subsequent years, Blue Hill Avenue and its environs continued to deteriorate and most businesses boarded up their buildings, earning the thoroughfare the sobriquet "Plywood Avenue." The Jewish community of Greater Boston, without a vital center as exists in other important cities, still lags behind on many touchstones of Jewish concern, such as per capita federation giving.

Twenty years later, it is difficult to invoke the subject of black-Jewish relations without reference to the two great visionaries, Martin Luther King and Abraham Joshua Heschel. Yet many Jews and blacks cannot share in the romantic memories of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. In many cases, they are the same individuals who cannot share in the economic rebirth of the American city.

It is not the voices of great spiritual leaders that they recall. It is, instead, the voices of blockbusters who called with veiled threats at midnight; the voices of loan officers telling applicants where one could and could not live; the voices of angry and violent youths and bitter and bigoted elderly.

For many of us, the 1960s was a period of personal growth and searing light. For others, more perhaps than we imagined, it was a time of Stygian darkness. □

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In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s much of that tradition was in retreat—a casualty of the cold war, McCarthyism, and the negative reaction that many Jewish intellectuals had to the agenda and style of the social movements of the 1960s. Many influential Jewish intellectuals moved to the right. Others simply abandoned politics, withdrawing into the comforts of a more specialized intellectual life built around narrow academic disciplines.

Public intellectual life suffered a decline, dominated increasingly in the 70s and 80s by cold warriors and apologists for inequality and corporate greed. The organized Jewish world suffered also—without its left intellectuals it appeared increasingly conservative, materialistic, and conformist, and many young Jews turned away, finding little to sustain a commitment.

In the 1980s there has been a growing recognition among many younger Jewish intellectuals that there is too much of value in the history and intellectual legacy of the Jewish people to allow it to be ceded to conservatives and conformists. A revived liberal/left tradition of American Jewish intellectuals has begun to develop. As in the past, liberal and progressive American Jewish intellectuals are concerned not just or primarily with Jewish issues, but with a wide range of concerns in American intellectual, cultural, and political life. As in the past, included are secular Jews, liberals, radicals, internationalists, cultural Jews, and many who do not in their normal intellectual life place explicit emphasis on their Jewishness. Unlike the past, when the left often insisted that Jews choose between their Jewish concerns and their loyalty to secular internationalism, today there is room for Jews who have discovered depths of insight within the Jewish tradition, Jews who have reasons to remain proudly Jewish.

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